Scramble for the Congo: anatomy of an ugly war by INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)
SCRAMBLE FOR THE CONGO
ANATOMY OF AN UGLY WAR
20 December 2000




DRC: MONUC Deployment ............................................................................. i
DRC: Deployment of Other Forces ................................................................ ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................... iii
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 1
II. THE STALEMATE ON THE CONVENTIONAL FRONTLINES .................... 2
A. The Equateur Front ............................................................................. 4
B. The Kasai and Katanga Fronts............................................................. 6
C. Rwanda and Uganda Also Come to Blows........................................... 8
D. Conclusion to the Military Situation.................................................. 10
III. THE MANAGEMENT OF CHAOS: THE REBEL WAR EFFORT AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES ................................................................................ 11
A. The Breakdown of the Rwandan-Ugandan Alliance.......................... 11
B. Rwanda and Burundi’s Unfinished Civil Wars, and Local conflicts in
the Kivus ........................................................................................... 11
1. The Rwandan Patriotic Army versus ALiR ........................................... 11
2. The Burundian Armed Forces versus the FDD/FNL .............................. 18
3. The Failure of the RCD...................................................................... 21
4. Fragmentation and Warlordism in the Kivus........................................ 23
5. Scenarios......................................................................................... 26
C. Uganda: Back to the Military Solution?............................................. 29
1. The Security Motives for the War....................................................... 30
2. The Army Goes into Business ............................................................ 31
3. The UPDF and the Bloodletting in Ituri ............................................... 32
4. Uganda’s Showpiece Rebel Movement: Wamba and the RCD-ML ......... 33
5. Jean-Pierre Bemba and the MLC: A Winning Formula?......................... 36
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 39
IV. LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA: IN POWER BY DEFAULT......................... 40
A. Kabila Inc.: The Absence of Regime Building.................................... 41
1. Political Control Compensates a Fragile Legitimacy.............................. 42
2. Personal Rule in the Extreme............................................................. 47
B. Kabila and Co.: Angola, Zimbabwe, and Others ................................ 54
1. Angola: The Godfather...................................................................... 54
2. Zimbabwe: Trapped in the Congo...................................................... 60
3. The Other Allies: Mercenaries and Mineral Buyers............................... 65
V. AN INSUFFICIENT RESPONSE TO A LEADERLESS PROCESS............. 66
A. Humanitarian Tragedy is Underway in the DRC................................ 66
1. Massive Displacement and Food Crisis................................................ 66
2. Lack of Donor Commitment............................................................... 68
3. An Urgent Necessity to Create Incentives for Peace ............................ 69
B. The Failures of Lusaka....................................................................... 70
1. Belligerents Made into Peace Keepers: The Story of the JMC ............... 70
2. MONUC: Mission Impossible? ............................................................ 72
2. The Failure of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue....................................... 79
C. Revising or Reviving Lusaka?............................................................ 82
1. The Belligerent’s Views ..................................................................... 82
2. The International Position ................................................................. 83
3. The New Focus on Disengagement: Saving MONUC and Saving the
SADC? ............................................................................................. 84
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 85
APPENDICES
A. Abbreviations, Names and Places
B. Chronology of the War in DRC
C. The Balance of Conventional Military Forces
D. Who’s Who in the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC)
E. Who’s Who Among Interahamwe Military Commanders
F. Maps: DRC Infrastructure and the Kivus
G. About the International Crisis Group
H. ICG Reports and Briefing Papers


























































































K I V U
K I V U
S U D -
N O R D -




B A N D U N D U
S H A B A 
(KATANGA)
E Q U A T E U R
P R O V I N C E 
O R I E N T A L E
K A S A I
K A S A I
O R I E N T A L




















































































   Lac
Mai-Ndombe
   Lake
Edward
   Lake
Mweru































































0 100      200 mi









 25°  30°






Map No. 4007 Rev. 6    UNITED NATIONS
April 2000
Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on 
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations.
Approximate Deployment of Forces in the DRC (Source: IRIN)
SCRAMBLE FOR THE CONGO
ANATOMY OF AN UGLY WAR
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed eighteen months ago to stop the war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has proved hollow. The accord largely froze the
armies in their positions, but did not stop the fighting. The mandated United Nations
observers, who were to oversee the disengagement of forces, have remained unable to
deploy for the most part due to the continuation of hostilities. Similarly, the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue, that was to have brought a ‘new political dispensation’ to the
Congo, appears stillborn.
Faced with this impasse in the peace process, the Congo has begun to fragment.
Throughout the country a humanitarian catastrophe is underway. The fighting has
already cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and an estimated additional two
million Congolese have been displaced as a result. The violence has also
encouraged ethnic militarism to grow, and the east of the country has already been
transformed into a patchwork of warlords’ fiefdoms.  The territorial integrity of the
Congo is threatened, as will in time be the stability of its nine neighbours if the
chaos continues.
The failure of the Lusaka Ceasefire has been due to an absence of leadership. The
agreement depended entirely upon the cooperation of the parties to succeed.
Tragically, none of the signatories fulfilled what they had pledged. Each suspected the
others of a double game, and used its suspicions to justify its own duplicity. Since the
belligerents themselves were the ones responsible for policing the agreement, and
since there was no external guarantor to compel their compliance, the agreement
quickly became empty.
Today it remains only as a reference document, at hand for when the belligerents
come to realize that they have no other options. At present this is not yet the case.
All are determined to persist with their military adventurism precisely because they
have so far failed to accomplish their war objectives. They all need to recoup
something for the investment of blood and treasure they so foolishly squandered in
the Congo. They all want to win, despite the fact that winning is no longer possible.
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Rwanda and Uganda’s second war in the Congo has seriously endangered their own
stability. The lightning strike they unleashed in August 1998 to overthrow Kabila has
since become of a war of occupation, and risks becoming an unsustainable war of
attrition. Energies and funds that each need to spend on economic development
have been redirected towards their growing defence budgets. And, under the
weight of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Eastern DRC, and the repeated clashes
between their forces in Kisangani, the reputations of Rwanda and Uganda’s leaders
have plummeted.
The war has been no better for Kabila’s allies. The DRC President’s adamant refusal
to accept MONUC’s deployment, and preference for sharing the country rather than
sharing power, has trapped Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe in the Congo.
Now the Harare strongman has little room left to manoeuvre, unwilling to risk a
unilateral and undignified withdrawal because of the internal economic and political
unrest at home. Angola, on the other hand, has escaped paying the costs of its
intervention so far. Its apparent success has tempted President Dos Santos to
assert himself as a regional power-broker for West-Central Africa. He supports
Kabila because he cannot permit the appearance of a strong and independent
leader in Kinshasa. An imminent change in the military situation, however, is likely
to call into question the success of this DRC policy, and reveal the limits of Angola’s
power. In power because there seems to be no other options, Kabila is only a ruler
by default.
The inadequate policies of the international community have contributed to this
ongoing fragmentation of the Congo. Determined to stop the fighting, the world
powers pressured the belligerents to sign the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. The
document fitted especially well with the United States’ preference for  ‘African
solutions for an African problem’. The limits of this policy have now become clear. At
present none of the belligerents has the power to escape the Congolese quagmire
without help. ICG therefore recommends a stronger and more determined
involvement of the world powers to revive the Lusaka peace process, ultimately
restore the territorial sovereignty of the DRC and achieve regional security.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
General
1. Pass a resolution to reconcile Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000) with the
Lusaka ceasefire agreement, that de-links the disengagement and withdrawal of
foreign forces, the disarmament of armed groups, and the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue from one another, in order to permit each to achieve the maximum
forward progress.
On Dialogue
2. Promote negotiations on power sharing and transition between the main players
(Government/rebels/civil society): the Community of Sant Egidio and Belgian
government would be the ideal facilitators.
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3. Give greater moral, financial, and logistical support to the facilitator for the
Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, including the appointment of a
francophone ‘co-mediator’ based in Kinshasa, and force Kabila and the rebels to
permit him to conduct consultations throughout the DRC.
On Disengagement
4. Support the Maputo Process and the implementation of the Kampala
disengagement plan as a first step to a phased withdrawal.
5. Pressure all countries involved in the war, and especially the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to provide a secure environment in which
additional MONUC MILOBS can be immediately deployed along the frontlines, as
recommended by resolution 1332 (2000).
On Disarmament
6. Create an international structure, headed by a high level personality, to find
solutions for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the
armed groups. This body would consult with the region, and the armed groups,
in order to formulate a robust and realistic plan for DDR.
7. Pressure Kabila to allow the Burundian FDD to join their country’s on-going
Peace Process.
8. Pressure the countries at war in the DRC to invest more of their energies in
domestic political reconciliation efforts, that in the end offer the only means to
convince the rebel fighters to return home.
On Peace-building
9. Design a ‘new humanitarian framework’ to tackle the complex emergency
unfolding in the DRC that follows the recommendations of the JMC resolution
adopted in Lusaka in early December. This can be accomplished by establishing
a separate humanitarian operations office under a UN Director for Congo
Humanitarian Operations responsible for the formulation and co-ordination of a
strategy for relief operations in both rebel and government territories.
10. Pressure Uganda and Rwanda to give compensation for the destruction of
Kisangani as called for in Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000).
TO THE DONOR COUNTRIES
11. Link the foreign belligerents’ commitment to the DRC peace process – together
with their illegal exploitation of the nation’s wealth - to scrutiny of their domestic
economic performance and record of ‘good governance’ in order to assess their
qualification for financial aid, debt relief and trade agreements.
12. Pressure SADC countries to compel Kabila to comply with the implementation of
the Lusaka agreement. Means to accomplish this include restricting the quantity
of fuel the DRC imports, and limiting the amount of SADC military support his
regime receives.
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TO THE FOREIGN WARRING PARTIES
13. Recognize that the Lusaka process offers the only way out of the DRC quagmire,
with all parties being involved in systematic negotiations as opposed to military
endgames or ad hoc, back-room contacts.
14. Provide MONUC MILOBS with the minimum guarantees needed to deploy in the
field, especially so that the unarmed UN observers can work unhindered.
15. Restore support to the JMC, by calling regular monthly Political Committee
meetings, pushing for further deployment of teams in the field and implementing
the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan.
16. Assist Masire’s office to prepare for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by providing
access to all parties and DRC territory.
17. Step up sincere domestic reconciliation efforts to end political or ethnic rivalries
that have spilled over into the DRC and drawn them into an ever-widening
conflict.
Nairobi/Brussels, 20 December 2000
APPENDIX D
SCRAMBLE FOR THE CONGO
ANATOMY OF AN UGLY WAR
I. INTRODUCTION
In July and August 1999, six Heads of State and over fifty rebels leaders signed a
ceasefire in Lusaka, Zambia, to end the fighting in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) – Africa’s first continental scale war. Tragically, the fighting never
stopped.
The war is said to be a Congolese civil war between DRC President Laurent-Desiré
Kabila and a rabble of different rebel movements. In fact, it is also chaotic mix of
other peoples’ wars, which together have overtaken the remnants of the country its
disgraced and defeated former ruler, Mobutu Sese Seko, left behind when he fled in
1996. At one level it is a conflict between two regional alliances – a ‘Great Lakes’
alliance of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, versus one of Angola, Zimbabwe, and
Namibia. On another level, it is a violent mixture of national civil wars, including
those of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Angola, all of which are partly fought on
Congolese soil. Finally, in the midst of this chaos, the Congo’s own stew of local
ethnic feuds has sparked an explosion of bloodshed in the eastern part of the
country. All of these conflicts feed and reinforce one another, and together risk to
transform the Congo into a patchwork of warlord’s fiefdoms.
The Lusaka agreement outlined both military and political measures to bring peace
to the Congo. Unfortunately it was never a very realistic document. It called for the
deployment of ‘an appropriate’ UN Chapter VII peacekeeping force to help
implement the ceasefire, as well as track down and disarm militias, and screen
them for war criminals. For the interim period prior to the UN deployment however,
the Agreement assigned the belligerents themselves with the task of policing the
disengagement of forces. This was to be done under the auspices of a Joint Military
Commission (JMC), composed of two representatives from each signatory and a
neutral OAU-appointed chairman, that reported to a Political Committee made up of
the the combatants’ Foreign and Defence Ministers.
On the political front the Lusaka Agreement envisioned a National Dialogue that
would deliver ‘a new political dispensation’ to the Congo. The aims of this Dialogue
would include the organisation of democratic elections, the formation of a new
national army and the re-establishment of state administration throughout the
country. President Kabila, the two factions of the rebel Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Démocratie (RCD), the rebel Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC),
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unarmed opposition groups, and civil society groups all would participate as equals
under the aegis of a neutral, OAU appointed Facilitator.
This agreement was never implemented. At first it was undermined by the
belligerents’ own non-compliance with its terms. Now it may have become
impossible for them to carry out what they promised, due to their mutual distrust
for one another, as well as their ill-concealed desires to pilfer the Congo’s riches.
Nevertheless, the principles of Lusaka remain as a reference for how the country
might be put back together, should the resolve to do so be found.
The destruction of the war has surpassed the expectations of all the belligerents.
What they all thought would be a rapid contest has become a bloody and expensive
stalemate. Moreover, the alliances with which they began the war, have either
collapsed in bloody in-fighting, or have withered away as a result of foreign
reluctance to fight the Congolese’s own battles. As a result no one has the power to
win the war. The current impasse however, will not last. Each country faces the risk
of defeat due to the Congo war’s corrosive effects upon state institutions (such as
disciplined standing armies) and national economies. In addition each faces the
ever-present threat of bad luck on the battlefield.
In December 2000 it appears that fortune favours Rwanda and Uganda. Since
August the Kampala backed MLC have threatened the key Congo River town of
Mbandaka - and by extension Kinshasa four days down river. The Rwandans and
their RCD allies have just decisively repulsed a Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)
offensive in Katanga, and have captured the important border town of Pweto. Good
fortune in war however, breeds over-confidence and risk taking. Both Uganda, and
Rwanda, may believe that they can overcome the stalemate, and win a military
victory in the Congo. Desperate to salvage success from the stalemate, they may
accept this gamble – and suffer defeat as a consequence.
Similarly, Kabila’s defeats make him look weak at present. This does not mean
however that his allies will accept his – and their defeat. Common interests between
them and Kabila have grown-up in the more than two years of war. As a
consequence, they have incentives to stand by the government in Kinshasa.
In this report, ICG gives a comprehensive analysis of the intertwined dimensions of
the Congo conflict and offers some concrete proposals on how to revive a
meaningful peace process.
II. THE STALEMATE ON THE CONVENTIONAL FRONTLINES
Eighteen months after the Lusaka Agreement, there is still no end in sight to the
war. The fighting mixes three different kinds of conflict. Along the frontline a largely
conventional war is fought between the foreign armies and their Congolese allies.
Elsewhere the national wars of DRC’s neighbours are fought out on Congolese soil.
And finally, under the destructive influence of the violence, pre-existing tensions
between different Congolese communities have erupted in horrific bouts of ethnic
bloodletting.
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The military background to Lusaka
At the time of the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire, Kabila was faced with the threat
of imminent military defeat. Government FAC and allied troops had failed to make
headway against the rebels and their Rwandan and Ugandan patrons. Heavier than
normal rains in early 1999 slowed the movement of the FAC and its allies. On the
other hand, the lighter Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) pushed on with its slow
westward advance.
In the midst of the Lusaka talks, the situation turned critical for Kabila and his
government. On 15 June 1999, RPA forces crossed the Sankuru River and captured
the Kasai Oriental town of Lusambo.1 The river formed the last natural obstacle in
front of province’s diamond-rich capital of Mbuji Mayi. The overwhelmed FAC
defenders fled, leaving behind their Zimbabwean and Namibian allies.2 The RPA
pressed on towards Kananga.3 By early July they had enlarged their bridgehead with
the capture of the towns of Pania-Mutuombo and Dimbelenge, 75 km short of Mbuji
Mayi.
In the east other RPA units simultaneously advanced from the direction of the north
Katanga town of Kabalo. Heavy fighting was reported in Eshimba, east of Kabinda
on May 22.4 A week later the RPA had reached Kabinda, some 120 km to the east of
Mbuji-Mayi. “The noose is obviously tightening,” reported Radio France
Internationale.5  Kabila was under serious pressure and appeared on the verge of
losing the war had a ceasefire not been reached.
The strategic importance of Mbuji Mayi cannot be overstated. The Kasais form the
geographical heart of the DRC. Unlike the impenetrable jungles and swamps that lie
to Kinshasa’s northeast, the route from the Kasais to the capital is relatively clear of
natural obstacles. Moreover the mineral revenues from Kasai diamonds are a critical
source of finance for the war. If Mbuji Mayi were to fall, the government would be
deprived of these funds and lose its land links to Katanga, also rich in minerals. In
the words of RPA Deputy Chief of Staff James Kabarebe: "If Kananga, Mbuji Mayi
and Kabinda are taken, then Kinshasa will fall."6 Under immense international
pressure the Rwandans eventually agreed to stop their military advance and sign a
ceasefire.7
The military situation since Lusaka
Today the war grinds on as the combatants jockey for positions of tactical
advantage along the 2,400 kilometre ‘conventional’ frontline. This battle line is
rarely discernible. No country’s army is very large, and the combatant forces are
dwarfed by the Congo’s vast size and remoteness. Troops are clustered in
strongholds built around logistical assets such as ports, airfields and the few
                                        
1 Ferdinand Bigumandondera, ‘Lusambo Under Rebel Control’, PANA (16 June 1999).
2 Sam Kiley, ‘Kabila At Risk in All Out Battle for Gem Fields’, The Times (18 June 1999).
3 ‘Kabila’s Last Throw’, Africa Confidential, (8 July 1999).
4 ‘Kigali Accused of Violating Ceasefire’ New Vision (2 June 1999).
5 Ghislaine Dupon, ‘Fighting reported in south - North Korean troops reportedly arrive’, Radio
France Internationale, Paris, in French 1230 gmt 29 June 99, as monitored by the BBC.
6 ICG Interview, Col James Kabarebe, RPA Deputy Chief of Staff (11 August 2000).
7 See ICG Africa Report N° 18, The Agreement on a Ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of
Congo: An Analyses of the Agreement and the Prospects for Peace’, 20 August 1999.
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passable roads. Attacks are only possible after long marches through jungle or
savannah. Soldiers are generally cut off from regular supply lines and are forced to




 What they bring to the war effort
AliR (Interahamwe
and ex-FAR)
30,000-40,000 Seen as determined fighters. They are divided between
the conventional frontline, and the Eastern Kivus region.
Angola 2,000 - 2,500 The Army is poorly disciplined, but heavily equipped.
Troops in the DRC are ‘second echelon’ quality.
Nevertheless their air power is a decisive advantage
despite poor equipment maintenance.
Burundi 2,000 Thought to be adequate tactically at the small unit level.





45,000 - 55,000 Even the ‘elite’ troops have proved to be unreliable in
battle. This number includes Interahamwe and FDD




16,000 Burundian rebels who have come to fight in the service
of Kabila. Their forces are split between the Congo and




6,500 – 9,000 Troops of various quality and origin. They enjoy the
advantage of Bemba’s complete control over the
movement.
Namibia 1,600 – 2,000 Infantry, some artillery. Generally of little importance to
the overall conflict.
RCD-Goma 17,000 – 20,000 Unreliable in battle. Many deserted from the FAC when
the rebellion broke out, and have little loyalty to the
rebel cause.
RCD-ML 2,500 Divided by internal feuds, and little able to assist Uganda
with the war effort against Kabila.
Rwanda 17,000 – 25,000 Troops are respected for their determination. The force
however has little firepower, and remains something of a
guerrilla army.
Uganda 10,000 Greater firepower than the RPA, but troops are less
reliable.
Zimbabwe 11,000 Viewed as a well-equipped and professional military.
However their performance in combat to date has been
poor.
 (See Appendix C for complete conventional order of battle data)
Since the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, these forces have clashed on
every front. In Equateur, the forces of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC have crept
westwards in the face of repeated FAC counter-offensives. On the central Kasai
front, the Rwandans have skirmished with their opponents to tighten their grip
around Mbuji Mayi. On the southern Katanga front, the FAC and its allies have
repeatedly sought to break through to Lake Tanganyika, and the Kivus. Elsewhere
less conventional forms of fighting have occurred. In the Eastern province of Kivu,
Kinshasa’s agents have encouraged resistance to the RPA and have sought to
threaten Rwandan territory itself. Armed with Kabila’s assistance as a result, the
Interahamwe grew stronger. Also benefiting were the more traditional Congolese
‘Mai Mai’ militias that have proliferated in the region since the Lusaka agreement.
A. The Equateur Front
The MLC of Jean-Pierre Bemba has grown from a motley collection of 154 fighters in
December 1998 to a force of over 6,000 that controls most of Equateur province.
With staunch UPDF support, these troops have advanced to threaten the key town
of Mbandaka on the Congo River.
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Located at the mouth of the Ruki River and its navigable system of tributaries, the
town’s fall threatens to force a collapse of FAC and allied forces across the whole of
the north of the country. Moreover, if captured intact, the town’s ferries and airfield
would serve as a springboard for an advance on Kinshasa, only a few day’s travel by
boat downriver.
To counter this threat, Kinshasa has launched two major offensives into Equateur
along the Ubangui River since the Lusaka Agreement. The first lasted from mid-
October to mid-December 1999, and made little progress.8 The second opened in
May 2000 and was at first more successful. By early August 2000 FAC forces had
advanced almost 200 km northwards. But then disaster struck; on 9 August the MLC
sank a ferry carrying hundreds of troops and overwhelmed Kabila’s elite 10th
Brigade. FAC resistance crumbled and with the support of UPDF artillery, by early
October Bemba recaptured all the ground he had previously lost.
Energized by these victories, Bemba threatened to march on Kinshasa. In the West
Equateur town of Gemena, on 1 October 2000, before a crowd of several thousand
supporters celebrating the second anniversary of the MLC’s foundation, Bemba said,
“(Kabila) understands only the language of war and I will give it to him.”9 He
warned that the first step towards this would be an attack on Mbandaka. “We have
the capacity to enter this town and tomorrow you will hear that Mbandaka has
fallen and the MLC has entered the town,” he told the crowd. In response they
shouted, “Mbandaka must fall.”10
Bemba’s success has allowed Kampala to reconsider pursuing a military solution for
the DRC war. At the time of writing MLC forces are on the move towards Mbandaka.
UPDF Commanders are said to be considering what would be required for an
advance on Kinshasa.11 But this manoeuvre would be militarily impossible in the
face of the resistance of Angolan forces. The terrain between Mbandaka and
Kinshasa is heavily forested and marshy, and an advance by river would be highly
vulnerable to observation and attack from the air.
                                        
8 Despite the signature of Jean-Pierre Bemba on the Lusaka Agreement his MLC forces continued
to threaten Mbandaka. The Kinshasa paper Le Potentiel reported in December that the MLC was
advancing towards Mbandaka from along the Lulonga River from the East, and along the
Ubangui River from the North. Bemba told reporters however that Kabila was responsible for the
fighting. Specifically, he claimed that the FAC had amassed 15 battalions of 15,000 troops in
Northern Congo, and had launched more than 40 attacks against his positions since the
beginning of November. Later when FAC forces captured the river port of Nkonya in mid
December Bemba told journalists that the attack was " part of a general offensive which has
been going on since October 15". In addition he claimed that Kinshasa was reinforcing their
force in Mbandaka with troops and equipment, and said that they had sent one naval battalion
up the Congo River to attack rebel positions. Fighting in the region persisted into January near
the towns of Mobambo, Ngalangba, Gwanlangu, Poto, Imese, and Libanda. See ‘Paper Says
Rebels Attacking on Three Fronts’, Le Potentiel, Kinshasa, in French (8 December99), as
monitored by the BBC (11 December1999); Todd Pitman, ‘Congo Fighting rages, UN Team
Arrives in Rebel Town’, Reuters (27 November1999); Chris Simpson, ‘DRC Belligerents Urged to
End War’, The Post of Zambia (17 December 1999); Todd Pitman, ‘ Rebels Claim 120 Prisoners
in new Congo Fighting’, Reuters (2 December1999).
9 Emmy Allio, ‘Bemba Plans Assault’, New Vision, Kampala (2 October 2000).
10 Todd Pitman, ‘Congo Rebel Threatens to Strike Towards Capital’, Reuters (1 October 2000).
11 ‘Great Lakes Update’, IRIN (4 October 2000).
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B. The Kasai and Katanga Fronts
At the moment of the Lusaka ceasefire, the RPA was poised to take the strategically
critical city of Mbuji Mayi. Since then this advantage has slipped away from the
Rwandans. The FAC used the time secured by the agreement to rearm and re-
organize the defense of the town assisted by its Zimbabwean, Angolan, and
Namibian allies. Meanwhile the RPA has had to overcome the daunting logistic and
command obstacles required to maintain an army in the field, stretched from
southern Equateur to the Zambian frontier, and to respond to the worsening
insurgency in the Kivus and the sudden outbreak of hostilities with Uganda.
Since the ceasefire therefore the strategic balance has continued to change. Feeling
militarily strong, Kabila has been more and more tempted to repudiate the
agreement. Afraid of losing the military superiority it held at Lusaka, the RPA has
felt increasingly compelled to take pre-emptive action to safeguard its advantage.
Without progress on the diplomatic front, this situation has been a sure recipe for a
very tenuous ceasefire.
An early flashpoint was the town of Ikela in Southern Equateur, where Rwandan
and its allied RCD rebels had encircled several thousand Zimbabwean, Namibian and
FAC troops. In late November 1999 a relief force attempted to break through,
supported by air and river gunboats, from Bukungu 64 km to the northwest. “There
was a massive attack by Kabila with three boats, four helicopters and many, many
Antonov bombers” rebel RCD-Goma spokesman Kin Kiey Mulumba told journalists.
“Our troops had to retreat.”12 For its part the Government of Zimbabwe confirmed
the story, saying that rebel attempts to cut off food supplies had necessitated the
attack’s launch. Ultimately the offensive failed to relieve the town and its garrison.
Press reports quoting Rwandan and rebel sources claimed a deal had been made
between Kigali and Harare, in which Bukungu would be returned to Rwandan and
RCD control in return for their letting in food supplies. Embarrassed, Zimbabwe
angrily denied the story. Nevertheless fighting died down around the town until the
following year.
Fighting around Ikela resumed in February 2000 when a combined force of
Zimbabwean, Namibian and Congolese troops was reported to have relieved the
siege.13 But then when significant FAC troop movements were reported in the
region that summer, observers again believed that government forces were seeking
to counter an RPA/RCD attempt to cut the town’s supply lines.14 The recent
demilitarisation of Kisangani following clashes between the RPA and UPDF however,
led UN officials in the region to speculate that the fighting may have been due to a
FAC attempt to take Kisangani by advancing towards Opala on the Lomani River.15
If taken, the FAC forces would have been poised to retake Kisangani, either by land
or via Yangambi and the Congo River. Rumours of battalion-scale RCD troop losses
around Ikela fuelled these suspicions at the time. Top RCD Armée Nationale
Congolaise (ANC) Commanders denied these stories, claiming that they originated in
the desertion of only a handful of Katangan soldiers on the Ikela front.16 Other
                                        
12 Todd Pitman, ‘Congo Conflict Re-Ignites, Fighting Spreads’, Reuters (4 December1999).
13 United Nations Security Council. ‘Second Report of the Secretary-general on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (18 April 2000), para. 30.
14 ‘UN Condems MLC Threat Against MONUC’, IRIN (21 July 2000).
15 ICG Interview, Kisangani (5 August 2000).
16 Interview with Commandant Bob Ngoy, Kisangani (4 August 2000).
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sources alleged that some seventy soldiers had deserted because of the persistent
failure of the RCD to keep them supplied.17
In March heavy fighting erupted in Kasai Occidental. A Rwandan offensive
ostensibly launched in response to FAC provocations, captured Idumbe, Mashala,
and Demba. In the east Kabinda was also reportedly attacked.18  These advances
brought the RPA and RCD to within several kilometres of the Katanga railroad that
connects Kinshasa with the southern province via the Kasai River port of Ilebo.19 If
cut, the capital would be separated from the mineral-rich Kasais and Katanga,
whose profits have financed Kabila’s war effort. Aware of the danger, the FAC and
Zimbabwean Army counter-attacked on the Katanga-Kivu frontier, along a line
between Kabalo and Kongolo.20
The FAC and allied forces have been more active on this southern front where they
benefit logistically from the proximity of the Zambian frontier at Ndola, and can
receive air support from the airbase at Kamina.21 The Rwandans face greater logistic
difficulties, and must either fly in all the supplies they need, or bring them in by
barge and rail to Kabalo, from where they must be flown or carried to units
elsewhere on the front.
Heavy fighting occurred in the summer 2000 in Northern Katanga between Kabalo
and Nyunzu. Rwandan leaders denied that these attacks represented a serious
threat, but UN observers believed that they might have been an attempt by FAC
forces to open a corridor to Lake Tanganyika.22 Whichever the case, the RPA
reportedly rushed in at least two battalions by boat and air to Kalemie.23 Rwandan
Presidential Envoy to the Great Lakes, Patrick Mazimpaka, also told journalists that
there had been an upsurge in the fighting. “There is fighting, there are infiltrations,
                                        
17 ICG Interview, Kisangani (30 July 2000).
18 The DRC Representative to the United Nations, Andre Mwanba Kapanga, also accused Kigali
of cooperating with the rebel Angolan movement UNITA to seize Luisa, 200 km to the south.
‘Serious Fighting Reported on Eastern Front’, IRIN, (22 Mar 2000).
19ANC Commander and RCD-Goma First Vice President Jean-Pierre Ondekane explained the
offensive’s justification. “Comme il n’avait pas une armée solide, il a dû signer d’abord, préparer
une armée par recrutement ensuite et lancer enfin une offensive. Les accords de Lusaka lui sont
apparus comme du chiffon. C’était pour lui un temps de repli lui permettant d’organiser son
armée par recrutement des jeunes gens et par rééquipement en armes et avions. Laurent Kabila
a essayé de nous attaquer du côté de Gandajika où il a essuyé des échecs. Il a pu nous prendre
Bukungu et Kela que nous contrôlions avant les accords. Qu’allions-nous faire ? Continuer à
observer que l’ennemi nous massacre ? Nous avons lancé une riposte foudroyante du coté du
Kasaï Occidental. Nous avons repris les localités d’Idumbe et de Dekesse. A toute action doit
correspondre une réaction.  Nous avons ouvert tous les fronts parce que Kabila a déchiré les
accords de Lusaka’, Interview with Jean-Pierre Ondekane by Nicaise Kibel’ Bel Oka, Les Coulisses
no. 79, Goma (April 2000).
20“Rebels Capture Strategic Town’, IRIN, (15 Mar 2000); ‘Serious Fighting Reported on eastern
Front’, IRIN (22 March 22); ‘Zimbabwe/Congo-Kinshasha- A Military Trap’, Africa Confidential (28
April 2000).
21 Kamina also serves as the coalition’s main operational headquarters.
22 An attack towards Nyunzu was reported to have taken place on 4 July 2000 in the vicinity of
Ankoro. It may have been carried out by the 3rd, 101th, and 106th ALIR Brigades, which were
reported to have detached themselves from the FAC forces in Katanga, Pweto and Lubumbashi
for redeployment in the Kivus. They also admitted that a large concentration of Interahamwe
had gathered at Pweto, from where they were expected to seek to break into southern Kivu. ICG
Interview, RPA Officer, Kigali (July 2000).
23 ‘Burundi News Agency Reports Ferrying of Tutsi Battalions to Southeastern DRCongo’ Azania
(6 August 2000) Bujumbura, in French 1715 gmt (6 August 2000) as monitored by the BBC.
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there is shelling. It’s an organized offensive. The whole front has been
reactivated.”24
FAC attacks resumed in mid-October when they seized Pepa, and repeatedly
bombed Kalemie and Moba.25 RCD officials claimed that the attacking aircraft used
Tanzanian airspace to approach their targets.26 Press reports from Rwanda noted
that the offensive was carried out by a combined force including one Interahamwe
militia brigade, two Burundian Forces pour La Défense de la Démocratie (FDD)
brigades, two FAC brigades, supported by Zimbabwean artillery and mechanized
units.27 Western diplomats with access to satellite intelligence confirmed that
Zimbabwean artillery at least participated in the attacks. By 10 November, Kigali
claimed to have recaptured Pepa after two days of intense fighting. The RPA and
their Congolese allies then pushed forwards towards Pweto, which they captured on
4 December 2000.
The fall of Pweto came after heavy fighting, that sparked the flight of thousands of
civilians and FAC soldiers (some 300 of which were reportedly Zimbabwean) into
neighbouring Zambia. 28 RPA officers told journalists that the FAC losses in weapons,
munitions and other materiel were “enormous”.29 Many of the casualties were
reportedly Burundian FDD rebels, allied to Kabila, while much of the captured
weaponry was Zimbabwean. Kinshasa termed the loss of the town a ‘tactical
withdrawal’ made because the 8 April 2000 Kampala Disengagement Plan
guaranteed the town would be returned ‘without a fight’.30 The loss of the town
came only days before a meeting in Harare where the belligerents pledged – again
– to comply with the Kampala Plan with effect from 15 December. Suddenly seized
with confidence that their enemies are on the verge of breaking however, Rwandan
sources raised the possibility of further military offenses.
C. Rwanda and Uganda Also Come to Blows
Another setback for Rwanda was the collapse of its alliance with Uganda in the
three confrontations for the diamond-rich city of Kisangani.31 This partnership had
formed the bedrock of Kigali’s security strategy since the 1994 overthrow of the
Habyarimana regime in Rwanda. But the events in the town were also bad for
Uganda. Although it maintained control of most diamond producing regions, the
                                        
24 ‘War resumes in DR Congo’, Reuters, printed in the Monitor, Kampala (3 August 2000). In his
September report to the Security Council, Kofi Annan confirms that there has been a number of
attacks in the region, but said that MONUC had not been able to verify the accuracy of the
reports. See United Nations. Security Council. ‘Fourth Report of the Secretary-general on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, (21 September
2000) para. 26.
25 The FAC reportedly also seized other areas in Katanga including Kantoula, Kasaika, Musa,
Balanmga, Mututo-Moja, Kyeruzi and Murungusha. See ‘Rebel RCD Group Claims it has
Recaptured Pepa’, PANA (12 November 2000).
26 ‘Attaques Aériennes sur Kalémie’, PANA (2 December 2000).
27 ‘Rwandan Army, DR Congo Rebels Recapture Eastern Town’, Radio Rwanda, Kigali, in English
1915 gmt (10 November 2000), as monitored by the BBC.
28 Stella Mapenzauswa, ‘African Defence Chiefs Sign Deal on Congo Withdrawal’, Reuters (6
December 2000). ‘Runaway DRC Soldiers held in Zambian prison’, IRIN, (15 November 2000).
29 ‘Intense Fighting in Southeast Ahead of signing of Withdrawal Pact’ AFP (4 December 2000).
30 ‘Congo Governmentt Calls Loss of Town “Tactical Retreat”, Reuters (6 December 2000).
31 For a more in depth look at the origins of t his Fighting See ICG Report ‘Uganda And Rwanda:
Friends Or Enemies?’, (4 May 2000); ‘Report Of The UPDF/RPA Joint Inquiry Into The Incidents
Between 6 and 17 August 1999 in Kisangani, DRC’, (17 August 1999).
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UPDF was defeated by the RPA in the city itself. At the same time the outbreak of
the fighting severely tarnished Uganda’s reputation in the eyes of the international
community.
Fighting between the RPA and UPDF first broke out on the 7 August 1999 over an
attempt by the Ugandan-supported RCD dissident Professor Ernest Wamba dia
Wamba to hold a political rally. Renewed violence broke out on 14 August, followed
by three days of clashes in which the two armies battled for the airport, the central
bank and the major road junctions.  By 17 August, when Rwanda and Uganda
agreed on a temporary ceasefire, the fighting had caused 600 casualties and had
forced much of the city’s population to flee into the jungle. When the Joint
Commission of Inquiry established by the two countries placed the blame largely on
the shoulders of the UPDF, the government of Uganda refused to accept the
verdict.32
Fighting between the two armies broke out again on 5 May 2000. At dawn the city’s
residents awoke to the sounds of artillery and gunfire that kept up throughout the
day, and forced the inhabitants to remain cowering in their homes. Later, it was
determined that some 250 shells had fallen on the town, killing scores of civilians,
and injuring approximately 150 others. An RCD-Goma statement, signed by then
Second Vice-President Moise Nyarugabo, accused the Ugandan army of trying to
secure the town of Kisangani for Wamba’s rival "minority faction". In response,
Uganda's National Political Commissar James Wapakhabulo said that Rwanda had
deployed additional troops to the city, and had without provocation attacked UPDF
troops at Simi Simi Airport.33
Alarmed by the violence, the international community deployed a team of UN
military observers to Kisangani on 12 May to broker a demilitarisation of the city.34
Ten days later, a plan of demilitarisation of Kisangani had been agreed between the
UPDF and RPA commanders. By 4 June, the UPDF had moved all their forces, other
than a single company left at Bangboka airport in line with the agreement, to Camp
Kapalata North of the city. Then at 8:00 AM the next morning, a UPDF liaison
vehicle on the Bangboka road was involved in a mysterious accident. The Ugandans
claim it was a Rwandan ambush that killed the vehicle’s two occupants. MONUC
says that a military observer who arrived at the scene minutes afterwards saw the
car burning, but no sign of any occupants.
Approximately an hour later, heavy canon and gunfire erupted in the city, and raged
for six straight days. Tens of thousands of city residents remained trapped in their
homes without food or water, and at least 60,000 fled into the surrounding jungles.
Stray small arms fire fell in all parts of the city. Artillery units north of the Tshopo
and south of the Congo Rivers both fired over and into the city. Random shellfire
struck all residential and commercial districts. Serious damage was inflicted on the
power station, the Tshopo hydroelectric dam, the Cathedral, and one of the cities
                                        
32 ‘Report Of The UPDF/RPA Joint Inquiry’ op cit.
33 ‘"Intensive" fighting in Kisangani’, IRIN (5 May 2000); Rwanda accuses Uganda of troop build-
up on border’, IRIN (8 May 2000).
34 From the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC).
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hospitals. Worst hit were the mud dwellings of the frontline Tshopo Commune.35
Interviewed after the battle, one neighbourhood resident told a journalist that
‘around Tchopo (sic) it’s complete carnage…dogs are eating bodies in the streets. I
went to look for my brother but the house was empty, they’re all gone. Houses are
burned, houses have dead inside buried under the rubble.’36
To stop the fighting, MONUC brokered a ceasefire signed by the countries’ army
commanders that was due to start on 5 June at 4:00 PM. Despite this senior
intervention, the truce was ignored by the troops in the field. MONUC negotiated a
further nine cease-fires before the fighting finally stopped on 11 June.37
In the week after 12 June, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
collected the bodies of some 630 civilians and 140 combatants. Teams of ICRC and
RCD-Goma soldiers also spent three weeks marking and collecting unexploded
ordnance and war debris.
The battle had brought the two countries no gain. The US condemned its two
‘friends’ harshly. UN Secretary General accused them of breaking promises to stop
what he termed ‘an outrage’, and recommended a harsh Security Council response.
This came with the passage of Resolution 1304 on 16 June 2000, which called for
the withdrawal of the two armies from the DRC without further delay – in apparent
contradiction to the Lusaka agreement, which had emphasized the simultaneous
withdrawal of all foreign armies – and called for Rwanda and Uganda to pay
reparations to the victims of their feud.
D. Conclusion to the Military Situation
In December 2000 the MLC and UPDF are at the gates of Mbandaka, and may be
able to take the town if they choose. What would be gained by such an attack
remains unclear. First, they would have decisively repudiated Lusaka. Second, from
Mbandaka, the MLC would threaten Kinshasa, but a further advance on the capital
would be impossible without the acquiescence of Angola. Discussions between
Uganda and Angola have been underway over the course of the autumn. So far
however, the result of these talks have not justified the risk of taking the town.
On the Kasai front, the advantage of being so close to Mbuji Mayi has slipped away
from the RPA. Kigali is hard-pressed to find the troops needed to capture the city.
In the intervening period Zimbabwean, Interahamwe, and FAC forces have built up
its defences. The defenders may also benefit from air support based at near-by
Kamina. To overcome these obstacles, a substantial logistical build-up would be
required, placing further strain on Rwanda’s supply lines. This would be difficult
given the increasingly troubled state of the Kivus, and the near certainty of a FAC
counterattack elsewhere along the frontline similar to that of October 2000.
The war today is in a state of tenuous stalemate. None of the actors have the power
to achieve a decisive victory; each risk to suffer a decisive defeat. This ever-present
threat makes all the combatants dangerously dependent on their uncertain allies.
                                        
35 MONUC says that weapons used by the rival sides in the city included 120 MM and 81 MM
mortars, multi-barrelled katyushas, field artillery, 12.7 MM 'Dushka' heavy machine guns, RPG-7,
recoilless rifles and possibly two tanks.
36 Todd Pitman, ‘ Rwanda Pulls Out of Congo City, Fighting Abates’, Reuters (11 June 2000).
37 ICG Interview, Lt Col Khalid, MONUC Sector Commander, Kisangani (23 July 2000).
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These alliances are not solid enough to sustain long-term endeavours however, and
the belligerent’s real power to direct the course of the war is little. Meanwhile the
conflict impacts the foreign powers’ own home fronts, where they must overcome
the social and economic costs of their military adventurism. They are all determined
to recoup something for the blood and treasure they have invested in the Congo.
They are all determined not to lose the war; they have all already lost.
III. THE MANAGEMENT OF CHAOS: THE REBEL WAR EFFORT AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
A. The Breakdown of the Rwandan-Ugandan Alliance
The worst blow to the rebel cause was the Rwandan-Ugandan infighting in
Kisangani. It revealed to the world that the rebel alliance was a myth, created to
conceal the projects of Kampala and Kigali. The illegal exploitation of DRC’s
resources was similarly exposed. Even more important however, was the damage to
the Rwandan and Ugandan war efforts. The three Kisangani clashes have left a
residue of distrust between the two one-time allies, who henceforth will unavoidably
remain a threat to one another.
When the Congolese rebels signed Lusaka they and their supporters were militarily
strong but politically divided. These tensions first burst into the open in August 1999
during the first clash between the RPA and UPDF in Kisangani. Lusaka offered
Rwanda and Uganda the opportunity to save some of what they had invested in the
war and to preserve the advantage they had won on the battlefield before events
turned against them. The agreement also offered both the means to continue
working towards their objectives. For Rwanda this was the destruction of the
Interahamwe and the fall of Kabila from power. For Uganda it was the pursuit of the
rebel Allied Democratic Front (ADF), the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and the
desire to influence events in the DRC. Burundi was not a signatory to the
agreement.
The divisions between these former allies contributed to the failure of the Lusaka
ceasefire. Kabila’s self-interested obstruction was in large part made possible by the
rebel’s own divisions. Simply put the Kisangani fighting destroyed whatever
credibility the RCD had to be an alternative to Kabila. In addition the military
advantage they had enjoyed as a consequence of the Rwandan-Ugandan alliance
disappeared when the two became rivals. Rather than comply with the terms of the
Lusaka, Kabila would henceforth attempt to exploit the differences between the two
former allies.
B. Rwanda and Burundi’s Unfinished Civil Wars, and Local conflicts in the
Kivus
1. The Rwandan Patriotic Army versus ALiR38
At the heart of the two wars in the Congo is the unfinished ten-year old
Rwandan civil war. The conflict that began with the 1990 assault of the
predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic front (RPF) against the regime of the
                                        
38 Armée de Libération du Rwanda.
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Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana, reached a bloody climax in the 1994
genocide and subsequent RPF conquest of the country. After their defeat, the
forces of the former regime fled to Eastern Congo, from where they continued
their war against the newly installed Tutsi-dominated regime. In 1996, Rwanda
intervened in the DRC in an attempt to secure final victory in its war against
forces of the former Hutu government, which were retraining and re-arming in
refugee camps along the two countries’ border.
Rwanda’s first invasion of the Congo made Kabila president of the country. The
Hutu exiles were scattered by the war, and tens of thousands of ex-FAR,
Interahamwe and many innocent civilians lost their lives in the fighting.
Nevertheless the new ruler of the Congo soon turned against his former
benefactors, and even made use of the same Interahamwe and ex-FAR
responsible for the 1994 genocide.39 These opponents of the Kigali regime found
sanctuary in the vast, virtually ungoverned Kivus from where they waged a
campaign to destabilize the country and topple the dominant Tutsi regime in
Kigali.40 Faced with a growing insurgency in their own Northwest at the
beginning of 1998, and the apparent support of the Kabila regime for their long
time enemies, Rwanda decided to attempt a second invasion of its giant
neighbour in the summer of 1998.
The RPA’s spectacular victory over Mobutu Sese Seko two years previously, and
its intimate familiarity with the dysfunctional Kabila regime convinced it that it
would be easily defeated. Consequently, the RPA struck rapidly at the towns of
Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, when the war broke out on 2 August 1998, before
launching a spectacular trans-continental air assault against Kitona and Kinshasa
itself. What Kigali had not anticipated however, was that Angola (its former ally
in the 1996 war) would dispatch 7,000 Forcas Armadas Angolanas (FAA) troops
to defend Kabila.41 Surrounded, the RPA troops involved in the operation,
together with the Banyamulenge FAC units that had joined them in Bas-Congo,
fought their way to safety in Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA)-controlled Northeast Angola, from where they returned by air to
Rwanda.
After this failure, RPA strategy reverted to a more conventional advance across
the country. Kisangani, the DRC’s third largest city, fell to the RPA and their RCD
proxies on 23 August 1998. In the south, the lakeside towns of Fizi, Baraka,
Kalemie and Moba all fell by the end of the year. These were soon followed by
the Katangan cities of Kabalo, and Kabila’s hometown of Manono, in early 1999.
On the central front, the Rwandans and the Congolese rebels pressed forward to
capture the strategic town of Kindu on the upper reaches of the River
Congo/Lualaba. By July, when international pressure compelled Rwanda to
agree to sign the Lusaka Cease-fire, the front reached as far as Katanga
                                        
39 According the Rwandan intelligence, Kabila had begun supporting ex-FAR and Interahamwe
from September 1997. These militia forces had assembled in Masisi and Congo's Virunga's
National Park, and had infiltrated Rwanda's adjoining Parc des Volcans. Before the second DRC
war, these guerilla forces were firmly established in the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi regions bordering
DRC and were attacking the rural areas around Gitarama.

40 See African Rights, ‘Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest’ (London, September 1999.)
41 Rwanda believed that it had received Angola’s blessings to overthrow Kabila. The delegation
that they sent to Luanda however, failed to meet with Dos Santos personally.
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province and Kasai provinces. Angered by the pressure to sign, Kigali
nevertheless acquiesced because it believed that, for all intents and purposes, it
had already won the war.
But since then, the RPA has failed to topple Kabila and to destroy or even
weaken the Interahamwe. Now more than two years later, Kigali finds itself
occupying a territory many times its own size, inhabited by an increasingly
rebellious population. Meanwhile, its erstwhile RCD allies have proven
themselves to be politically incapable, as well as prone to human rights abuses
that on top of the RPA’s own actions have irreparably tarnished Kigali’s
international image.
Rwanda’s war effort meanwhile, has exacerbated the anti-Tutsi feeling already
present in tense and violent eastern DRC. The country is evolving towards a
dangerous political and territorial fragmentation, where a new breed of ethnic
warlords risks to replace the more traditional structures of authority. No military
solution by itself is likely to be able to stop this ominous evolution towards
chaos.
a. Who are the Interahamwe42
The former ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias that fought for Habyarimana were
routed and driven into exile in July 1994. Although they have been ceaselessly
chased by the RPA since then, they have always managed to escape and
reorganise.
Despite the deployment of thousands of RPA and RCD-Goma troops in DRC, the
Hutu militiamen have only grown stronger. Guerrilla prisoners seized by the RPA
relate that their morale remains high.43 Continued recruitment has augmented
their ranks with youths who may not have played any role in the genocide,
together with Congolese Hutus44. Their numbers have increased through regular
infiltration of additional recruits from Katanga, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo-
Brazzaville, Gabon, and the Central African Republic. They also benefit from the
logistical support of the Kinshasa government delivered either by air to locations
in the DRC, or by boat from Tanzania.
Today the Interahamwe and ex-FAR are known as the Armée de Libération du
Rwanda (ALiR), and can be found both in Kabila’s conventional army and in the
Kivus. Kigali believes that they comprise some 15-20 per cent of Kabila’s better
frontline soldiers. A senior ANC commander estimates their forces deployed on
the frontline at 14,800 and that these fighters are on all fronts, particularly near
Mbuji Mayi.45 The Rwandans accuse Kabila and his Zimbabwean allies of
recruiting in the Hutu refugee camps in Zambia and Tanzania and of running
ALiR training camps in Lubumbashi and Kamina.
                                        
42 This information is based on ICG field interviews with Congolese, RPA and ANC officers, UN
officials and international humanitarian agencies, Goma (July-August 2000).
43 ICG Interview Lance Corporal Joseph Bizimana, ALiR, Sake DRC (July-August 2000).
44 ICG Interviews RPA officers, Humanitarian sources, Goma, (July-August 2000).
45 ICG Interview, Commandant Bob Ngoy, Kisangani (4 July 2000).
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Other forces are conducting a hit-and-run guerrilla war in the Kivus, where apart
from frequent ambushes, attacks have struck deep into the urban centres of
Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira. RPA intelligence believes there are two Interahamwe
divisions in the Kivus numbering some 15,000. This compares with estimates
from 1999, which ranged from 3,000 to 5,000.46 These numbers are likely to
increase, for even Rwandan intelligence sources admit that the ALiR is recruiting
from among Congolese Hutus. Other reports indicate the infiltration of an
additional three ALiR brigades into South Kivu during July.47
Ex-FAR Commander General Augustin Bizimungu is widely reported to have his
base in Lubumbashi. Force operational headquarters for the Kivus is thought to
be near Shabunda. In North Kivu alone the Rwandans believe that there are
three brigades operating out of the forests of Walikale and the volcanic Virunga
National Park. Located on the Lukweti-Mutongo axis is the ‘Limpopo’ Brigade
commanded by Col Mwalimu. The ‘Lilongwe’ Brigade is based to the south,
around Katoyi. And the ‘Niamey’ Brigade moves around Rutshuru. Each Brigade
is reported to have three battalions that typically operate independently but
which can combine for large-scale attacks.
The ALiR exhibit a high degree of military organization. Forces are grouped into
permanent divisions, brigades, battalions, companies and platoons. They wear
uniforms, maintain a formal rank structure, and for an insurgent army are well
equipped with small arms and radio communications.
Larger formations possess limited numbers of heavier support weapons. Military
sources say that each battalion has two 60mm mortars; each brigade two 12.7
anti-aircraft machineguns that are frequently used against troops. In addition
each company is reported to have five rocket-propelled grenade launchers and
five crew-manned machine guns. Their communications equipment includes
limited quantities of hand-held Motorolas and man pack VHF radios.48
The reports of the local populace indicate that they lack vehicles and regular
supplies. They also suffer from perennial shortages of ammunition, food, radio
and flashlight batteries and medicines. For such items they depend on raiding
local populations. They loot village pharmacies and set ambushes along roads on
market days. What they seize in these attacks can either be carried back to their
bases in the forest, or resold. In fact, ALiR fighters frequently attend village
markets to sell stolen goods and purchase supplies. Otherwise they live off of
the yams that grow along the forests’ edge in places that were formerly
cultivated.
Since at least January 2000, the Interahamwe and some Mai Mai forces have
reportedly been receiving supplies from Kabila via air.49 The RPA subsequently
occupied all but two drop sites, which are still used by the guerrillas.
                                        
46ICG Interview, International Goma-based humanitarian source, Nairobi (30 September 2000).
47 The Brigades are the ALiR 3, 101, and 106.
48 ICG Interviews, RPA Officers and Kigali-based diplomatic sources, (Goma and Kigali, July-
August 2000).
49 In an 11 August 2000 ICG interview, RPA Deputy Chief of Staff Col James Kabarebe said such
drops had occurred at Kasese, Katshungu, Lungungu, Lulingo, Shabunda, Kilembwe (near
Kimano II north of Kalemie), and Lulimba. ALiR prisoner Lance Corporal Joseph Bizimana,
described one such operation to ICG Interview, Sake DRC (21 July 2000).
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Coordinated by satellite telephone, these operations can be quite sophisticated.
Independent sources confirm that in one instance in early 2000, a combined
force of ALiR and Mai Mai seized and held the airstrip at Lulingo, near Shabunda
long enough to land five cargo aircraft flights.50 Senior officials in RCD-Goma
allege that many of these flights originate in Western Tanzania.
ALiR infiltration into Rwanda has been on the increase during 2000. Their
objective is apparently to demonstrate the inability of the RPA to protect its own
national territory. For instance, the ALIR launched a bold three-hour attack
against Ruhengeri on 1 August.51 This in turn pressures the Kigali government to
concentrate its overstretched forces closer to its own borders.
b. The Rwandan Counter-Insurgency Effort
The Rwandans regard the ex-FAR and Interahamwe as savage criminals with
whom there can be no compromise. They remain determined to neutralize them
and destroy the threat they pose. RPA Lieutenant Colonel Alex Ibambasi, a
Brigade Commander in Gisenyi explained to ICG: "These are people that have
committed suicide [by committing genocide]. They cannot come back. They are
determined to do wrong things until their deaths."
RPA forces have increased military pressure on the ALiR by striking their jungle
bases and training camps. They suffered a temporary setback in June, when the
insurgents used the third bout of Kisangani fighting between Rwanda and
Ugandan troops to attack RPA positions in Kibarizo, Nyabyondo, Pinga, Gichanga
and the Masisi Zone headquarters. But according to the RPA, the back of the
offensive was swiftly broken.  The most important Rwandan victory occurred
when the RPA intercepted the ALIR Limpopo Brigade after it had attacked RPA
Masisi headquarters. Over the course of the two battles, the RPA claimed to
have killed 200 and captured 70 rifles while suffering only five wounded.52 This
could not be checked independently, but the RPA claimed that the Interahamwe
were dispersed deep into the forest, away from food sources on the cultivated
fringe, where they would sicken and starve.
In the face of spiralling guerrilla war, the RPA has become concerned with the
hostility of the Congolese population, and has launched a ‘hearts and minds’
campaign aimed at rehabilitating its image.53 Like many conventional armies
before them, RPA officers believe that they are winning the guerrilla war in the
Kivus. They claim to have ‘pacified’ Masisi and Rutshuru, and to have virtually
halted all cross-border infiltration into Rwanda. They also believe that they enjoy
the support of the Hutu and Tutsi Banyarwanda – or people of Rwanda who
                                        
50 ICG Interview, RPA officers and humanitarian sources, Goma (26 July 2000).
51 ICG Interviews, Goma, (August 2000); ICG Interview Lt Col Alex Ibambasi, Goma (16 August
2000); Rwandan intelligence sources report that they enter by three prefectures: Cyangugu,
Kibuye, and Gisenyi. Those who infiltrate into Cyangugu come down from Walungu, Kaziba,
Nyangezi, and in the moyen plateau of Rubalika, the plain of Rusizi, and the collectivity of
Bafulero. Those that infiltrate in Kibuye come from Ziralo, Numbi, Bunyakiri Kahuzibiega Forrest
and pass through lake Kivu. Those that infiltrate in to Gisenyi come down from the Masizi
Mountains.
52 Humanitarian sources in Goma confirm that an attack against Masisi Zone Headquarters
occurred in June in which approximately 60 Interahamwe died.
53 ICG Interviews, RPA Officers, Goma, (July-August 2000).
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immigrated to the Congo in multiple waves since the 19th century - as
manifested by their participation in local defence forces.
Rwanda has sought to recruit the Congolese Hutus and organise them in local
defence forces with the argument that there exists a common interest in peace
for all the Banyarwanda. Early on during the RPA occupation, ‘promising’
individuals were transported to Rwanda for several months of political-military
indoctrination.54 Once the training completed, these students returned to their
homes where they were tasked to spread anti-Interahamwe propaganda.55
Similar three-month political-military courses are now conducted in the DRC for
local defence forces.
When the RPA sets out to pacify a region, it begins by occupying it militarily.
Then it makes contact with all the local authorities (such as chefs de quartier,
Mwamis and priests) in order to mobilise support for the formation of a local
defence force training camp. Other than medicine and instructors, the local
population must supply everything, including food and students. At one point
earlier this year in North Kivu, there were six training camps in operation
simultaneously. In North Kivu alone the RCD claims to have 10,000 local defence
forces members. In South Kivu these camps have reportedly been organised in
Kiziba, Kavumu, Katana, and Kalemie.56
The RPA also feels that it has made progress in combating the threat of a
cohesive alliance between the ALiR and the native Congolese Mai Mai militias57.
While they are seen as militarily insignificant, the Mai Mai’s native legitimacy
threatens Rwanda’s efforts to isolate its opponents from the local populations.
The RPA claims that many Congolese have come to understand that the ALiR are
the true enemy due to the fact that these guerrillas have laid waste the land. A
prime example they cite is the case of the Hutu Banyarwanda 'Mongole
Combatants'. Originally created to defend the Banyarwanda from expulsion from
the Congo, the Mongole viewed the Interahamwe and ex-FAR as allies in 1994.
Since the excessive brutality of the ALiR has caused tensions to grow between
the two groups, according to the RPA, more than a thousand have changed
sides. Similar approaches have been made to the Bunyakiri Mai Mai leader Padiri
Karendo Bulenda in mid 2000, in which the two forces collaborated in an attack
against Interahamwe near Bukavu.
Another element of the Rwandan counter-insurgency strategy is to promote the
return of Hutu refugees from the DRC to Rwanda. Primarily, these are Hutus
who fled Rwanda in 1994, and who constitute a natural support base for the
ALiR. In North Kivu the prime agent behind this is the local non-governmental
organization Tous pour la Paix et le Développement (TPD). In existence since
October 1998, this group sends agents into regions inhabited by the Rwandan
refugees in order to ‘sensitise the population’ and organize their return.58 In
                                        
54 Such individuals have included students, teachers, and government functionaries.
55 ICG Interviews, Kisangani (July 2000), Uvira (August 2000).
56 ICG Interviews, RPA officer, Goma (July 2000), Uvira, RCD administrative official (August
2000); ‘Goma Rebel Force Trains 105 New Recruits in Katanga Province’, RTNC radio, Goma, in
French 0500 gmt (21 October 2000), as monitored by the BBC. Amnesty International, ‘Killing
Human Decency’, (31 May 2000) 37.
57 See section below on Fragmentation in the Kivus.
58 ICG Interview with Alexis Makabuza, TPD Founder, Goma (16 August 2000).
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South Kivu it is the RPA that does this work. Already, they have repatriated tens
of thousands of Hutus to Rwanda.
This strategy also includes the return of the Congolese Tutsis to the DRC, who
fled their homes during the 1996 Masisi war to seek refuge in Rwanda. Since
1999, there have been some 10,000 resettled in Masisi near the relatively safe
town of Mashiki. Far more controversial is the clandestine effort by the TPD to
resettle Tutsi refugees in Kirolirwe (30 km north of Sake) on the border of the
Virunga Park, which UNHCR says to be too unsafe to allow the return of
refugees. Rwanda denies that it supports this, but it is hard to believe that the
transportation of more than a thousand people across the border and through
Goma by night could happen without the permission of Kigali. Nevertheless only
once when a truck broke down in town did the city’s population discover the
operation – when they nearly attacked petrified Tutsi passengers.
A variety of motives might explain this policy. UN observers suspect that it is
propelled by the need for more local defence forces, and maybe to justify RPA
presence in the Congo with the need to protect the Tutsi populations. RPA
officers angrily deny this and claim to be better qualified to judge whether the
Virunga Park is safe. Finally, many of TPD’s backers come from powerful
landowning Congolese and Banyarwanda families, who have an interest in
keeping their land settled.
Other motives may be rooted in Rwandan political-military strategy. Positioning
a population of armed, loyal Tutsis along the Western edge of the Virunga Park
may be an effort to block the infiltration of Interahamwe towards the Rwandan
frontier. If this population helps to cement support for the RPA from the other
inhabitants of the region, as is outlined in the Kigali’s political strategy of
fashioning a common Banyarwandan front for peace, then Interahamwe access
to the park will be cut off. However, this strategy exposes the returned refugees
to attacks by armed groups.
c. The Results on the Ground
Predictably, the RPA is claiming to ‘see the light at the end of the tunnel’ in the
Kivus. The reality is very different. Traditional authority in the Kivus has
collapsed in the chaos brought on by the war. The increasingly anti-Tutsi Church
and civil society have gained influence in the urban areas, while in the
countryside the equally prejudiced militia leaders have come to the fore. This
makes it difficult for the RPA to find reliable allies who can ensure the stability of
the Kivus. Despite its military strength in the region, the RPA cannot even
control areas along major roads that lie within 30 km of its frontier.
Take for example the case of Kichanga, a village next to the Virunga Park some
60 kilometres north of Goma (close to Kilolirwe) that the RPA claims to have
pacified. The RPA, RCD-Goma, and its own local defence forces defend the
town. But the reality for the villagers is that they have suffered attacks at least
seven times since the beginning of the year (30 December 1999; 31 January
2000; 8 May 2000; 19 June 2000; 19 July 2000; 20 July 2000; 7 August 2000).59
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Who is responsible for these attacks is often unclear. In the view of a local
village leader who describes himself as a Mai Mai and claims to be in contact
with the Interahamwe, the attacks may be the work of the Rwandans in
collaboration with Hutu extremists. He believes this because of the failure of the
RPA to defend the village, despite the written warnings that often precede the
attacks. The ALiR is present in the region, however, as revealed by a series of
late July attacks. But their identities are equally muddled. For example, a
Congolese prisoner taken in one of these attacks met someone from his village
among the gunmen, who told him that there were “many” local Hutus with the
Interahamwe.
At about the same time, the limits of the RPA’s grip on the border town of Goma
were revealed by a dramatic increase in Interahamwe activity.60 On July 25
a cyclist on the 20-kilometre Goma-Sake road came across a large group of
Interahamwe crossing from south to north (he reported 2,500). That week the
ALiR occupied a near-by Seminary at Buhima, and robbed motorists on the road
for three days straight (25-27), killing four people. Men abducted that
week claimed to have seen three thousand gunmen in a camp eight hours walk
into Virunga Park. In Goma meanwhile the numbers of troops increased
substantially. Congolese troops at the airport were even disarmed, while the RPA
established positions in the surrounding hills. Then on July 30th, a reported 3,000
Interahamwe attacked Rubagabo near Rutshuru, before apparently heading to
strike the Rwandan town of Ruhengeri on the night of 1 August.61
2. The Burundian Armed Forces versus the FDD/FNL62
Spillover from the Burundian civil war has also contributed to the chaos in the
DRC. Soon after the outbreak of the second war, the Burundian army deployed
along on the DRC side of Lake Tanganyika, in order to guarantee the safety of
its borders. The Government of Major Pierre Buyoya had feared that Kabila
would offer the rebels bases, from which to wage their war in Burundi. But then
as the FAC failed to make headway in its own war, and his allies grew more
wary of shedding their soldiers’ blood, ties between the Burundi rebellion and
the Kabila government deepened. In return for Kinshasa’s support, the Conseil
National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de la Defence de la
Démocratie (CNDD-FDD of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye agreed to assist Kabila
in his war. Now they have become virtual mercenaries to Kinshasa. The
importance of their contribution to the DRC president’s war effort moreover
means that Kabila cannot permit them to sign a peace deal with the Burundi
government. Trapped in the Congo by their own greed and ambition, Burundi’s
most important rebel group now wages Kabila’s war as much as its own.
a. Burundi’s Civil War
Burundi’s civil war dates back to the 1993 assassination of its first Hutu
President Melchior Ndadaye, by extremist Tutsi army officers determined not to
lose their grip on power. Overnight the country descended into a bloody chaos,
in which as many as 50,000 people lost their lives in fighting between the two
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62 Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie/ Front de Libération Nationale.
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ethnic groups, and in the security clampdown that followed.
The most important Burundian rebel group, the CNDD was first created in the
aftermath of Ndadaye’s assassination. Léonard Nyangoma, a founding member
of Ndadaye’s FRODEBU party, refused to accept power sharing deal with those
who had killed the President and denied the legitimacy of the 1993 election
results. To re-establish the institutions of 1993, he launched the rebel CNDD
movement in April 1994. His leadership was contested four years later by his
cousin Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, who split the movement and took over its
armed wing, known as the FDD.
The FDD is currently headquartered in the Katangan capital of Lubumbashi.
Troops are recruited in the refugee camps of Tanzania, and are trained and
organised in the Congo from where they launch their attacks against south-
western Burundi in the regions of Rutana, Makamba, Bururi and Southern
Bujumbura Rural. Today, the movement probably numbers about 16,000. The
Nyangoma faction has also kept some military units, and launches attacks from
the DRC into the northern Burundian province of Bubanza.
Another active rebel movement is the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) that
was created in 1992 from the historic Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu
(PALIPEHUTU) movement, launched at the end of the seventies after the
extermination of Hutu elites by the Tutsi led regime of Colonel Michel Micombero
in 1972. Like the FDD, the FNL has since split from its political wing due to
difference within the movement over their relationship with the legal FRODEBU
party.
The FNL mainly operate in the region of Bujumbura Rural, and frequently
infiltrate from the Rusizi Plain on the DRC side of the border. The movement at
one point also included many ex-FAR.63 The FNL stronghold in Burundi is the
region surrounding the capital, where 1,000-2,000 fighters are based. These
forces are also well entrenched on the Congolese side of the border in the Rusizi
plain, and have on occasion cooperated with Congolese Mai Mai.
b. Why Burundi is in the DRC
Congolese territory had been a base for the Burundian rebellion until 1996,
when the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire
(AFDL) backed by Rwanda and the Burundi army attacked FDD camps and
forced the rebels to flee to Tanzania.
After the AFDL war, few Burundian troops remained in the Congo to protect the
country’s commercial interests. Burundi at that time was under a regional trade
embargo imposed in the aftermath of the July 1996 coup that brought Buyoya to
power. Because the DRC government never observed the regionally imposed
sanctions, Burundi’s trade with the outside world passed through the Congo.
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This commerce was made doubly important by the on-going civil war in the
country. Clinging to power in the face of a raging rebellion, the Government
depended upon this route to import weapons, munitions, and gasoline.
When the second war broke out the government of Burundi closed its embassy
in Kinshasa and deployed approximately a thousand troops to Kalemie, on the
Congolese shore of Lake Tanganyika. President Buyoya was not happy with this
course of events because the DRC government had permitted him to use its
territory to by-pass the restrictions of the embargo. Consequently he wanted the
deployment – which has never been officially acknowledged - to remain discreet.
Government officials in Bujumbura however, were prepared to let it be known
that these forces were there to prevent the rebels from establishing bases in the
Congo from which they could attack the national territory of Burundi. They were
also to protect the Lake Tanganyika trade against rebel piracy that could
threaten Burundi’s defense capability. In addition, the Burundian deployment in
South Kivu could help secure some Banyamulenge communities, under threat
from the Babembe or Bafulero Mai Mai.
At the RCD rebellion’s outset however, the Rwandans had presented Buyoya
with information that Kabila was assisting the FDD, and that many of these
fighters were even serving in the FAC. The outcome of the war in Burundi was
therefore linked to that of Congo. Soon after the war’s outbreak moreover, some
3,000 Hutu rebel fighters left the Tanzanian refugee camps to join the FDD in
the Congo in response to a recruitment campaign run by the DRC Consulate in
Kigoma. Kabila had reportedly promised the FDD weapons, uniforms and
money.64
c. The Current Situation
After two years of negotiations to end their own civil war, 19 political parties
signed a peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, on 28 August 2000. The accord
was signed under intense regional and international pressure, and orchestrated
by the peace process’ facilitator, Nelson Mandela65. The agreement nevertheless
did not include a ceasefire. Since 1998 the rebels have refused to recognize the
legitimacy of the Arusha talks, and have demanded that direct negotiations take
place between the belligerents - themselves and the government.
Far from quelling the level of violence, the peace agreement marked the start of
a resurgence of the war. Wearied by the bloodshed and rebel foot-dragging,
regional leaders issued an ultimatum in September that threatened the rebellion
with sanctions if they did not lay down their weapons. But the credibility of such
a threat is questionable. Tanzania, the only country that could restrain the
insurgents, is sympathetic to their cause and to Kabila’s. Armed and equipped by
the DRC president, and protected by Tanzania, the FDD have no interest in
joining the peace process.
In private discussions with Western visitors, moreover, Kabila has repeatedly let
it be known that he needed the Burundi rebels, and could never release them
from his service.66 For example, many of the troops employed in the October
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2000 Katanga offensive were FDD. If the Zimbabwean forces start to withdraw,
Kabila will become even more reliant upon the Burundian rebels.
The leaders of the FDD are suspected by their own troops to care little about the
liberation of Burundi. Kabila has reportedly made them into millionaires, has
permitted them to control a territory three to four times bigger than their own
country. In return, for Kabila, the FDD also bring certain advantages. First, they
are far more under his control than is the Rwandan ALIR. Second, they seem to
have a never-ending supply of new troops from the Kigoma camps in Tanzania
and are able to move easily between Tanzania, Burundi, Zambia and the DRC.
Finally, their status as ‘freedom fighters’ in the Burundi peace process
contradicts their position as ‘negative forces’ in the Lusaka agreement, and gives
Kabila greater reason to demand its revision.
The continuation of the war is not a bad option at this point for President
Buyoya. ‘Rehabilitated’ by his signature on the Arusha peace agreement, Buyoya
intends to secure his appointment as the nation’s leader during the upcoming
‘transition period’, while simultaneously retaining his military advantage on the
ground with the help of the anti-Kabila alliance. 67
3. The Failure of the RCD
When the August 1998 RPA attack on Kinshasa failed, Kigali was forced to
improvise a new strategy for a more protracted war. Its solution was to turn
back to the RCD, which was created at the conflict’s start to provide a Congolese
political face for Rwanda’s war effort. Since then the ineptitude and blatant
opportunism of these RCD leaders has provoked its widespread rejection by the
Congolese population.
The movement included an array of political viewpoints. Originally at the head of
the movement was Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba the long-time Mobutu
opponent and Dar es Salaam University. His position as leader was the result of
a compromise between other factions in the movement, as well as the support
of Museveni and the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, rather than any
strong personal following in the movement. Other tendencies included former
AFDL Banyamulenge members like Moise Nyarugabo, Bizima Karaha, and the
North Kivu-Tutsi Déogratias Bugera. A third faction was made up of former
Mobutists such as Lunda Bululu, a former prime minister under the Zairian
strongman, and an anti-Kabila Katangan.
Internal divisions plagued the RCD from the outset. The movement never
represented a coherent political program or belief. Instead, it was a coalition of
opportunistic politicians who shared little more than a common antipathy for
Kabila. This mixture was billed as a ‘consensus based movement’ that no single
individual would be able to hijack as Kabila had done with the AFDL. Instead, its
leaders immediately began to accuse each other of misusing funds, failing to
rally popular support and of falsely claiming personal credit for military
successes. In addition, differences between the movement’s Rwandan and
Ugandan supporters also spurred divisions: Those close to Kampala always
claimed to be more concerned with political mobilization of the population than
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were those backed by Kigali, who preferred to benefit from Kigali’s war machine
to reach a quick solution.
Of the founding members, the first to go was long-time opposition politician and
president of the Forces du Futur party, Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, who said the
movement had centralized too much power in the Executive Committee, and
accused it of being insufficiently representative of the anti-Kabila opposition.
Then in March 1999, opposition from within the movement prompted Wamba to
move his headquarters from Goma to Kisangani. "There is no coup d'état but
there is some malaise in Goma,” he told journalists.68 This break between RCD-
Goma and the Ugandan backed ‘RCD-Kisangani’ – later renamed RCD-
Mouvement de Liberation (RCD-ML) – was then formalized in May 1999 when
the college of founding members voted to remove Wamba as the movement’s
president, and replace him with the Katangan Emile Ilunga. Wamba disputed his
removal saying that it was a coup, and maintained that he remained the
legitimate leader of the rebel movement.
In Goma, the popularity of Illunga’s RCD faction continued to plummet. The
absence of any political program was deeply resented by the population of
Eastern Congo, as was the presence of the Banyamulenge leaders in key
security and financial positions. Also damaging was the movement’s failure to
pay state employees (as Kabila had occasionally done after May 1997) and its
soldiers, who as a result preyed off the population. This insolvency occurred
despite the proliferation of new taxes, and the outright theft of bank deposits
and water and electricity revenues.69 The population’s simmering resentment
became clear by early 2000 with a wave of church-led ‘dead city’ civil
disobedience campaigns in Bukavu and Goma. The RCD responded with the
highly unpopular move of denying the Roman Catholic Archbishop Emmanuel
Kataliko the right to return to Bukavu.70 Similar protests occurred in Kisangani
during early to mid-2000.71
RCD-Goma’s lack of legitimacy can be attributed to its failure to provide the
average Congolese with a modicum of security. Indeed, instances of RCD troops
abusing the civilians under their protection occur frequently.72 The UN Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights, Roberto Garreton, in his January report concludes
that RCD forces have retaliated to attacks “by massacring defenceless civilian
populations with machetes, knives and guns, causing thousands of victims.”73
Abuses committed by the predominately Banyamulenge troops based in the
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69 These practices were all committed by the RCD-Goma government in Kisangani. ICG
interviews, RCD-Goma Functionaries, Kisangani (July 2000).
70 Under intense international pressure the Archbishop was permitted to return on 24 September
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71 ICG interviews, Kisangani (July 2000).
72 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest’,
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region fuel the popular resentment driving the Mai Mai movement in South
Kivu.74 According to the RPA, undisciplined RCD soldiers are often responsible for
the violence in the outskirts of Goma.75
Kigali finally tired of the RCD leadership and removed Ilunga at the end of
October 2000, replacing him with former Foreign Affairs Minister Adolph
Onusumba. Also removed were his two Vice Presidents, Moise Nyarugabo and
Jean-Pierre Ondekane. To explain the change, movement spokesman Kin-Kiey
Mulumba told journalists that Ilunga had ‘recognized the mistakes of his
leadership’, which included failures in the areas of political mobilization and
communication of its message.76 Since his appointment, the new president has
apparently made efforts to change the RCD’s corrupt image.
The Rwandans created the RCD in order to provide a political justification for
their war. Likewise the Congolese politicians who signed up for the movement
sought to use Kigali’s military to capture their state. But instead of helping, the
two hurt one another. Kigali’s transparent effort to conceal its bellicosity behind
the rebel movement undermined its own credibility. As its creator, moreover,
Rwanda found itself responsible for its ally’s brutality.77 The rebels did no better
however. They were never able to mobilise support because they were
immediately labelled as Kigali’s puppets. Even worse, when they seemed to be
at the verge of victory in mid-1999, the Rwandans abandoned their cause and
forced them to sign the Lusaka cease-fire.
4. Fragmentation and Warlordism in the Kivus
Society in Eastern DRC has been suffering from the effects of years of war and
neglect by the international community. Successive conflicts have impoverished
the population, by driving them from their farmsteads and robbing them of their
livestock. Conditions of insecurity simultaneously empowered those with
weapons, permitting them to seize the goods of the weak. A new, predatory
system of violence has emerged, in which groups seek wealth and political power
through the barrel of a gun. All this, combined with the re-emergence of ethnic
politics, has sparked an explosion of ethnic bloodletting.
a. Kabila’s Second Front
Today the rampant acts of violence committed by all sides strike down the
innocent and the guilty alike. The ideology of genocide has spread from Rwanda
to the Congo, where it has developed deep roots. “The Interahamwe made a
school for tribalism in the Congo,” one Bafulero Territorial Administrator told
ICG. “And they taught the population evil things.” 78
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A consequence of the latest war in the Congo has been a revival of the Kivu’s
longstanding tradition of rural militias known as the Mai Mai. The rationale
behind their creation has always been a mix of self defence and profit secured
from pillage and cattle rustling. Historically, these militias have also been an
expression of discontent from some of the most marginalized communities in the
region such as the Batembo and Babembe of South Kivu. Today, the
radicalisation of the urban population and the country’s economic collapse
prompts even urban youths to join these movements. “Who are the Mai Mai?
They are our children. They are the children of our houses,” explains one urban
Bafulero leader.79 They are a manifestation of the collapse in traditional and
state institutions of authority.
The Kabila government played a part in the surge of violence. As a former Mai
Mai leader himself, Kabila was familiar with the currents of rebellion that have
animated Eastern Congo since the 1960s. He evidently saw that with some small
logistical support and political encouragement from Kinshasa, a firestorm of
opposition could politically be raised in the Kivus to tax RPA resources in the DRC
and threaten a resumption of attacks on Rwanda itself. To this end, he
appointed fellow long-time Mai Mai Warrior Sylvestre Lwetcha as FAC
Commander on 3 September 1999.80 Other veteran leaders such as Padiri,
Lwengamia Dunia, and Shabani Sikatende were named FAC Commanders at the
same time. He knew also that he could make use of the presence of the
Interahamwe and the Burundian Hutu rebel FDD in the region, and encouraged
military coordination between them and the Mai Mai.
But the coalition between these local militias and the foreign forces never
become very deep-rooted. At first the Congolese were prone to sympathy for the
Rwandans, who they saw as little different from their own native Mai Mai militias.
Ties between the gunmen and the civilian populace often acted as a brake upon
violence. The Interahamwe were seen by many to simply want food, and people
to act as temporary porters. For example they have on occasion been known to
apologise to villagers for killings that they committed. Once when accused of
murder, the militiamen delivered into the hands of the local Kichanga North Kivu
authorities ‘bandits’ they said were responsible.
Over time however, the violence appears to have become more indiscriminate.
Since the end of 1999, the population has complained about the attacks by the
ALiR and lack of protection by RPA troops.81 On the night of the 9 June 2000 for
example, a force of over three hundred Interahamwe stormed into the town of
Sake, 20 km west of Goma, to loot the town’s pharmacies. In the process they
killed 34 people and razed two camps of displaced Hunde and Tembo peasants.
The RPA believe they infiltrated from Masisi to attack these 'positive elements of
the Congolese population’, in order to incite them to hate the Rwandans.’82 
The effect of this and many other such incidents is the transformation of the
Kivus into a patchwork of militia fiefdoms and local conflicts, in which the Mai
Mai are sometimes allied, and sometimes opposed to the Interahamwe. The
longstanding presence of the Rwandan Hutu militias around Bunyakiri and
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82 Interview Lt Col Alex Ibambasi, RPA BRDG Commander, Goma (16 August 2000).
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Walikale helps to explain the comparatively strong ties between the Mai Mai and
the Rwandan guerrillas in that region. Further south the conflict with the
Banyamulenge that predates the second war explains the anti-Tutsi character of
the local Mai Mai despite their differences with the Interahamwe and FDD.
b. Ethnic Hatred: The Plight of the Banyamulenge
In South Kivu this ethnic conflict centres on the question of the ethnic Tutsi
Banyamulenge, who are accused by other inhabitants of the region of being in
league with the RPF regime in Rwanda.
Tensions between native Congolese and the more recently arrived Banyarwanda
– or people of Rwanda - over land or citizenship rights have long existed in the
Kivus. Civil wars in neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi and the subsequent influx
of Hutu refugees into the Congo in 1994 transformed these local conflicts and
made them more focused against ethnic Banyarwanda Tutsis such as the
Banyamulenge of South Kivu.
Faced with the growing threat of Hutu radicalism in the DRC, the Banyamulenge
enlisted heavily in the 1996 AFDL war to oust Mobutu. When popular sentiment
turned against the movement in the aftermath of the first war, the
Banyamulenge were left even more isolated than before. Since the second war
was precipitated by a mutiny of the Banyamulenge 10th Brigade in Bukavu
against Kabila, they have become indelibly associated in the public mind with the
Rwandan occupation. This perception persists despite the widely noted
differences between Kigali and the Banyamulenge, and the lack of efforts by the
RPA to defend their Congolese ethnic cousins. Meanwhile the anti-Tutsi tenor of
public discourse in the Kivus has poisoned attempts to re-open dialogue with
neighbouring communities.
Today the Banyamulenge find themselves besieged on the Haut Plateau region
by the Mai Mai, FDD, and ALiR. Economically dependent on their access to the
market in Uvira for selling cattle and purchasing goods they themselves cannot
produce, they can only descend through the hostile Moyen Plateau with an RCD
army escort. Travel between urban centres like Bukavu and Uvira is deadly if
they happen to be stopped by anti-Tutsi militiamen. Conditions are little better in
town, where Banyamulenge risk being attacked if they stray into the wrong
neighbourhoods.
“We think that we are proceeding in the logic of genocide,” one Banyamulenge
RCD official told ICG. The sentiment is common. The Banyamulenge can no
longer travel, nor cultivate their fields, nor reach their cattle. Many villages in the
Haut Plateau have been burned and the RCD appears to be powerless to prevent
this. Since June 2000, Congolese Tutsis have been fleeing to Bujumbura. There
they now number in excess of seven hundred families. This movement
intensified in the first three weeks of August to such a degree that RCD
authorities in Goma ordered local authorities to stop the flow – which they failed
to do.
The other inhabitants of South Kivu blame the Banyamulenge for seizing upon
their association with the AFDL to rustle cattle after 1996. This violence has
continued. The people carrying out killings are both military and civilian
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Banyamulenge known as ‘guerriers’ – warriors.  Approximately 80 per cent of the
ANC 9th Brigade based in Uvira is composed of Banyamulenge, and
Banyamulenge-dominated units also control Fizi, Uvira, and Mulembe. The
Rwandans attempted to try the soldiers responsible for killings in Makobola,
there were confrontations between the RPA and ANC forces. In summary sighed
one ANC officer “we do not have a real army here.”83
People join the Mai Mai to defend their families from mistreatment at the hands
of the Banyamulenge. But when the attacks multiplied, the Mai Mai responded
with attacks of their own. Now the situation is at an impasse. “The RCD cannot
advance without resolving their problems with the Mai Mai,” warned Aroni
Kashali President of the Mutualité des Bafulero in Uvira. This means disarming
the Banyamulenge guerriers. “If they put down their arms today there will be no
vengeance” he promised. “What is happening here is the consequence of what
they [the Banyamulenge] have done. All actions have consequences. When you
do harm, it will come back upon you.”84
5. Scenarios
The pursuit after military victory holds expensive economic, political and social
costs for Rwanda. Nevertheless the FPR regime is likely to persist in the effort.
a. The Costs of the War
There are enormous costs to Rwanda’s never-ending war. The government has
reportedly resorted to extra-budgetary funding such as re-allocating teachers
salaries to pay for its defence bills.85 The IMF contested the official tallies of 4.3
per cent of GDP for defence spending in 1998. In fact estimates that account for
the revenues of semi-public companies and illegal diamond trading put the real
figure closer to 8 per cent. Evidence of the difficulty of sustaining this spending
was the appeal by the Speaker of the Parliament in November 1999 for financial
support from Rwandans living at home and abroad to fill the ‘budgetary gap’
created by the war.86
Other costs of the war effort are social and political. The all too scarce energy
required for the post genocide reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis is
squandered in the Congo. The continued ethnic overtones of the conflict
undermine the trust, upon which the country’s future rests. Moreover, its
majority Hutu population feels itself marginalised by the war mentality that grips
the country. The same is true for the Tutsi survivors of the genocide, whose
needs go unmet as a consequence of the conflict. The regime’s military priorities
prevail over those required for the give and take of politics. Opposition and
criticism are therefore not tolerated. Ultimately, as long as the war continues,
there can be no sense of common interests between Rwanda’s two ethnic
groups.
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Rwanda therefore is caught in a vicious circle. Its war against the evil that
massacred up to a million persons in 1994 cannot be won without reconciliation
at home, which in turn cannot happen while the war in the Congo continues.
More ominously, the human and material consequences of Rwanda’s military
policies have been to deepen the roots of ethnic hatred across the region. Even
some Congolese now speak openly of their desires to commit genocide against
the Tutsis. This means that they have already crossed a dangerous threshold.
b. The Military Option
Rwanda appears determined to continue its pursuit of the military solution. This
is true despite the proliferating difficulties it faces. First, Kabila enjoys the
support of Angola and Zimbabwe, and therefore could not be defeated as easily
as Mobutu. Second, the stalemated frontlines have since stretched Rwandan
forces both militarily and financially. Third, the no doubt irreversible popular
rejection of the RCD obstructs RPA efforts to enlist the Congolese population in
its war effort. Fourth, the repeated clashes with the UPDF in Kisangani has
transformed Rwanda’s neighbour and former ally into a new strategic threat
astride its immediate northern flank that will inevitably divert RPA resources from
its primary objectives.
During mid-2000, in the aftermath of the harsh Security Council Resolution 1304,
that condemned Rwanda and Uganda for their fighting in Kisangani, Kigali began
to refashion its Congo strategy. The international community’s apparent call for
the two countries’ forces to withdraw from the DRC before those of Kabila’s
allies, threatened the legitimacy of Kigali’s war against the ALiR, as secured
under the terms of the Lusaka agreement. The simultaneous unilateral rejection
of the agreement from Kabila’s government made the situation even more
worrisome. In response to these developments, Rwanda adopted a more
conciliatory attitude towards the international community that was intended to
refurbish its tarnished reputation, uphold Lusaka’s principle of disarming the
‘negative forces’, and consolidate the RPA’s military position in the DRC. This
new strategy included the early August ‘offer’ for a 200 km withdrawal from the
existing forward line of forces. The pull back from non-essential territory made
sense for an over-stretched army in the context of growing instability along the
Rwandan-DRC frontier. Rwandan diplomats moreover could take advantage of
this manoeuvre by claiming it was to provide space for the safe deployment of
MONUC peacekeeping forces. Since the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan
only required a pull back of 30 km, Kigali thus appeared to be ‘going the extra
mile’ for peace.
But in late 2000, it appeared as if Rwanda’s strategy had undergone yet another
evolution. The rise of Bemba’s MLC forces in Equateur, and their military
successes near Mbandaka, threatened to sideline Kigali and make it powerless to
manipulate events in the Congo. In response to this, there are indications that
Rwanda may be looking for ways to imitate Bemba’s winning ethnic and regional
formula to gain political and military ground for the RCD in the central Kasai
region. The recent reshuffle of the rebel movement’s leadership can be seen as
evidence of this. The new rebel President, Adolph Onusumba, is an ethnic Tetela
from the same village as nationalist hero Patrice Lumumba. Moreover, he
demonstrated an ability to garner support for the rebellion when in the position
of deputy governor of Kasai in charge of finances and administration for the
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rebel government. His appointment to the top post therefore might be an
attempt to imitate Bemba’s winning ethnic formula, and to use Lumumba’s
legacy to rally support for the RCD-Goma in the Kasais.
Rwanda was also encouraged to re-engage in the war by the continuing crises
swirling around the regime of Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe. These included
widespread price riots, an impeachment motion from the popular opposition
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and a rising level of discontent in the
president’s own ZANU-PF. A withdrawal of Zimbabwe’s 11,000 professional
troops would radically alter the balance of military power. The Mugabe regime
has already made it known that Zimbawe intends to retire from the DRC in the
‘near future’. Doubts persist about whether he personally could swallow his pride
and accept defeat. A successor however, might well want to withdraw more
quickly. With this in mind Kigali no-doubt focused on the mid-December ZANU-
PF party conference. The mutterings heard from the ranks of the President’s own
followers suggested that he was already weakened. Kigali may have speculated
that a military defeat in time for the conference could bring down the Zimbabwe
strongman, and prompt a ZNDF withdrawal from the Congo.
The existence of these opinions in Kigali revealed themselves in the aftermath of
the RPA and RCD capture of Pweto, on the Zambian frontier. In mid October
2000, Kabila launched an offensive in Katanga that aimed to open a corridor to
Lake Tanganyika. Humiliated by the apparent success of the attack, the RPA
riposted immediately, re-taking the town of Pepa, and ultimately Pweto. The
fighting is reported to have been heavy. After three days however, the FAC and
Zimbabwean defenders broke and fled, leaving behind a rich harvest of
abandoned weaponry.87
This suggests that a decisive military solution in the regional conventional war
remains an option for Kigali’s decision-makers. Their past relations with Kabila
leave them convinced that there can be no peace while the DRC President
remains in power. They are also aware of the costs of the conflict to their
reputation and economic development. Thus, in view of the current collapse of
Lusaka, and the fruitless efforts to replace it, they may well have concluded that
a military victory is the only acceptable end to the war.
Militarily the RPA has few options at present. Concerned about their international
image, they do not want to appear as the initiators of fighting. If they can have a
pretext to attack however, their options still remain slim. A resumption of the
conventional assault could aim for three alternative objectives (Mbuji Mayi,
Kinshasa, Lubumbashi) - none of which hold much promise of success. There
would be great symbolic value - for the RCD especially - in taking the capital.
Kinshasa however, is a city of millions where there has been past evidence of
strong anti-Tutsi feeling. The prospect of trying to take this city in the face of
popular resistance probably does not tempt the RPA.
A somewhat implausible alternative course of action for Rwanda would be an
attempt to destabilize Kinshasa. With Kigali’s support, one of Kabila’s rivals could
be tempted into launching a coup attempt. This might come in conjunction with
diversionary assaults on the frontline from the RPA and RCD. This scenario is
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unlikely however. It would be difficult for Kigali to find an individual willing to
hazard such a dangerous alliance. The RPA would be unable to provide sufficient
assistance to offer a credible defence against the certain resistance of at least
some elements of the FAC, the Angolans, and the anti-Rwandan Kinois.
Other objectives include Kabila’s own home province of Katanga, and the heavily
defended Mbuji Mayi. But the RPA is already over-stretched and would be hard
pressed to find the manpower necessary for either of these campaigns.
Lubumbashi is 400 km from Pweto, and were an RPA column launched it would
be dangerously vulnerable to being cut off in the southern DRC. Therefore of the
two the only realistic objective is Mbuji Mayi. The RPA is already at the gates of
the town. To capture it and its environs would place the RCD in the geographic
heart of the country, astride the region’s rich vein of diamonds. The rebel
movement moreover might find the region’s soil more fertile than the Kivus have
proved to be. Unfortunately the town’s defences would make a successful assault
very difficult. Already stretched thin in the Congo, the RPA would have to mass a
large per centage of its best troops to overcome the town’s Zimbabwean, ALiR,
and FAC defenders. Such a concentration of forces would be clearly visible to the
FAC, and risks inviting Kabila and his allies to attack elsewhere on the front.
A second option open to the RPA would be to work to isolate Mbuji Mayi from
Katanga to the south. A penetration in the vicinity of Kabinda that advanced 100
km could cut the Kananga-Lubumbashi railroad, and isolate the FAC and allied
forces in Mbuji Mayi and its environs. The threat of such an attack succeeding
would put pressure on Mugabe, and might even cause his fall from power.
Decisive victories like Pweto, that suggest that the enemy is weak, encourage
risk-taking. With such a prospect in mind, Kigali might decide to persist in its
Congolese adventure.
Over the long term however, this strategy has little chance of success because of
the differences between Kigali and Kampala. Should the RPA seem likely to take
Mbuji Mayi, the Ugandan backed MLC would almost certainly seize the
opportunity to advance on Kinshasa. Whatever the outcomes on the battlefields,
the rebel movements’ rival interests would become apparent.88 If one movement
were to emerge as a probable victor, the other movement would be likely to
attempt to create obstacles because of the mistrust that exists between Kampala
and Kigali. These differences are unlikely to be overcome by any reconciliation
between Rwanda and Uganda. As long the current regimes remain in place,
neither can permit the other to benefit disproportionately from their common
war in the Congo.
C. Uganda: Back to the Military Solution?
Uganda also justified the effort to unseat Kabila by citing its security interests.
Beneath the surface, Kampala had other motivations for the war such as its hopes
for greater regional prestige, and economic gain. Viewed as the mastermind of the
first rebellion that installed Kabila in power, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni
could not afford to remain out of the second rebellion. However, Uganda’s
intervention has proven counterproductive in a number of respects. The ethnic
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bloodletting in Ugandan-controlled areas and the fighting in Kisangani have all
revealed the corruption and divisions in the UPDF, where senior officers openly
sacrifice the interests of their country for their own personal financial gain.
Meanwhile, the security situation in the country that justified the original
intervention is no better than before the war. Once the leading light of new African
leaders, Museveni now looks more and more like those from the older breed that he
claimed to replace.
1. The Security Motives for the War
The UPDF ostensibly intervened in the DRC to destroy the rebel ADF’s Congolese
rear bases, and to prevent supplies from transiting the region in the future. For
instance President Museveni explained to the Ugandan Parliament that,  ‘like his
predecessor Mobutu had done, he [Kabila] entered into an agreement with the
Sudan government to destabilize Uganda. Kabila put at the disposal of the Sudan
Congo’s airports to enable the Sudanese to supply the ADF and to use these
facilities to destabilize Uganda directly.’89
The ADF emerged in 1995 from a combination of pre-existing Sudanese
supported opposition movements to the NRM regime in Kampala.90  Since then
the ADF has terrorized the inhabitants of southwest Uganda with its viciously
brutal attacks. The movement is not strong enough to pose a military threat to
the regime. However, it has proved resilient enough to resist UPDF efforts to
crush it.
The UPDF advance into the DRC probably contributed to temporarily disrupting
the rebel movement’s operations. The army has simultaneously increased its
counter-insurgency efforts in Uganda itself. For instance, in late 1999, the UPDF
launched Operation Mountain Sweep in the Rwenzori with some 6,000 UPDF
troops specially trained in mountain warfare under the command of army Chief
of Staff, Brigadier James Kazini. The operation was ‘to deal the final blow to the
rebels’ he told journalists.91 The Minister of State for Defense announced some
two months after the operation was launched that the army had killed more than
80 ‘bandits’ and that they had “depleted the enemy’s strength both in terms of
personnel and equipment captured.”92
The ADF was not so easily defeated, as they demonstrated in early December
with a series of deadly attacks. One of these operations struck the Fort Portal
Prison, and reportedly had as its target Kazini himself, who was present at the
time. And whereas most ADF operations involve only a handful of fighters, this
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attack counted approximately 150 rebels, and succeeded in freeing 365 prison
inmates.93
An unforeseen development of the increased UPDF pressure in the Rwenzori
Mountains was that it forced the rebels to move into other regions of the
country. The year 2000 witnessed ADF attacks in Bushenyi, Hoima, Kibale,
Bundibugyo, and even Mubende.94 In early September President Museveni
cancelled his trip to attend the UN Millennium Summit in New York because of
the increase in violence in the West of the country. Touring Hoima district, he
reportedly complained to the Resident District Commissioner about the
authorities inability to bring the guerrillas to heel. “This talk of ‘rebels escaped
from us’ - I hate it. How can the rebels come out of the forest, really escape
from you and go back to the forest? Where was the army?” he asked.95
2. The Army Goes into Business
The cohesion and discipline of the UPDF has suffered from its war in the DRC.
The access to Congolese resources has proved an irresistible temptation to many
a UPDF officer. In fact, the spoils of war, which Uganda had tasted in the first
invasion, always loomed large among the reasons for Kampala’s second
intervention. In 1996, just after the fall of Mobutu, the UPDF controlled regions
of North-eastern Congo yielded an estimated $60 million in gold exports for
Uganda. Official figures by the Bank of Uganda, which controls all gold exports,
show that Uganda’s gold exports shot up from $12.4 million in 1994-95 to $110
million in 1996. 96 The capture of key airports such as Kisangani and Gbadolite
would permit the export of Congolese coffee and minerals directly to Kampala.
Since the beginning of the second DRC war, Kampala has exploited the
resources of the Congo with impressive resolve. An illustration of this is again the
spectacular rise in Ugandan gold exports, which became the country’s largest
non-coffee official export in 1999 despite the lack of any increase in domestic
production. By way of contrast, according to a private Ministry of Natural
Resources, reported gold production represented only 0.2 per cent of exports in
the 1996/97 financial year. This sudden availability of gold corrected the
country’s US$ 600 million trade deficit, and caused a significant improvement in
Uganda’s balance of payments despite radically increased defence expenditures
that had caused the country to overshoot the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF) limit of 1.9 per cent of the GDP. The defence budget overshot this
by 2.2 per cent in the first six months of 1999 and led to a temporary freeze in
ESAF disbursement until government pledged to control defence expenditure.97
                                        
93 ADF Spokesman Rogers Kabanda claimed the attack’s target was Brig Kazini who was
reportedly in Fort Portal at the time. The rebels also abducted 365 of the prison’s 902 inmates
during the attack. “ADF Abducts 365 Inmates in Attack on Prison”, IRIN (10 December 1999).
On December 26 the Lord’s Resistance Army, whose leader Joseph Kony lives in Sudan, also re-
emerged in northern Uganda after nearly six months of inactivity.
94 ‘Museveni Talks Tough to Uganda’s Rebels’ BBC News, (9 September 2000).
95 ‘President Museveni Castigates Army for Not Routing rebels’, New Vision, Kampala, (9
September 2000).
96 Republic of Uganda. Statistics Department. Statistical Abstracts, (Entebbe: 1999) 75.
97 William Reno, ‘War Debt and the role of pretending in Uganda’s International Relations’, a
paper presented at the conference ‘Conflict and Peacemaking in the Great Lakes Region’,
Entebbe 11 July 2000.
Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War
ICG Africa Report N° 26, 20 December 2000                                                                 Page 32
Top UPDF officers were involved in Congolese business dealings since the first
war. For example Major General Salim Saleh, the President’s brother and at that
time Minister of State for Defence, was deeply involved in buying gold in UPDF
controlled areas. Although the gold deal was terminated last year, Saleh still has
interests in Air Alexander, which since August 1998 has been flying cargo and
passengers into Eastern Congo.98 Other senior UPDF officers have behaved in a
similar fashion. Brigadier Kazini is accused of distributing diamond and cobalt
concessions while he was the commander of UPDF operations in the DRC.99
Ties between front-line UPDF commanders and businessmen fuelled much of the
Hema-Lendu violence, which may have claimed some ten thousand lives in the
Ugandan controlled north-east since the war’s outbreak. Kazini for instance
carved out entire ‘provinces’ to award to his allies like Lotsove Adel - without
even consulting the Congolese RCD-ML authorities ostensibly supported by the
UPDF. Lotsove has since been dismissed from the RCD-ML on accusations of
fuelling the violence to favour her business interests in timber and gold from
areas such as Bombo and Mungualu. Likewise, former UPDF Sector Commander
in Bunia, Lieutenant Colonel Arocha, and his deputy Captain Kyakabale stand
accused of conniving with Congolese businessmen to fuel the killing of the
Lendu. Local Congolese in Bunia allege that the two army officers abused their
positions and involved UPDF soldiers in the clashes. The two officers were
removed and placed under investigation by the UPDF on allegations that they
were involved in mineral dealings.
3. The UPDF and the Bloodletting in Ituri
For years, the Hema and Lendu tribes have lived together in the Djugu region of
Ituri. The Hema are a minority pastoral community that arrived in the Ituri
region starting in the sixteenth century. Culturally, they are related to the Tutsis
in Burundi and Rwanda as well as the Hemas and Banyoros of western Uganda.
The indigenous Lendu are farmers and hunters related to the Kakwa, Lugbara
and even Alur of West Nile region in Uganda.
The heart of the dispute between the two peoples concerns land. Belgian
colonial authorities favoured the Hema and permitted them to amass large
landholdings in the final days of European rule. Despite the resentment of the
Lendu, the two groups lived alongside one another peaceably until the closing
days of the Mobutu regime. In the subsequent chaos however, rich Hema
landowners upset the status quo by seeking to acquire additional land holdings
from the Lendu. In this they were facilitated by the collapse of state
administrative structures and the loss of important records such as land titles in
the war to overthrow Mobutu. Powerless to respond legally because they lacked
documentary proof of ownership, the Lendu turned to violent means of
resistance. In the fighting that followed, it is estimated that more than 10,000
people died in a period of 18 months. The bloodshed is said to have been worst
in two areas - Djungu and Fataki.
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Rather than prevent the fighting, the UPDF presence in the region and their
interference in the already delicate social, political and economic balance of the
ethnically divided society exacerbated these ethnic killings. Senior UPDF officers
deployed to the DRC sided with rich members of the mainly Batutsi tribes such
as the Hema in Ituri province. Instead of providing for the security of the whole
society, they protected the interests of the rich Hema. Some UPDF officers are
even accused of arming and training militia groups such as that led by Bosco
Ntaganda, in return for financial payment to Hema business men. As a
consequence, the UPDF has come to be seen as a brutal occupation force in
much of the region, and in particular the Ituri and Mahago zones.
Recently, these resentments against the UPDF soldiers have led local peoples to
turn their weapons against the Ugandan soldiers. In recent months they have
even started targeting UPDF positions. For example on August 26, a group of
about 10 local people, referred to by UPDF as Mai Mai, attacked a UPDF
headquarters at Lubero in Beni. They were repulsed, but in the process over 33
were killed. Reports indicate the Congolese were armed with bows, sub machine
guns, arrows and spears. In Ituri Province, another group attacked and overran
an RCD-ML detachment at Nyakunde. The UPDF relief force had to deploy two
tanks to overcome the attackers who were by then only 6 or 7 kilometres from
Bunia town. On 11 September, a group of about 150 men armed with guns,
machetes and spears attacked the Butembo residence of a UPDF officer. The
Ugandans beat them back, killing 21 of the Congolese.100
Investigations by the UPDF into the causes of these ethnic conflicts are
underway. Security sources say there are indications that some of the Congolese
behind the conflicts are prominent members of the rebellion who sought to
inflame opposition to the UPDF. There was no independent confirmation of these
claims but it reflects the continued resentment against the UPDF in many parts
of Eastern DRC. For example, the North Kivu provincial Security Council has
accused the UPDF of a number of human rights violations. Mbake Kayisavera,
the Governor of the region, formally complained about this to the Ugandan
Government on 16 August 2000
4. Uganda’s Showpiece Rebel Movement: Wamba and the RCD-ML
From the outset, Rwanda and Uganda disagreed with one another over the best
strategy for the war. Initially, Rwanda sought to topple Kabila through military
means alone. When Uganda entered the war, Museveni tried to assert his
authority by advocating a more political approach of ‘empowering the
Congolese’. The pressure of these differences fractured the rebel RCD
movement, as individual leaders adopted the positions of their sponsors.
a. The Failure of ‘Mchaka Mchaka’
Differences over ‘the National Resistance Movement (NRM) ‘Mchaka Mchaka’
system of political military education were a factor in the 19 May 1999 split
within RCD ranks.101 Convinced that victory was only possible through such
means, President Museveni sought to duplicate the system in the DRC. Starting
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solidarity through physical exercise in the morning.
Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War
ICG Africa Report N° 26, 20 December 2000                                                                 Page 34
in February 1999, trained cadres were deployed to the Congo by the NRM
Secretariat. Uganda advocated the system be adopted by the entire rebellion.
Many RCD members such as Emile Ilunga, Bizima Karaha, Moise Nyarugabo,
Lunda Bululu and Alexis Tambwe rejected this idea. Wamba however was better
disposed to it and accepted the Ugandan training.
Wamba’s RCD-ML therefore became the showpiece of Uganda’s strategy to
politically empower the Congolese. In the Northeast DRC, Uganda assisted with
the training of rebel forces and encouraged the election of local leaders. Each of
the provinces was to elect both a governor and local council officials to further
enlist the population behind the war effort.
Nevertheless the Congolese population rejected the movement and its Ugandan
system of political mobilization. Blind to this, the Ugandans sought to employ
Wamba as the rebellion’s leader despite his Western DRC origins. Well aware of
these sentiments, their leaders preferred to mobilize support behind the proven
standards of ethnic politics. In contrast, Mbusa Nyamwisi, the RCD-ML Prime
Minister, used his local Mukonjo ethnicity to enlist followers in the Beni region.
Similarly, Mbusa's deputy Tibasiima Atenyi used his local Hema roots to mobilize
his own supporters in Ituri. Consequently, when Wamba attempted to suspend
the two in August, he sparked a series of violent revolts in the region that
fractured his RCD-ML movement.
A second force behind these divisions was the competition for resources in the
fast-growing war economy. The RCD-ML was heavily invested in the gold trade
from the outset. The movement formed its own army-mining brigade for use in
zones like Bafwasende and Banalia.102  In a state of reckless enthusiasm, the
movement even signed an agreement with the Bank of Granada for the
organization of an “African Union Reserve system” for the financial
administration and economic development of the Congo. As occurred with the
UPDF, the opportunity to personally profit from these resources got the better of
the rebel movement’s leaders. Both Mbusa Nyamwisi and Atenyi Tibasiima are
accused of misappropriating over US$20 million in proceeds from mining deals
since early 2000. In the midst of the 5 November ‘coup’ against him, Wamba
explained to Reuters that “[Nyamwisi] wanted to have control of resources… he
made promises to people, promises about money and diamonds.”103
b. Uganda Abandons Ideology for Ethnicity and Regionalism?
Uganda’s showpiece rebel movement collapsed as Wamba’s lieutenants
abandoned him to recruit personnel armies of ethnic kinsmen. Aware that
reconciliation was critical for resolving the region’s ethnic disputes, Ugandan
officials hastened to patch up the differences between the RCD-ML rival leaders.
The alternative was to be confronted with popular discontent similar to that
faced by Rwanda in the Kivus.104 Consequently, September witnessed a flurry of
                                        
102 ICG Interview, Professor Wamba dia Wamba, President RCD-ML, Bunia, 24 August 2000.
103 Todd Pitman, ‘Congo Rebel Leader Accusses Rival of ‘Coup Attempt’, Reuters (4
November2000).
104 Using his authority as President Wamba sacked Nyamwisi as Prime Minister. But to remove
him from his post of President of the RCD-ML General Assembly, he needed the support of a
majority of its members. But since only the President could convene a meeting of the Assembly,
his replacement would be still difficult to engineer. To overcome this, Uganda hoped to convince
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activity aimed at repairing the RCD-ML’s internal divisions. Kampala made
recommendations on how to re-structure the movement and launched a training
and re-education program for the movement and its splinter groups.105 Museveni
later brokered an agreement between Wamba and his opponents in State House
on 11 October 2000, which led to the re-appointment of Nyamwisi as the First
Vice President of the RCD-ML and of Atenyi to Second Vice President two weeks
later.106
The Ugandan Government was working to correct the errors of its own
misconceived strategy. There was a growing awareness in Kampala that Wamba
could not overcome the leadership crisis in the RCD-ML. Unfortunately, Museveni
was reluctant to admit that his original support for the former scholar, turned
rebel leader, was misplaced. This would mean admitting that Uganda’s NRM, and
indeed its whole strategic approach to the war in the DRC, was misguided. It
would also mean that Rwanda had been correct to seek the ouster of Wamba as
RCD leader. Museveni still hoped that Wamba’s potential would be realized once
the rebellion reached Western Congo. Wamba was in the meantime promoted as
a ‘consensus builder’ with excellent international contacts, who understood
better than most the social, political, and economic problems that afflict the DRC.
Rancour nevertheless persisted between the two rivals despite their Ugandan-
brokered reconciliation. In late October, supporters of Wamba suddenly became
concerned when UPDF troops took control of the Bunia airport and Radio station.
RCD-ML spokeswomen, Colette Ramm, told journalists that Ugandan officers
seeking to protect their interests in the DRC initiated the move. “Things are
getting very tense around here… it’s going to be hard to contain the bloodshed”,
she said”.107 Events came to a head on 3 November, when Nyamwisi arrived in
Bunia from Kampala to announce over the radio that Wamba had been deposed.
Three days later, forces loyal to Nyamwisi launched a coup attempt against
Wamba forcing him to seek refuge in Bunia’s MONUC headquarters. “We control
the situation here,” announced Nyamwisi’s spokesman Suddin bin Musme, “We
control the town, the airport, and the radio station.” 108
Fighting between the two sides continued off and on for another two weeks. On
12 November, Museveni ordered that Wamba be evacuated from Bunia back to
Kampala, but the professor refused to leave.109 Finally, on 19 November,
Museveni dispatched his formidable advisor on DRC affairs, Colonel Kahinda
Otafire, to Bunia to escort both Wamba and the others to Kampala. “We have
chased all trouble and non-trouble makers out of Bunia… I have brought about
                                                                                                                               
Wamba to accept Nyamwisi back as Prime minister of the RCD-ML, and to convince Nyamwisi to
permit meetings of the Movement’s assembly in return, which could help resolve the region’s
ethnic tensions.
105 ICG Interview, Bunia. Also, ‘Hundreds of DRCongo Rebels Reportedly Training in Uganda’,
The East African (25 Sep 2000).
106The meeting was attended by the Minister for the Presidency of Mozambique, Francisco
Madeira, Tanzanian Envoy to the Great Lakes, Adam Marwa, the Ugandan National Political
Commissar, James Wapakhabulo and Ugandan Minister for the Presidency, Ruhakana Rugunda.
107 ‘UPDF Turn on Wamba, Grab Bunia Aiport not true, says Wapa’, The Monitor, Kampala (31
October 2000).
108 Todd Pitman ‘Fighting Erupts for Control of Congo Rebel faction’, Reuters (6 November
2000).
109 ‘Museveni Wants Wamba in K’la’, The Monitor (13 November 2000). Todd Pitman, ‘Congo
rebels Accuse Rivals Over new Fighting’, Reuters (15 November 2000).
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60 Bunia leaders who are dangers to themselves. They have come to try and
sort out their mess from here and we hope they do it,” announced Otafire upon
his return.110
The incident illustrates the disarray of Ugandan policy with the rebel groups.
UPDF units intervened on both sides of the conflict – reflecting different interests
within Ugandan ranks and the lack of overall control by the Commander in Chief.
They had allowed Nyamwisi’s group access to the radio station, but nevertheless
continued to provide protection forces for the beleaguered Wamba after the
coup attempt. A Ugandan soldier, identified as Tinkamanyire, reportedly
announced the coup over the radio, and subsequently orchestrated the
crackdown on anti-Nyamwisi demonstrators.111 In early December 2000,
Ugandan authorities still claim to recognize Wamba as the rebel movement’s
leader. Privately however, they admit that given Nyamwisi’s ethnic support and
economic power in Province Orientale, it is wise to have him head the rebellion
to avoid further ethnic violence. In other words, Uganda’s strategy of political
empowerment along the lines of the NRM’s Mchaka Mchaka ideology was
dropped in favor of the more potent ethnic militarism.
A second motivation behind the deterioration in relations between Wamba and
his Ugandan benefactors is the professor’s long-held view that Lusaka is the best
option to resolve the war in the DRC. While Uganda also claims to support the
agreement, its recent successes alongside Bemba in Equateur have encouraged
renewed thinking about a military solution.
5. Jean-Pierre Bemba and the MLC: A Winning Formula?
Faced with the continuing difficulties of Wamba and his NRM-inspired rebellion,
Uganda has turned towards Bemba. The millionaire businessman enjoys a
degree of popular and financial support unmatched by Wamba, or any other DRC
rebel movement. Moreover, unlike both branches of the RCD, he is in sole
command of his troops. These strengths have convinced Kampala that he might
be in a position to win the war. This belief is not entirely a free choice however.
Museveni wants some gain from his Congolese adventure before the upcoming
elections (scheduled to take place before March 2001). Caught in a war without
end, Museveni needs Bemba to save his pride, and pay his bills.
a. A Self-Financing Movement
Uganda’s intervention has proved to be expensive. ADF violence has persisted in
Western Uganda despite the UPDF’s presence in the DRC. In the financial year
1997/98, Uganda's defence expenditure was some US$70 million. This
represented 1.5 per cent of GDP and was higher than the targeted expenditure
of 1.1 per cent of GDP.  In 1998/99, Uganda budgeted an increase in defence
spending to US$98.6 million. This rise was aimed at facilitating army operations
to pacify Northern and Western Uganda and to protect the border with the DRC.
However, actual spending for the financial year 1998/99 turned out to be much
higher - US$129.3 million. This overspending has drawn criticism from donors,
who fear the government is neglecting priority areas such as poverty eradication,
education and health. As a result of missed targets on defence spending, the
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111 ‘Nyamwisi Jolts Wamba Control of Bunia’, New Vision, Kampala (16 November 2000).
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) postponed a portion of its agreed loan in
March 1999.112
In the view of a government under severe financial pressure, Bemba is thus a
welcome client. His ability to raise revenues from taxes levied on tea, coffee,
timber, gold and diamond exports is appreciated by his Ugandan backers. As a
result, Bemba can finance much of his own war effort. According to the Finance
Secretary, Francois Mwamba, the movement paid for 60 per cent of its expenses
in August 2000. This was expected to rise to 90 per cent by the end of the
year.113  The fact that Bemba even has his own captured Antonov transport
airplane – larger than anything in the Ugandan Military inventory - also helps
reduce what are otherwise expensive (approximately US$30,000) charter flights
between Entebbe and Gbadolite.114
b. A Popular and Regionally Balanced Movement
Ugandan officials trumpet the popularity of Bemba, and the fact that MLC seems
to have put in place a representative government, with key appointments
distributed to individuals from every province of the DRC. The Government’s
Secretary General (Prime Minister) is Olivier Kamitatu - son of Cleophas
Kamitatu. Among the top ranks in the MLC forces are officers from different
regions. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Amouri, comes from eastern DRC. The
Defence Secretary, Colonel Mulomba Kibonge, is also from the East. The rebel
movement has also created a central treasury with a Finance Secretary, Francois
Muamba, a former member of Etienne Tshsekedi's party, who comes from Kasai
Province. The Secretary of the Economy, Albert Mbia, is a former ambassador to
Portugal and is from Equateur province. The movement is also in the process of
drawing up a financial budget to be allocated to different organs for different
activities.
c. The Reasoning Behind Uganda’s Support
Museveni is wedded to Bemba for reasons of prestige. After the collapse of
Wamba, and the humiliation of three successive defeats to the RPA in Kisangani,
Museveni wants to find a winner who justifies his original intervention in the
DRC. This desire stems partly from the Ugandan President’s pride, and from his
need to transform the politically unpopular war into a success in time for the
Presidential elections that are to be held by March 2001. The sudden emergence
of NRM Colonel Kiiza Besigye – a strong critic of Uganda’s support in the DRC -
as an election opponent, underscores this need. One commentator, for example,
predicted in mid-October that: “Without a big trophy, the President will be
ridiculed as a loser, and projected not as a star general winning wars, but as a
                                        
112 Andrew M. Mwenda and agencies, ‘Domestic Debt Record Shs 100bn, IMF Suspends Aid to
Uganda’, The Monitor, Kampala (13 March 1999); Consultive Group Meeting for Uganda’s
Donors. US Delegation Background Paper (March 2000); Government of Uganda. Ministry of
Finance. Background to the Budget 1999/2000, (Kampala: June 1999) 93.
113 ‘Rebels Use New Openings to Boost Economic Activity’, SouthScan, Brussels (30 August
2000).
114 ICG Interview, RCD-ML officials, Bunia (August 2000); Information confirmed by VR
Promotions, Kampala.
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reckless gambler who was blinded by power and other unspeakable temptations
in Congo and lost.”115
Uganda is currently assisting Bemba in every way possible. Officially, Kampala
admits its providing support to Bemba in the form of artillery, medical, and
communications. In reality, however, there are more than 10,000 UPDF in
Equator Province under the overall command of Brigadier Katumba Wamala,
based in Gbadolite.
Bemba’s successes seem to have put Uganda in a strong position to affect the
outcome of the war. If Mbandaka were taken, MLC forces would be a mere four-
days boat ride from Kinshasa. But to move beyond the town would be well nigh
impossible in the face of Angolan resistance. The FAA air force could inflict
severe damage on forces using the river to approach Kinshasa. FAA ground
forces could do the same in and around the capital city. Angola may be unhappy
with Kabila, but they do not want to see him replaced by Bemba, who is a
Mobutist with close ties to UNITA.116
Consequently, the threat Bemba posed to the key river port in the late summer
of 2000 provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity. Angolan Chief of Staff, General
Jogo Baptista De Matos, visited Kampala in late August for discussions with UPDF
Commander, Major General Jeje Odongo, during which he met Ugandan
President, Yoweri Museveni and other high-ranking civilian officials.117 Bemba
himself met with the Angolan Foreign Minister, Joao Bernardo Miranda, in Paris
in August.118  The many talks sparked by the threat to Mbandaka even raised the
possibility that Kinshasa’s allies might remove Kabila as a result of negotiations
with the rebel alliance. But then, at talks held in Windhoek on 9 October, Kabila’s
Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean allies pledged to defend Mbandaka and
threatened ‘full-scale war’ against Uganda and Bemba’s MLC forces. Following
this, in late October, Luanda gave UPDF Commander, General Odongo, who was
on a reciprocal visit to Luanda, a demonstration of its military muscle during
visits to Catumbela airbase and the Funda Military Zone.119
                                        
115 ‘Why Kinshasa Needs to Fall Before March 2001 Polls’, The Monitor, Kampala, (12 October
2000).
116 At the moment of the FAA offensive against UNITA in December 1998, the Equateur
businessman purchased fuel in Zambia for sale to the Angolan rebels in response to an appeal
from Savimbi. See United Nations. Security Council. ‘Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the
Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993)
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to UNITA’. See ‘Zambian Aid for Angolan Rebels’ Mail And Guardian, Johannesburg (9 April
1999).
117 ‘President Meets Angolan Army Chief’, New Vision, Kampala (26 September 2000).
118 Africa No 1 radio, Libreville, in French 1200 gmt (28 September 2000), as monitored by the
BBC.
119Angolan TV2 reported on the visit: “We are at Catumbela Air Base in Benguela, in the center
of the country. General Odongo saw part of the Angolan’s Army military potential, and some of
the capabilities of the national Air Force. The visiting general obtained information about the
advances that have taken place in the FAA. After seeing and hearing came the
acknowledgements: FAA is much more advanced than Uganda’s ballistic potential, therefore
military cooperation is necessary, despite the differences that separate the two sides in the DRC
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November 2000), as monitored by the BBC.
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According to numerous sources, Bemba wants to take Mbandaka and maybe
even push towards Kinshasa. However, UDPF has so far refused to support this
option. An MLC advance on Kinshasa is not likely to bring an end to the war. If
an accord were fashioned between the Angolans and Ugandans, Kigali would be
likely to attempt to seize Mbuji Mayi. Kabila meanwhile, could be expected to flee
to Lubumbashi. If based in Katanga, he could continue with the support of many
Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, whose economic
interests in the DRC lie primarily in the mineral-rich southern region. Together,
these moves would make Bemba’s success less important. He could take
advantage of the implicit sovereignty accorded by control of the national capital -
but he would not have access to the economic heart of the country.
Bemba would also face the opposition of rival rebel leaders. Outside of their
hopes to win political power, the leaders of the rival factions all have economic
interests that Bemba would be certain to oppose. Not surprisingly, many suspect
Bemba of seeking complete control of the state. Despite the trappings of
government in the MLC for instance, his grip on the leadership is total. He
personally nominates all candidates for key positions such as the 12 National
Secretaries and the seats in the Political and Military Liberation Councils. Even
Kamitatu recently admitted in Uganda that the MLC was not running a
government, saying instead that it was a guerilla movement that had created
administrative structures to facilitate its operations.
And finally, Bemba would also face political difficulties in the capital city. Despite
the ethnic mix in the movement’s leadership positions, the Kinois are not likely to
view him as a liberator because he comes from Equateur. More likely, he would
be seen as a resurrection of the still-hated Mobutu regime. He is widely
rumoured to have ties to Mobutist intelligence circles, and is thought to employ
the Union des Republicains Nationalistes Pour la Libération, composed of former
members of Mobutu's Special Presidential Division.120
6. Conclusion
Ostensibly launched for security reasons, Uganda’s effort in the DRC has failed to
quell insurgent unrest in Southwest Uganda. Instead, the policy has spurred the
growth of a war economy that has in turn, provoked the collapse of discipline in
the UPDF. More tragically, the Ugandan policy has spurred an explosion of ethnic
violence, and the rise of ethnic warlords, whose presence on Uganda’s borders
do not bode well for the future.
Short of a victory, President Museveni is probably incapable of ordering a
withdrawal of the UPDF from the Congo. Many of the senior officers have carved
out economic interests that they would be loath to surrender. More important
however, is probably the Ugandan leader’s own personal pride, which has driven
his strategic decision making from the outset. He disagreed with the Rwandan’s
drive for a rapid military victory, substituting the lessons of his own experiences -
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that the people must be politically ‘empowered’. His views were not necessarily
wrong in principle, but nevertheless spurred the fragmentation of the rebel RCD
movement, and contributed to the breakdown in relations between Kigali and
Kampala.
In the end, the Congolese rejection of the alien ideology he sought to impose
upon them sealed the fate of his ‘empowerment strategy’. This failure has left
him with no other choice than to accept the ultimately destructive mobilising
power of ethnicity and regionalism. At present he still claims to recognize
Wamba as President of the RCD-ML. If he is to maintain a semblance of control
in the Northeast DRC, and thus protect Uganda’s frontiers, he has no choice but
to accept the rise of Nyamwisi.
IV. LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA: IN POWER BY DEFAULT121
Kabila’s departure from office has often been predicted. His power base within the
DRC has never seemed very secure. When he joined forces with the AFDL rebel
movement in 1996, he had virtually no troops of his own, and few Congolese had
ever heard of him. Today, after more than three years in power, he has yet to build
a cohesive political party. His army does not fight enthusiastically. Even his
cheerleaders have failed to organise pro-government demonstrations on any scale.
Yet the regime does at least keep better order, in government-controlled territory,
than its predecessor. The corruption and rent-seeking under this regime seem to be
more controlled than they were under Mobutu, with fewer people profiting. Kabila’s
generals have not earned the reputation of Mobutu’s generals, who were a law unto
themselves. But while he probably spends less than his predecessor on internal
supporters, Kabila spends a lot more on foreign allies.
Kabila has only one strategic objective: to stay in power. Observers in Kinshasa
believe that he prefers sharing the country to sharing power.122 So far, he has
succeeded in this respect despite the miserable performance of his troops and his
complete dependence upon the support of foreign backers. Despite widespread
discontent with his rule, Kabila’s regime is not threatened by internal unrest, or
even a coup. Kabila’s fate depends mainly on whether or not he remains useful to
his allies, and whether or not the cost of removing him remains higher than the
benefits. Without strong internal support and despite his erratic behaviour, Kabila
has only stayed in power because of his bargaining capacity with his foreign
supporters, for whom no better Congolese option has appeared. In other words, he
has been mainly a ruler by default.
                                        
121 The interviews quoted in this section of the report were conducted between 27 August and
15 September 2000 in Kinshasa. Unless they are members of the Congolese government the
persons interviewed are only generically identified for security reasons. ‘Members of the
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A. Kabila Inc.: The Absence of Regime Building
Kabila’s claim to legitimacy comes from his victory over Mobutu, as well as his
leadership in the war against the ‘foreign invaders’. He presents himself as a
nationalist and patriot, and frequently refers to the Western conspiracy to loot the
Congo.123 Foreign plots to rob the country of its wealth have been a popular political
theme ever since independence. The Congolese see colonization and the Western-
imposed Mobutu regime as examples of these attempts to exploit the Central
African country. Consequently, Kabila’s anti-colonial and anti-Western language, as
well as his penchant for blaming foreigners for his own shortcomings, resonates in
the DRC.
Measured against the final days of the previous regime, Kabila’s rule appears less
violent. So far, his army has not ransacked the capital, and the Congolese living in
Government-held territory are better off than those in rebel zones. The political
abuses of the authorities do not compare with those committed in the occupied
territories, where UN Special Envoy for Human Rights, Roberto Garreton once
reported the population was ‘often denied the right to live’.124
Yet Kabila’s mismanagement of the economy and dictatorial tendencies have
become a growing source of dissatisfaction for the population. Last year’s estimated
growth in real GDP fell to minus 14.5 per cent due to the effects of the war, and the
Government’s catastrophic handling of economic affairs - through an overvalued
exchange rate, stringent restrictions on foreign-currency trade, uncontrolled growth
in the money supply, constant harassment of business, and the looting of state
owned companies. Some 80 per cent of state revenue now goes to the war effort.125
The Government has had to slash civil servants’ salaries (redirecting some of the
spending to meet the army payroll), and cut the already-minimal spending on social
services and infrastructure. For example, it now dedicates less than 1 per cent to
education, and less than 2 per cent to public health. In the past few months, a
foreign-currency crunch has sparked a worsening fuel shortage. In November, the
government responded by devaluing the Franc Congolais (FC) from 23 to the US
dollar to 50 FC – about half of the black market rate.
The government blames this economic situation on its internal enemies, who are
trying to weaken its grip on the country. Alternatively, it is the result of an insidious
attempt by the international community to undermine Kabila’s anti-colonial
government.126 As evidence, its apologists point to the refusal of foreign donors and
                                        
123 For a brief analysis of the original ideological discourse and philosophy of Laurent-Desiré
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multilateral institutions to provide aid for the past ten years. But the Congolese do
not fall for this ‘foreign conspiracy’ excuse. Were it not for his stridently nationalist
stance, Kabila would have very few supporters outside his closest collaborators and
family. 127
1. Political Control Compensates a Fragile Legitimacy
For most of last year, the DRC could be called a ‘no-party state’. Kabila assumed
all executive, legislative and military powers in early 1999, when he relieved the
AFDL of the last vestiges of its independence. He promised presidential and
legislative elections within two years, but then postponed them indefinitely in
May 1999. At present, political activities are heavily restricted. Parties cannot
operate unless they have registered with the authorities. The internal opposition
is unanimous in saying that the conditions set out by decree in January 1999 are
impossible to fulfil. These require parties to hold meetings, with the approval of
local authorities, in every province, including those controlled by the rebellion.
The Government also reserved the right to deny registration on grounds such as
the moral and intellectual fitness of the applicants.128 To date only four (more or
less pro-government) parties have complied with the process of registration.
Government apologists claim that the Kinshasa political class was either complicit
with Mobutu, or in the case of the opposition parties, corrupt. They say the
parties do not speak for the masses, who support Kabila, as was demonstrated
during the AFDL war and, later, during the three-week August 1998 RPA siege of
Kinshasa. Since the country is at war moreover, it cannot afford divisive politics.
Therefore political freedoms must be curtailed, so that the country can unite and
concentrate on the war effort.129
The Government has employed several means to mobilize support. It created the
Comités de Pouvoir Populaire (Committees for Popular Power or CPPs) to
organize the population politically. It organised its own ‘transitional process’
towards a reform of government in order to torpedo support for the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue: this included the creation of an Assemblée Constituante et
Législative-Parlement de Transition (ACL-PT) that was inaugurated in
Lubumbashi in August 2000. Despite these efforts to bring legitimacy to Kabila’s
rule, the regime remains internally weak, which in turn has led to an increase of
political repression.
a. The Committees for Popular Power, National Consultation and
Assembly all Fail the Credibility Test
Elections for the North Korean-inspired CPPs were held in Kinshasa in February
2000.130 Theoretically, every citizen belonged to this government-created
‘movement of the masses’, and was supposed to elect their street
                                                                                                                               
pay to buy US dollars at 10 to 20 per cent over the black market rates and then export them out
of the country.
127 Many ICG interviews with Congolese sources, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).
128 Cf. for more details, see ICG Africa report N° 19, Kinshasa sous Kabila à la veille du dialogue
national, 21 September 1999.
129 ICG Interview, Minister for Human Rights, Léonard She Okitundu, Kinshasa, 29/08/00.
130 Cf. for more details, see ICG Africa report N° 19, Kinshasa sous Kabila à la veille du dialogue
national, op. cite.
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representatives. The winners would in turn, elect his or her neighbourhood
representatives, who would then choose the commune’s CPP. Complaints that
some commune representatives were chosen before the street elections had
even been held, forced the government to annul the election results, and to
appoint a Commission of Inquiry. On state TV, Foreign Affairs Minister, Yerodia
Abdoulaye Ndombasi, explained that the commission also needed to validate the
results because ‘the people are not used to voting. They are not used to reading
either. We needed to make sure that those elected were real patriots.’131 In the
end, the Commission of Inquiry nevertheless confirmed most of the election
results.
The CPP’s have since failed to appreciably mobilize public support for the
Government. Under the former AFDL Commissioner for Propaganda, Raphaël
Ghenda, the institution has failed to symbolize the democratic roots of Kabila’s
rule. On the contrary their members are seen as opportunists, composed mostly
of unemployed young Katangans paid by the government, who spend their time
spying on the people with a view to extorting money or denouncing
“antipatriotic” activities to the security services.132
In November 1999, the CPPs were tasked to recruit 20,000 men for a local
defence force. After a few days training however, almost all the ‘volunteers’ had
deserted to avoid being sent to the front.133 The Government has also
experienced difficulties in mobilising people for the official celebrations and
demonstrations of support that were common in Mobutu’s time. In March 2000,
a free concert and rally in honour of the President was to be held in the national
stadium (capacity 50,000). Some of the nation’s most popular musicians,
preachers and miracle healers were billed to perform. But, due to the lack of
public enthusiasm, the event was moved to a smaller venue where according to
state TV it attracted only 5-6,000 people.134 In March 2000, the CPPs received a
resounding ‘thumbs down’ when the 1,100 delegates to the National Political
Consultation called for their abolition.135 Since then the Government has placed
less emphasis on them.
The results of other Government efforts to mobilize support have been equally
disappointing. It created a Congolese women’s movement called the Réseau des
Femmes Congolaises, (REFECO) led by pop star, and reputed presidential
mistress, Tshala Mwana; a National Bureau for Social Protection (BNPS) led by
former AFDL executive, Agathe Mulimbi; and a paramilitary movement named
the Service National (SN), which some at first feared would become a reservoir
for pro-Kabila militias.136 These fears were unjustified. None of these institutions
possess the financial resources to have any real impact on the population,
whether good or bad, and none seems to be particularly active at present. The
BNPS is a Presidential welfare organisation. Mainly run by women, it is best
known for the Magazins du Peuple - state shops with controlled prices - which
they have tried to organise. But these shops are too few to have much impact,
                                        




135 ‘La consultation nationale se retourne contre le régime Kabila’ Congo Presse Service, (6
March 2000).
136 ICG Interview with Congolese source, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000)
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even if they were properly managed, and the Congolese press tends to be very
dismissive of their performance. The National Service’s most-publicised project to
date has been the cultivation of unused land on Plateau Bateke, near Kinshasa,
to help overcome the food deficit of the capital. Despite announcements that
more than 10,000 hectares would be planted by April 2000, only a small
proportion of this area has been planted according to UN Food and Agricultural
Organisation (FAO) officials. The resultant crop would supply only one and a half
days of the capital's food needs. Its chief, General Denis Kalume Numbi, has
announced that demobilised child soldiers would work for the SN. But the poor
record that the government enjoys nowadays with the Kadogos, and its need for
fighters on the front, makes it highly unlikely that the SN contribution to feeding
Kinshasa will amount to much137.
The closest thing to a representative assembly that Kinshasa has witnessed since
the Sovereign National Conference of 1991 has been the two week National
Political Consultation of February 2000. Organized by religious leaders, the
meeting gathered representatives from Government, parastatals, political parties,
the business community, NGOs, women’s groups, youth groups, as well as
lawyers, academics and customary chiefs. Those in attendance came from all
over the country, but were mostly resident in the capital. Invitations seem to
have been easily attainable, but the rebels are not thought to have been
present.
In spite of the Government’s efforts to pack the assembly with its supporters, the
resounding majority of delegates vocally opposed the Kabila regime. The
conference, which had been supported by the President as an illustration of his
political benevolence, quickly turned into an open forum for criticism against his
Government. The audience loudly applauded calls for an end to his personality
cult (a ban on Kabila lapel badges, and the removal of posters with his portrait
from around the capital), the appointment of a new Government, the abolition of
the notoriously-arbitrary Court of Military Order (COM) and Office for Wrongly-
Acquired Goods (Office des Biens Mal Acquis or OBiMA), the freeing of political
prisoners, the lifting of restrictions on political activity, and the immediate start
of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue .138
The President and Government disregarded the criticism and created the
Constituent Assembly, which they claimed would offer the population the means
to determine its own destiny. At first this assembly was to be set up after an
electoral process.139 Instead of organizing elections however, the Government
invited applications, in May 2000, from all those interested in serving on a
Preparatory Committee for the creation of the Assembly. In response to this
appeal, it received 966 dossiers in two weeks. But when the membership of the
15 member preparatory committee was announced, the only well-known names
from outside the Presidential entourage were those of two former organisers of
Mobutu’s Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) party.140
                                        
137 Interview ICG with Congolese source and diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September
2000).
138 See Le Potentiel, (6 March 2000).
139 Cf. Congo presse service, (31 March 2000).
140 Interview ICG with Congolese source, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).
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Subsequently, in July, it was announced that 60 of the MPs had been chosen by
the President himself and the other 240 would be selected by the Preparatory
Committee. The Assembly was to be based in Lubumbashi, capital of the
President’s home province, Katanga. Among the nominated MPs were Congolese
pop stars Tabu Ley and Tshala Mwana. On 21 August the President formally
opened the parliament. The new Assembly, he declared, was ‘constitutionally the
second institution of the nation’ - the Presidency was the first. He then warned
the members to behave themselves: ‘your behaviour must be credible ... you
have learned this during the [pre-opening political] seminar. We did not want to
brainwash deputies… but we wanted that together we would understand the
immense tasks that lie before you.’141 Despite this warning, the members
immediately began to challenge the Government’s management of the country.
The first task the Assembly faced was to pass a motion calling for revision of the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In September, it was announced that a committee
of MPs would even be charged with the preparations for the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue. The regime also said that two recent defectors from the rebel RCD
would serve on this body. These appointments aroused the resentment of
Assembly members however, who then tabled a motion in opposition to this
move. Other disputes concerned official compensation for member’s expenses.
In the end, assembly sessions were suspended in October when police cleared
members from their offices in the parliament building. What was to have been a
rubber stamp assembly had turned into a coterie of demanding political clients,
all of whom sought to constantly renegotiate their support for the Government.
b. A Divided Political Opposition Subjected to Repression
Congolese political parties are deeply divided along regional, ethnic, historical
and personal lines.142 Other than the Union pour la Démocratie et Progrès Social
(UDPS) and the MPR, none possess much in the way of financial resources or
national following. And yet the capacity they demonstrated in the early 1990s to
mobilize in Kinshasa makes them a threat to Kabila, who has repressed them
persistently. After two years of this most are on the verge of extinction.
The DRC’s best-known opposition politician is Etienne Tshisekedi, the leader of
the UDPS. A Minister of the Interior under Mobutu in the 1960s, he eventually
became an opponent to the regime, and founded his own party in 1982.
Subsequently, the Sovereign National Conference elected him Prime Minister in
1991 and then again in 1992. In 1993, he even formed a government in defiance
of Mobutu. People in Kinshasa also remember that the UDPS is the only
opposition party to have filled the national stadium in Kinshasa (again during the
Sovereign National Conference). But Tshisekedi’s image suffered when he
agreed to serve in government under Mobutu. His popularity slipped further
when he failed to condemn the rebels at the outbreak of the second war in 1998.
The party has also been weakened of late by the Kabila-encouraged breakaway
of Katangan leader, Kibassa Maliba, and his followers. Nevertheless, while the
UDPS’ centre of support remains Kasai Oriental, no other party has more national
organization or support.
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142 For a detailed account of their activities in the “transition period”, see Villers (G. de), Zaïre :
la transition manquée, Cahiers Africains n°27-29, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997.
Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War
ICG Africa Report N° 26, 20 December 2000                                                                 Page 46
The other nationally structured political organization is Mobutu’s MPR, the former
single party. In mid 2000, the current leader, Catherine Nzuzi Wa Mbombo, was
imprisoned for several weeks because she had challenged Kabila over his
management of the country. At present, it is unlikely that the MPR movement
could rally a national following because it is blamed by most Congolese for the
country’s ruin.
The other established opposition parties are almost completely defunct. The Parti
Démocrate et Social Chrétien (PDSC) is supported by some intellectuals.
Regionally its centre is Bandundu, where it is split between Northern and
Southern factions. Like Tshisekedi, its leaders, André Bo-Boliko and Cléophas
Kamitatu Massamba, served in governments under Mobutu. Arrested after
making a strongly anti-government declaration to the press, Kamitatu was
sentenced to four-years imprisonment for corruption under the former regime in
June 1999.
The Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU) was formed in the 1960s by Antoine
Gizenga, a minister in Lumumba’s government who was released from jail in
1964, and one of the few politicians who seems to have never co-operated with
Mobutu. His movement however, is regarded as largely a tribal affair supported
by the Bapende and Bambunda of Bandundu. Gizenga moreover, is known for
claiming magical and spiritual powers, and has, for the past year stopped
appearing in public. It is possible that the PALU could cause serious disturbances
in Kinshasa. Kabila has therefore worked to disarm this threat by filling the local
authorities with people from Bandundu, who presumably would not hesitate to
suppress the Kasaian supporters of the UDPS. The people of Bandundu have
consequently been a major source of recruits for the new Police d’Intervention
Rapide (PIR). Similarly, the Governor of the capital, Théophile Mbemba, is a
Bandundu ethnic leader.
The Mouvement Nationaliste du Congo/Lumumbiste (MNC/L) originates from
Patrice Lumumba’s party, the MNC. His son, François Lumumba, who has
proclaimed himself heir to his father’s political legacy, has since kept the tradition
alive. His party has his father’s name with which to rally support. It also claims
as a member Kisase Ngandu, a popular Tetela leader like Lumumba who was
killed in the early days of the AFDL. At present, the party’s leader has fled to
Brussels after a brief imprisonment, and its strength on the ground looks
minimal.
A more recent creation is the Forces Innovatrices de l’Union et de Solidarité
(FONUS) Its leader, Joseph Olenghankoy, is the youngest of the well-known
opposition leaders, and has no experience of government. He has won a
reputation for fearlessly condemning dictatorship, under Mobutu and Kabila, but
observers doubt whether he has a national or regional following. His outbursts
have never had much effect, and have earned him repeated spells in detention.
The opposition probably has more difficulty mobilising people than the
government. Since 1994, they have not even tried, preferring instead to call
upon their supporters to stay at home, on strike. Street marches, and the
pillaging that could result from demonstrations, do not appeal to the middle class
or to anyone with a livelihood to lose. Virtually the first attempt to organise an
opposition protest in the capital since 1997 came in March 2000, when the
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FONUS’ leader Olenghankoy said that he would launch a strike on 8 April if all
the foreign troops - including the Government’s allies - had not quit the country
by 1 April. On 30 March, he was arrested briefly, and the protest failed to
materialise. The UDPS called another strike a few weeks later, which reduced
traffic for a few hours, but was not followed by the mass of the city’s workers.
Since then, there have been no more attempts.
The fear of repression and the frequency of arbitrary arrests have also cut the
numbers of opposition leaders at liberty to agitate against the Government. In
September, the UN High Commission for Human Rights appealed to the
government to release 253 prisoners of conscience, political prisoners and others
in the DRC whose fate was of particular concern to the organization. Two
amnesties have been declared in the past year, but some of these prisoners have
remained in detention. The respected NGO Voix des Sans Voix reported in late
2000 that 91 activists of PALU have been held for more than seven months, and
that ten UDPS activists have been held for three months. The PDSC leader,
Cleophas Kamitatu, has been in detention since last year. Civil society leaders
are even more frequent targets of these arrests because of their support for an
Inter-Congolese Dialogue.143
Some human rights circles believe that political detainees could actually be ten
times the official figure. Throughout the country, people suspected of
‘intelligence gathering for the rebellion’ often disappear, and can be held
incommunicado for months. They are transferred from one prison to another
ahead of the visits of human rights groups, and families without means have
virtually no hope of getting information about their loved ones. There are also
fears that prisoners risk being sent to the front.144
2. Personal Rule in the Extreme
Mobutu dismembered the Congolese state long before Kabila took power in
Kinshasa. Territorial sovereignty is often an illusion in Africa, but in the case of
the DRC amounts to a complete fantasy. Kabila’s rule is restricted to a few major
towns (Kinshasa, Kikwit, Mbandaka, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Kolwezi, Lubumbashi)
and strategic locations (the port of Matadi and the Inga hydro-electricity dam)
and some important roads and rivers. Kabila’s empire is therefore, relatively
small and his methods of leadership have not differed fundamentally from those
he practiced as a militia leader in Fizi-Baraka or while running his many
Tanzanian businesses.
He rules his territory like the autocratic father at the head of a family enterprise.
Power sharing is not part of his thinking, and no single minister or civil servant
can take a decision independently.145 He does not hesitate to send those who
misbehave, or forget his authority, to prison for a few weeks. Only two of the
current Ministers of State, Gaëtan Kakudji and Mwenze Kongolo, have avoided
arrest. Kabila even dared to jail the Angolan-backed former Petroleum Minister,
                                        
143 See for detailed accounts: La Vois des Sans Voix, Bulletin d’information pour la défense et la
promotion des Droits de l’Homme, n°19-23, (January 1999-April 2000).
144 Observers in Kinshasa that this may be the case with approximately 800 death penalty
convicts held in Kananga. ICG interview, diplomatic corps and international NGOs, (August
September 2000).
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Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War
ICG Africa Report N° 26, 20 December 2000                                                                 Page 48
Victor Mpoyo, who he detained briefly in June 2000 in response to allegations of
corruption. His accuser, the head of Hydrocongo and of the OBiMA Kazadi
Nyembwe, suffered the same fate soon afterwards.
a. Family, Balubakat, Lunda and the Diaspora146
Political repression and divide and rule tactics have permitted Kabila to overcome
the domestic discontent with his rule.147 These practices are not conducive
towards regime-building, however, and it is doubtful whether he can rely on any
strong power base within the country. Therefore Kabila needs people he can
control or trust completely to run the affairs of the State. This explains the
ubiquitous family members in the security apparatus, the role of unknown
figures from the Congolese Diaspora in the Government, and the absence of any
alliance with well-known regional or ethnic leaders.
Key positions in the DRC security services are filled with the family members of
the President. Kabila’s son, Joseph, is Deputy-Chief of Staff and Commander of
Land Forces. General Yav Nawesh, the commander of the Forces d’Intervention
de la Capitale (FIC) is a relative by marriage. He heads the army brigade based
in Kinshasa that merges the troops of the capital’s 7th Military Region with the
Presidential Guard (Groupe Special de Sécurité Présidentielle or GSSP). Gaetan
Kakudji, the Minister of the Interior and head of the country’s intelligence
services, is a cousin, as is the President’s Aide-de-Camp Colonel Eddy Kapend,
who is one of the most feared men in the administration. The late commander of
the security services in Lubumbashi, Commandant Georges Masile Fundi, is a
half-brother, and the chief of the national police, Celestin Kifwa, is a brother-in-
law. Moreover, his son, Jean-Claude, known as “Commandant Tango-Tango”, is
second to General Nawesh in the Kinshasa army brigade.
Kabila’s father was a Mulubakat from Manono, in North Katanga, while his
mother was from the Lunda tribe, which inhabits South-West Katanga, Western
Kasai and Western Bandundu. The Balubakat (or Luba from Katanga) do not
appear to monopolize leadership positions however. Of the dozen leading
members of the cabinet, only three are from Katanga. Joseph Kabila is the only
one among the army chiefs of staff. Out of the commanders of the eight Military
Regions and the two ministers who are also generals, there are only three
Katangans. The three most senior personnel in one of the national intelligence
services (Agence Nationale de Renseignement or ANR) are not Katangan. Lunda
elites actually occupy more visible positions in the security services, especially in
the army. Most of the generals and security chiefs served the previous regime
and already occupied relatively senior posts when Kabila took over. This
apparent widespread distribution of leadership positions gives the Kabila
government an appearance of national unity. For the most sensitive matters
moreover, Kabila has preferred to rely on trained professionals whatever their
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147 For a systematic and detailed account of Human Rights violation in DRC see Garreton (R.),
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regional origin.148 Nevertheless, these individuals are monitored by Katangans
loyal to Kabila, who he has placed in subordinate positions.
Who’s who around Kabila149
NAMES ORIGIN CURRENT POSITION AND
BACKGROUND
Family Members
Joseph Kabila Mulubakat, son of the
president
Commander of the Land Forces.
Gaëtan Kakudji Mulubakat, cousin of the
President
Minister For Home Affairs, right hand man
to the President.
Mwenze Kongolo Mulubakat, cousin of the
President
Minister for Justice, left hand man and
ambassador at large for the President.
Col Eddy Kapend Mulunda, cousin of the
president
Presidential Aide-de-Camp.
Gen Celestin Kifwa Mulubakat, brother-in-
Law to the president
Inspector general of the Police including








Second in command to Brigadier General
Nawesh at the head of the FIC.




Former General in the Angolan army.




wife’s family related to
the head of State
Minister for Reconstruction and
Commander of the National Service
Corps.
Other Key Cabinet Ministers
Pierre Victor
Mpoyo
Muluba from Kasai Minister for State without portfolio,
former Minister of Petroleum and
employee of Elf-Aquitain. A close friend to
Angolan president Eduardo Dos Santos






Former head of the presidential cabinet
and Minister for Foreign Affairs, now
Minister of State for National Education. A
Holds a PhD in Philosophy and was a
Lacanian psychoanalyst based in Paris for
many years. Currently under an
international warrant from a Belgian






Former propagandist for Mobutu who
subsequently became a charismatic leader
and is now Minister for Information and






Minister for Foreign Affairs, and former
Minister for Human Rights. Exiled in
Geneva for many years. Fancied by the
international community.
Didier Mumengi Mbunda from Bandundu Minister for the Youth and Sports, former
Minister for Information. Is sometimes
used by the President as an ambassador
at large.
Parastatals
Raphaël Ghenda Tetela, Kasai oriental Head of the CPPs, former Commissioner
for propaganda in the AFDL
Agathe Mulimbi Mulubakat Head of the BNPS, former executive of
the AFDL.
Tshala Mwana Friend of the President.
Muluba from Kasai
Orientale
Head of the Réseau des Femmes
Congolaise, REFECO and member of the
new Assembly
Kazadi Nyembwe Mututsi from Burundi Head of Hydrocongo and of the OBiMA. A
                                        
148 For instance, Leta Mangasa, the head of the National Intelligence Agency is an Equatorian
reported to have received some Israeli training.
149 Source : Interview ICG, Congolese sources and diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-
September 2000) and Villers (G. de), Willame (J;-C.), eds., RDC : Chronique politique d’un entre-
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close friend and associate of the President
since the early eighties.
Security services
Leta Mangasa Ngbaka from Equator Administrator for the ANR, internal wing
Dr Ismail South Kivu Administrator for the ANR, external wing
Col Damas
Kabulo
Mulubakat Head of DMIAP internal wing





Security advisor to the President and the
head of the State Security Council.
Hadith Juma Mubembe from Fizi Head of the DGM
b. The Multiplication of Intelligence Services and the Withering of
the Army
Laurent Kabila seems to believe that he will follow in the footsteps of Patrice
Lumumba, and die as the victim of a Western conspiracy and the treason of his
own men.150 To prevent this he has created multiple official and unofficial
intelligence services. The UN Human Rights Special Rapporteur reported that as
many as thirteen security services are active in the DRC.151 The president’s
paranoia compels these organizations to uncover plots against his rule, or risk
appearing complicit in them. Consequently, spies linked to one or another of the
official or unofficial security services are found everywhere in the DRC.
Agence nationale de
renseignement (ANR) 
The National Intelligence Agency. Run by a General
Inspector and two administrators for internal and
external affairs. Thought to be the most professional of
the security services, and is led by people trained in
Israel, Belgium, France and the USA under the Mobutu




Service for the Detection of Anti-patriotic Activities.
Organized in the same fashion as the ANR, the DMIAP is
supposed to cater for military intelligence but in fact
replicates the ANR with its interest in all forms of “anti-
patriotic” activity. A Balubakat stronghold.
Conseil de Sécurité de
l’Etat (CSE)
The National Security Council. Official umbrella
organization for all the security services. Found within the
office of the President.
Direction Générale des
Migrations (DGM)
The Immigration Service. Officially in charge of all
movements in and out of the country.
Force d’Intervention
de la Capitale (FIC)
Military intervention Force for the capital. Created in late
1999, the force merged the GSSP and the Kinshasa-
based 7th army Brigade. The FIC is mostly composed of
Balubakat and is ready to crush attempts at insurrection.
In this respect, it proved efficient during the camp
Tchatchi mutiny of early September 2000.
Police d’Intervention
Rapide (PIR)
Paramilitary Force in charge of policing the streets of
Kinshasa. A Bandundu Lunda stronghold that is trained
by Angola. Reputed to be prone to shooting suspects and
rowdy soldiers. Largely credited for the return of safety
on the streets of the capital.
Unité Spéciale
Présidentielle (USP)
The force responsible for the security of the presidential
palace. Composed solely of people from Kabila’s
hometown of Manono.
Kabila employs the same shadowy management of ethnic loyalties with the
army. When Kabila took over from Mobutu in May 1997, the AFDL’s three main
components were the Congolese Tutsis from the East of the country, the
Kadogos, or children recruited on the way to Kinshasa, and the Angolan
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‘Tigers’.152 At that point these Swahili speakers made up the majority of soldiers
in the new FAC. Historical animosities existed between them and the Western
Lingala speakers who had dominated the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) since its
creation. A series of wars had been fought between the two groups, including
the Katanga secession, the two Shaba revolts and the insurgency in the Kivus. At
last in command thanks to Kabila, the often-defeated Easterners treated the FAZ
brutally, and hundreds or more may have died in post-war AFDL re-education
camps.
These soldiers from the east have a vested interest in preventing a mutiny or
coup by a different regional group. They are very aware that they might
themselves face re-education camps if Kabila were overthrown by a non-
Katangan. As a result, the Swahili speakers remain the only FAC troops that fight
with any enthusiasm. Soldiers from Katanga make-up the backbone of the FAC.
Swahili replaced Lingala early in Kabila’s presidency as the language of
command. In August 1999, some 760 new officers were appointed, many of who
were Katangans. Since the outbreak of the current rebellion however, their
predominance has been diluted somewhat.
Important units for the protection of the regime are still dominated by the
Katangans however. Approximately 80 per cent of the Kinshasa-based FIC are
reputed to be Balubakat. The unit in charge of protecting the Presidential palace
is entirely composed of people from Kabila’s hometown of Manono.153 The
second most important component of the security forces are Lunda troops from
South-Western Katanga and Bandundu. Many Tigers are Lundans, as are the
Angolan-trained leaders of Kabila’s army such as General Nawesh, Colonel
Kapend, and General Faustin Munene.154 Not coincidentally, the two groups are
historical enemies of one another. The Lunda supported secession attempt of
Moïse Tshombe, and many subsequently became ‘Katangan Gendarmes’, while
the Balubakat favoured the Lumumba government.
Corruption, favouritism, and differences in units’ pay pose the greatest threat to
the regime. The most serious breakdown in military discipline in Kinshasa under
this regime, a two-hour shootout at camp Tchatchi, occurred in late August.
There were no official reports of casualties, but sources close to the Presidency
said at least 15 men were killed and 27 wounded. It arose when a previously
privileged group of soldiers, alleged to be Kivu Kadogos, did not receive their
habitual bonus, and refused to go to the front. When it was discovered that this
group had kept weapons within the camp, the Kinshasa brigade was sent to
suppress the mutiny. The unit regarded Joseph Kabila as its patron, and refused
to answer the orders of any other commander, resulting in the shoot-out. Since
September, rumours and accusations about a vendetta against Kadogos and
more specifically Kivutian members of the FAC have spread. Officers reportedly
unhappy with their treatment and Kabila’s lack of decisive support for the Mai-
                                        
152The historical descendants of the tigers are the ‘Katangan Gendarmes’. When their attempted
succession from the Congo failed, they fled to Angola and joined with the MPLA in order to fight
Mobutu in the 1970s and 80s. They later contributed decisively to the AFDL effort to win the first
war.
153 ICG Interview, diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).
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Mai have been arrested “en masse”, further weakening the cohesion of the
armed forces155.
Morale in the FAC is generally very low. The August defeat of the elite 10th
Brigade on the Ubangui River has had serious consequences on the force’s
eagerness to fight. The pre-combat desertion rate in the FAC is estimated to be
60 per cent at least. At present, only frontline units are regularly paid or fed.156
These units’ families are expelled from the barracks in Camps Tchatchi and
Kokolo while they are away from home however, so that new recruits can be
lured with free housing.157 The regime has not introduced conscription, but many
recruits are press-ganged by local authorities or customary chiefs. The Ministry
for Defence launched a recruitment drive in Kinshasa in August 2000, which
netted only 1400 new soldiers. It then turned to the army camps to enlist
soldiers’ own children into the force. As the war continues therefore, discontent
is growing among all units.
c. No Grand Ethnic Alliance
The absence of regime building is also apparent in Kabila’s refusal to concede
any degree of power to recognised regional leaders. Kabila has chosen many of
his close collaborators in government from among the Congolese Diaspora. The
Ministers for the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Petroleum, Justice, Finance, Energy,
Human Rights, and the Secretary-General of the CPP all returned from exile
during the AFDL war. Most of them had been out of the country for a decade or
more, do not have domestic political power bases, and are not viewed as
legitimate community leaders by the public. Similarly, few of Kabila’s
collaborators had been leading figures in the internal opposition.158 Kabila cannot
tolerate the growth of independent leaders who might threaten him, and
responds harshly to challenges to his authority.
The main victims of this policy are the economically powerful Kasaians.  The
regime’s attitude towards them is typified by the affair of the Ngokas diamond
and the monopoly of industrial diamond marketing given in August to a single
and so far unknown Israeli company: IDI Diamond Ltd. In late May, Ngoyi
Kasanji, President of the Fédération des Diamantaires Congolais (Fecodi), the
private association of Congolese diamond traders, was arrested in Kinshasa
when he tried to sell a 267 carat stone. The government alleged that the
diamond was stolen from the state-run Miba mining company (Minière du
Bakwanga). Security officials confiscated the diamond and tried to sell it. Buyers
in Kinshasa stayed away however, after traders in Antwerp were warned that the
diamond was stolen property. Miba moreover had not reported the theft of any
                                        
155 Some suspect that up to 300 Kivutian officers have been arrested in October and November
2000. ICG interview, diplomatic corps, (December 2000) and CADI/Uvira, “SOS: Les militaires de
l’ex-Kivu en danger de mort à Kinshasa”, mimeo, 1/12/00.
156 When Kabila first came to power, the soldiers were promised US$ 100 a month by the
government. Soon afterwards, they began to be paid in FC at the official rate - five to six times
less than the black market rate.
157 Interview ICG, diplomatic corps, international NGOs and Congolese sources, Kinshasa,
(August-September 2000).
158 Two notable exceptions are Frederic Kibassa Maliba, former Minister for Mines and now
leader of the state authorised wing of the UDPS, and Theophile Mbemba, the Governor of
Kinshasa. Both men were once key figures in Tshisekedi’s UDPS, Kibassa as a regional standard
bearer, and Mbemba as a party strategist.
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diamonds during the period in question. Eventually Ngoyi was freed after his
case had been heard in court. It took another three months to persuade the
government to return the stone to him. After selling the diamond for a cool US$
18 million, Ngoyi held a parade in the capital to thank the President for seeing
justice done. Yet, the Ngokas diamond saga sent a strong message to the
diamond traders and the Luba of Kasai as a whole: their economic power would
not last if it did not serve the Government’s interest. The monopoly granted to
the previously unknown IDI Diamond, contained the same message. The deal
later collapsed when it became clear that IDI could not pay for consignments it
received. The attempt to freeze diamond tenders was nevertheless viewed as a
declaration of economic war by the Kasaians, revealing the government’s instinct
to destroy alternative sources of power in the country.
The same attitude prevails with the Equatorian economic elite. Bemba Saolona,
the Mobutist entrepreneur and Minister for Economic Affairs for a few months
(and father to rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba), was demoted in June 2000 and
arrested for a few weeks. Catherine Nzuzi wa Bombo, the leader of the MPR was
simultaneously detained for several weeks, sending a clear signal of the
behaviour that the President expected from members of the former regime.
The possibility of a political opening by the Kinshasa regime to former Mobutists,
or any other parties, is highly unlikely. Dominique Sakombi, the Information
Minister, set off for a tour of some Western capitals in November to meet ex-
Mobutists and other opposition figures. Sakombi was already responsible for the
return of General (professor) Likulia Bolongo, a former Prime Minister for
Mobutu, and of Professor Vunduawe Te Pemako, another heavyweight of the
previous Republic. Sakombi's mission is expected this time to involve a meeting
with Kengo Wa Dondo, among others. Likulia, Vunduawe or Lambert Mende are
useful people for Kinshasa to have on its side. They all have considerable
influence in their home areas: Vunduawe in Equateur, Likulia in Province
Orientale, and Mende in North Kasai Oriental. Any former Mobutist who does not
pledge his support to Jean-Pierre Bemba can be considered as a victory for
Kabila.
But Kabila did not offer much, other than immunity and the return of their
property. For some time it was thought that Likulia would get a senior cabinet
position, but in the end he was only given the Ministry for Transport. Catherine
Nzuzi Wa Mbombo, was in fact arrested the same day Vunduawe was 'unveiled',
as if to remind Mobutists that they are not permitted to operate as a party even
though individual ex-Mobutists may receive VIP treatment. Former rebels who
defect from the RCD receive the same treatment at the hands of Kinshasa. The
most important was Professor Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, who was groomed for the
post of Prime Minister (which was to be specially created for him). In the end
however, he was only offered the junior position of Minister for the
Francophonie, which he eventually turned down.159 Power sharing with leaders
of the previous regime or members of the rebellion is not on Kabila’s agenda.
In the end, Kabila’s rule does not rely on the legitimacy of the new political
institutions he attempted to create, or on strategic alliances with the country’s
regional power bases. Kabila simply filled the vacuum left by Mobutu’s
                                        
159 ICG Interview, diplomatic corps and Congolese informants, Kinshasa, (August-September
2000).
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overthrow, and has since managed to stay in power thanks to coercion, divide-
and-rule tactics, and most importantly – the support of foreign powers intent on
seeing a weak leader in Kinshasa.
B. Kabila and Co.: Angola, Zimbabwe, and Others
Kabila has no real power over his foreign backers, but has nevertheless made
himself valuable to them over the past three years. The proceeds of diamond and
cobalt sales - which are said to amount to approximately US$ 1 billion a year –
permit him to purchase weapons and otherwise finance the war. On the ground
however, he depends upon the support of his foreign allies: Angola and Zimbabwe
to hold the front and coordinate logistics, and the CNDD-FDD, Interahamwe and ex-
FAR to launch offensives.160 To pay for the presence of the foreign forces, Kabila
has mortgaged the economic resources of Government-held territory.
1. Angola: The Godfather
The decisive intervention of the FAA saved him from defeat at the hands of the
RPA in August 1998. Since then, Angolan heavy artillery support and air power
have played a key role in defending the Government-held towns of Mbuji Mayi
and Mbandaka.
In Luanda however, the recent military successes of the FAA in the DRC – and in
the region - have created a growing imperialist appetite in the MPLA regime. The
Angolans have intervened in four wars in the two Congos over the past three
years. The rationale for each intervention has been their strategy of encircling
UNITA, cutting off the rebels’ lines of communication and denying them secure
rear bases. They also sought to protect the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, wedged
between DRC and Congo Brazzaville.
These expeditions transformed the FAA into a regional policeman for West
Central Africa. President Dos Santos is seen by many as the new kingmaker of
the region. He controls Africa’s second largest resources of crude oil (production
is actually going to overtake Nigeria in 2001) and is said to be able to break half
a dozen neighbouring governments if he so chooses (Namibia, Zambia, DRC,
Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, RCA). Dos Santos has embraced this hegemonic role,
and intends to decide who rules in Kinshasa. This has provoked a competition
between Rwanda and Uganda for the favour of Angola. But for a bankrupt
country already embroiled in its own 25-year-old civil war, such ambitions can be
dangerous because they invite challenges.
a. The Angolan Civil War and the DRC
Angola first entered the DRC war to save Kabila’s regime and, afraid of the
vacuum that might result from his fall, guarantee that no support would be
forthcoming from Kinshasa to the UNITA rebels of Jonas Savimbi. It suspected
that Rwanda and Uganda had close ties to these rebel opponents. Both Entebbe
and Kigali airports were thought to be important hubs in the gunrunning and
diamond business of the Angolan rebels. At the time moreover, UNITA was in
the final stages of a major re-armament that guaranteed an imminent clash. In
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these circumstances, the FAA felt that an effort to break UNITA’s supply lines in
the DRC was an essential strategic objective.
The civil war between the MPLA regime and UNITA has raged almost
continuously since the country’s independence from Portugal in 1975. At first the
conflict was aggravated by cold war geopolitics that led the Soviet Union and
Cuba to back the Marxist MPLA regime, while the United States and apartheid-
era South Africa supported Savimbi. The end of the super power conflict brought
hopes for peace to Angola with the signing of the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord.
Subsequently, when Savimbi refused to accept the UN monitored September
1992 election results, the war resumed.161 An uneasy peace later returned to the
country with the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. This agreement however, also unravelled
because UNITA failed to comply with its terms, which specified returning territory
to state control, handing in its weapons and demobilising its troops.
In the months leading up to the outbreak of the second rebellion in the DRC, the
MPLA’s rebel opponents became increasingly powerful. UNITA had used the brief
interlude of peace to re-build the military potential of its purported 60,000 strong
force.162 The glut of former Warsaw Pact weaponry for sale at this time benefited
UNITA arms purchasers. Using false end-user certificates supplied by the
Government of Zaire among others, and the services of a number of shady arms
dealers, the rebel movement purchased tanks, armoured personnel carriers,
artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and small arms.163 Countries from
which these weapons were purchased reportedly include Bulgaria, Ukraine,
Belarus, and the Russian Federation.
By mid 1998, it was essential for the FAA to cut UNITA’s supply lines and deny
them the use of DRC’s ports and airfields. The rebel’s perennial shortage of fuel
was their critical weakness. They would also need spare parts, weapons and
munitions in the coming clash. Their increased reliance on vehicles promised
moreover, to make these needs even more pressing.
There were nonetheless risks associated with Luanda’s decision to send
thousands of its best troops to the DRC when a major rebel offensive loomed.
The country was faced with an external debt burden of US$ 11 billion and
                                        
161 In response to UNITA’s repeated broken promises the UN imposed a laundry list of sanctions
upon the movement. In September 1993 Resolution 864 imposed the first set upon the sale of
arms and petroleum products to the rebels. A second package of sanctions came with Resolution
1127 in October 1997 that closed the its overseas offices, froze UNITA bank accounts, forbade
unauthorized flights into its territories, and banned international travel by its leaders. In July
1998, a third set of sanctions were imposed with Resolution 1173 that forbade the sale of
mining equipment to the rebels, and banned international trade in Angolan diamonds not
certified by the Luanda government.
162 See United Nations. Security Council. ‘Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the
Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council’ with enclosure ‘Report of
the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA’, (10 March
2000); Action for Southern Africa, ‘Waiting on Empty Promises: The Human Cost of International
Inaction on Angolan Sanctions’, (April 2000); ALSO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH.
163 These reportedly included four T-64 main battle tanks, BMP-1 and BMP-2 armoured vehicles,
South African made SAMil-100 armoured personnel carriers, BM-22 Uragan multiple rocket
launcher, 73mm SPG-9 anti-tank guns, and ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns.
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depressed world oil prices.164 UNITA attacks moreover, picked-up almost
immediately as the rebels moved to recapture those territories they had earlier
surrendered to the government. The long-awaited UNITA offensive began in
earnest in December 1998, with large-scale armour and artillery supported
assaults upon the towns of Huambo and Cuito in the central highlands. To
repulse these attacks, the FAA was forced to fly in reinforcements from its forces
in the DRC. Fighting in the central region of the country, and in the north along
the frontier with the Congo, raged through the spring.
Many reports from these battles highlight the links between the wars in Angola
and the DRC. According to Angolan radio in the December attacks on Cuito there
were many Rwandans and Banyamulenges.165 There are also reports of Ugandan
troops being seconded to UNITA forces.166 On 26 March 1999 UNITA reportedly
captured the important frontier city of Maquelo do Zombo with the help of
Congolese rebels. To recapture the town, the heads of state from Angola,
Namibia, Zimbabwe and the DRC agreed to mount a joint operation.167 And
indeed, on 28 April 1999 it was reported that UNITA had been driven back into
Uige by FAA troops operating out of the DRC.168 A 29 September 2000 press
release from Action by Churches Together reported that two FAA battalions from
the DRC were operating against UNITA forces in Moxico province.
The Government counter-offensive began in September 1999, after the signature
of the Lusaka Ceasefire for the DRC. FAA forces rapidly lifted the siege of Cuito
and Huambo. Under the pressure, UNITA began to crumble. One reason for the
collapse was a shortage of fuel. UNITA only had 500,000 litres of fuel
(approximately 25 tankers-full) when the FAA struck. By January, this had
declined to only 100,000.169 Within months, the conventional military capacity
that it had built up since 1994 was destroyed. A mid-November press story
quoted a Western diplomat with access to intelligence reports on Angola saying
that there had been a significant drop in UNITA radio communications since the
onset of the offensive. “They are almost silent now, and this is an indication both
of a crisis in the leadership as well as the loss of communications equipment.”170
The FAA captured its fortified headquarters at Jambo on 24 December 1999. By
July 2000 the Government claimed to control 92 per cent of the country’s 157
districts. The last provincial capital in UNITA hands, Cazombo on the Zambian
                                        
164 In April 1999 the Angola government announced that it had exhausted its savings on the war
effort against UNITA. At about the same time press reports indicated that it had been forced to
mortgage future oil sales to finance the purchase of weapons. See ‘ Government Mortages Oil
Sales for Military Equipment’, IRIN (11 May 1999).
165 Angola Peace Monitor, no. 4 vol. V (18 December 1999).
166 ‘Zambian Aid for Angolan Rebels’, Mail and Guardian, Johannesburg (9 April 2000).
167 The Zimbabwe Independent reported on 5 November that 2,000 Zimbabwean Commandos
had been operating in Angola for four months under the command of Brigadier general Kachana.
The Zimbabwe government denied the report.
168Angola Peace Monitor, no. 8 vol. V (29 April 1999).
169 To resolve thi fuel shortage Savimbi turned for assistance to Jean-Pierre Bemba among
others. The Equateur Businessman reportedly complied by purchasing fuel in Zambian to sell the
Angolan rebels. See Angola Peace Monitor, no. 7 vol. VI (30 March 2000); United Nations.
Security Council. ‘Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola
Addressed to the President of the Security Council’ with enclosure ‘Report of the Panel of
Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA’, (10 March 2000) para 64-65.
170 ‘Unita General Defects’, IRIN, (19 November 1999).
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border, fell on 19 September along with its strategically important three-
kilometre airstrip.
In strictly military terms, the intervention of Angola in the DRC is a success. The
year 2000 witnessed the defeat of UNITA as a conventional military force. This
was due in large part to the presence of FAA troops in the DRC, which frustrated
UNITA efforts to find fuel, munitions, and spare parts. Nevertheless, the rebel
movement retains its nation-wide organization and is capable of continuing its
guerilla war. Already in the midst of the government victories, there has been a
rise in ambushes, hit and run attacks, standoff bombardments and mine-laying
actions across the country.171 Government control outside the towns is reported
to be tenuous at best.
b. The Angolan Commitment to Kabila
The Angolan commitment in the DRC war, following its original intervention, has
been minimal. FAA forces in the country are thought to have remained less than
5,000, and are at present said to number only 2,500. Its troops limit themselves
to protecting important strategic points such as the port of Matadi, the Kamina
airbase, and the Inga hydro-electricity dam that feeds the Angolan grid.172 Also
important is the FAA’s fleet of MiG and Sukhui jet planes and helicopter gunships
that remain ready to intervene in the DRC
The economic spoils of the DRC war are distributed by Dos Santos himself and
help to cement his overall hold on power. The Presidency controls Sonangol
(National Angolan Fuel Company), which, in return for the FAA’s assistance, has
gained control of DRC’s petroleum distribution and production networks via its
Cohydro firm. Reports in 1999 suggest that Kabila relinquished his government's
share of the offshore Coco crude production, estimated at 15,000 barrels per
day.173 Angola has also positioned itself to control deals covering future
exploration in Kinshasa's offshore territorial Congo Basin. These agreements
were in part, negotiated by Mpoyo, who has ethnic ties to Angola. Strategically
therefore, Angola has gained control of a 1,000 km stretch of Atlantic seaboard,
including DRC, Congo-Brazzaville and its own Cabinda enclave - and this could
translate into further gains in the oil industry. 174
c. What Next?
Angola’s intervention in the DRC has created new interests and new enemies. Its
financial interests in the Congo, as well as the reputed interests of its generals in
the country’s diamond business, makes it difficult for Luanda to contemplate a
loss of influence. The intervention has also transformed former allies, like
Rwanda, into enemies.175
                                        
171 ‘Security Report Suggests UNITA Still Strong’, IRIN (28 November 2000).
172 Interview ICG, members of the diplomatic corps, Kinshasa, (August-September 2000).
173 Energy Compass, (12 March 1999).
174 Africa Confidential, (20 November 1998).
175 After the failure of the August 1998 attack on Kinshasa, two RPA Battalions and allied ex-FAC
forces were stranded in Bas-Congo by the FAA’s arrival. In order to rescue these forces,
Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame contacted Savimbi to request his assistance. No doubt
aware of the advantages to be had with such a relationship, the Angolan rebel agreed to allow
the RPA to withdraw into the UNITA-controlled Northeast of Angola, from where they were later
evacuated by aircraft to Kigali. There are also reports that some RPA remained with UNITA. See
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The Angolan rebels appear to have remained in contact with Kigali. Areas of co-
operation have included the dispatch of UNITA SA-16 Anti-Aircraft crews to aid
the Rwandan-backed RCD rebels in Congo.176 In return Kigali seems to have
permitted the Angolan rebels to use Kigali as a transhipment point for diamonds,
weapons and war materials. There are also allegations that after UNITA’s 1999
loss of Andulo and Bailundo, the movement deployed troops to fight alongside
the RPA in the DRC. In addition, Rwanda reportedly attempted to carry out an
airdrop into UNITA territory on 15 January 2000.177
The state of Angola’s relations with Uganda are little better, as evidenced by its
views on Bemba. Luanda distrusts Kabila for his erratic behaviour, and penchant
for presenting his allies with faits accomplis such as the summer 2000 Equateur
offensive. At times therefore, it suits Angola to appear equivocal. Its officials
make an effort to tell foreigners that they are fed up with Kabila. The day after
the FAA Chief of Staff’s late September meeting with Museveni, Kabila was
summoned to Luanda for three hours of discussion with Dos Santos, the subject
of which was not disclosed to observers. Luanda however, has no intention of
dropping Kabila for Bemba - to whom they refer as the ‘young delinquent’.178
The evidence of MLC cooperation with Savimbi therefore, as well as Bemba’s
Mobutist links, are sufficient to condemn him in Angola’s eyes. 179 This message
was driven home to Ugandan Army Commander Jeje Odongo in late October
when, during a visit to Luanda, he was given displays of Angolan military power.
Angola remains therefore, the most important of Kabila’s allies. It fears that
replacing the DRC president – or permitting his flight to Lubumbashi - could open
the way for UNITA to re-establish its bases in the DRC. Other factors
contributing to Angola’s support for Kabila include its fears that chaos could
erupt in Kinshasa were it to attempt to replace him, as well as its disinclination to
give up the spoils of the war he provides. Its forces in Cabinda, Brazzaville,
Pointe-noire and Dolisi are positioned within a few hours of the Congo’s capital
city. Even more important are their allies in the DRC government. Former
Katangan ‘Tigers’, whose leaders all served in the FAA, are the most influential
members of the security forces. Angola is also training the PIR together with
Congo-Brazzaville’s police.
                                                                                                                               
United Nations. Security Council. ‘Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the
Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council’ with enclosure ‘Report of
the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA’, (10 March 2000)
para 25-26.
176 By February 1999 this battery was reputed to have shot down one MiG fighter. See United
Nations. Security Council. ‘Letter Dated 10 March 2000 From the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in
Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council’ with enclosure ‘Report of the Panel of
Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA’, (10 March 2000) para 50.
177 Action for Southern Africa, ‘Waiting on Empty Promises: The Human Cost of International
Inaction on Angolan Sanctions’, (April 2000).
178 ICG Interview, European Diplomat, Brussels (31 October 2000).
179 According to an opposition newspaper in Kinshasa, flights between UNITA airstrips and
Bemba's Equateur airstrips have occurred in the past months.
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This support for Kabila was revealed in the 27 October Kinshasa summit,
organised under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African
States (CEEAC), which called for the revision of the Lusaka agreement. 180 In
attendance were Dos Santos and Kabila, along with the heads of state of Congo-
Brazzaville, Gabon, and the Prime Ministers of Equatorial Guinea and the Central
African Republic. Some observers believe that this meeting is evidence of the
formation of a coalition of central African oil-producing countries, under the
leadership of Dos Santos and supported by France, to oppose Rwanda, Uganda
and Burundi.
Another important motivation behind the meeting was the war’s effect upon the
Congo River trade. The summit’s participants agreed to mount patrols to ensure
security on the Congo and Ubangui Rivers. Gabonese President Omar Bongo
warned Bemba to take note of this initiative. “If he attacks us, we will respond in
good and due form,” he told reporters.181
Kabila’s dependence upon this support was demonstrated in the November
Government re-shuffle. Yerodia was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the Ministry for Education. He had been a diplomatic disaster, and
since early August had been handicapped by the issue of an international
warrant against him by a Belgian Judge for his role in the August 1998 massacre
of Tutsis in Kinshasa. His replacement was the internationally respected former
Minister for Human Rights, Leonard She Okitundu. Other key figures in the new
regime are thought to have close links with Luanda because they are Lundas
from near the Angolan border. These include the new Vice Foreign Minister,
Ilunga Awan, Generals Yav, Numbi, Munene, and the Governors of Katanga and
Bas-Congo.
Luanda is said to be considering the establishment of a transition government
however, either with or without Kabila.182 The new leadership could be the
product of a power-sharing agreement negotiated between the foreign
belligerents. How the Angolans could depose Kabila, without calling into question
the legitimacy of their original intervention to save him, and without provoking a
major succession crisis in Kinshasa, is unclear. Moreover, it is unlikely that
Luanda would want to see a strong government emerge in Kinshasa.
But Luanda is in a risky position. The desire to be a regional hegemon is a
dangerous distraction for a country still in the throes of its own vicious civil war,
and which admits to being broke.183 To date, it has been able to maintain its
ambitions with only a minimal commitment of troops, but a serious reverse on
the military front would force it to live up to its pretensions. The DRC is a second
front in its own civil war, and Luanda would be forced to increase FAA troops
deployed to the country. Discussions on the subject held in mid-April 2000
between the Defence Ministers of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia in Kinshasa,
allegedly concluded that that the FAA would have to send more troops.184 Now,
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181 ‘Central African leaders Want to Alter Congo Accord’, Reuters (28 October 2000).
182 ICG Interview, Brussels, (27 October2000); ‘Angola America’s Good new Friend Luanda’, The
Economist (7 October 2000).
183 In April 1999, the Angolan government declared that it had exhausted its savings. See C.
Gordan, ‘Angola’s Debt Burde’, Daily Mail and Guardian (1 July 1999).
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in early December Government sources in Kinshasa report that additional
Angolan forces have been deployed to Lubumbashi in response to hints of
withdrawal from Harare, and in the aftermath of the Pweto defeat. The scale of
Luanda’s commitment to the DRC in other words, is not entirely its own to
decide.
Another option for Luanda would be to try and fashion a deal with either Rwanda
or Uganda. At present there appears to be competition between the two Great
Lakes countries to curry favour with Angola. Luanda could decide to accept one
or the other of these aspirants were a Zimbabwean withdrawal from the DRC
actually to take place. Nevertheless, this would be a radical departure from its
habitual antipathy towards all those with ties to UNITA, as well as its DRC policy
of the past three years. The likelihood of a pro-UNITA regime in Kinshasa,
originating either out of the Mobutist MLC, or somewhat more improbably, out of
the Rwandan-backed rebels, probably means that Angola cannot surrender its
hold over Kinshasa.185
2. Zimbabwe: Trapped in the Congo
The backbone of the FAC is Zimbabwe’s contribution of 11,000 professional
soldiers. They include infantry, artillery units, an armoured car squadron, tanks,
engineers and support staff, along with periodic deployments of UK-built Hawk
and Hunter ground attack aircraft. Namibian troops are also present. These
number from 1,600 to 2,000, and include an artillery battalion. These troops are
vital for the defence of Mbandaka and Mbuji Mayi.
For Zimbabwe the involvement in the DRC has always been a dangerous
adventure that it could not afford. President Mugabe’s August 1998 decision to
intervene had more to do with his own ambitions to assert his leadership as an
African statesman, and the economic interests of the ruling elite, than with the
interests of his country. Now under political pressure at home, he finds that he is
stuck in the Congo. He cannot pull out without achieving a return on what he
has already foolishly invested in the war. This would damage the interests of
powerful domestic political forces upon whose support his position depends. Nor
can he afford to fight because of the economic crisis that afflicts his country.
a. Zimbabwe’s Financial Interests in the DRC
Protocols for military and economic cooperation between Zimbabwe and the DRC
pre-dated the outbreak of the war. Since then, Kabila has promised Zimbabwe a
great deal more in return for its military support. On 4 September 1998,
Presidents Kabila and Mugabe signed a deal providing for a ‘self-financing’
intervention by the Zimbabwean National Defence Force (ZNDF). Under its
terms, Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) was to provide arms and munitions
to the DRC, in return for which the Zimbabwean mining company, Ridgepointe,
would take over the management of Gecamines, and receive a 37.5 per cent
share of the DRC state mining company. Moreover, between 20 and 30 per cent
of the DRC government’s 62.5 per cent of the firm’s profits was to be used for
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financing the Zimbabwean war effort.186 Subsequent agreements have dealt with
electric power, civil aviation and agriculture.
So far however, the benefits to Zimbabwe have been elusive. When the Lusaka
agreement was signed, the DRC government already owed the Government of
Zimbabwe US$2.6 million for arms payments. Subsequently, it has stopped
paying the monthly instalments it owes Zimbabwe.187 Other forms of
compensation have proved equally fruitless. Zimbabwean exporters face twin
obstacles in doing business with the Congo - a lack of hard currency on either
side, plus the lack of a banking system in the DRC. Up to the present some
imports have been bartered for electricity or paid for in FC distributed to
Zimbabwean troops. In August, ZDI announced they had exported two million
dollars worth of food to the DRC in three months, paid for by barter. More
imports are expected to come on stream with the opening of a so-called ‘Grand
Silo’ project in Kinshasa. Banks in DRC and in Zimbabwe have been found to
guarantee (in local currencies) barter transactions, and the storage facilities for
Zimbabwean products are being built.
The Zimbabweans were wrong to believe that Gecamines could easily make
them profits. Harare does not have the US$50 Million required to restore the
firm’s operations.  Meanwhile, the state mining company produces only between
10 and 20 per cent of its 1980s production of 475,000 tonnes of copper and
17,000 tonnes of cobalt.188 A contract with Gecamines to supply 2,500 tonnes of
copper monthly to a reprocessing plant in Zimbabwe produced only 3,000 tonnes
over 18 months.189 In addition, the firm faces US$1 billion of long-term debt and
has immediate trade liabilities of US$50 million.190 The chairmanship of white
Zimbabwean transport mogul Billy Rautenbach, who had been Mugabe’s pick for
the post, was terminated last year because of his failure to turn the firm
around.191
Other Zimbabwean mining interests include a joint venture between its army firm
Osleg (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy), and the DRC’s Comiex, to buy diamonds
and gold for sale on the Kinshasa Precious Minerals Market. Harare was reported
to be investing US$3.5 million a month earlier this year.192 Short of funds these
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firms tried to float the Oryx Diamonds mining consortium on the London Stock
Exchange in June 2000, but were blocked by the British Foreign Office.193
Outside the mining sector, Harare has other interests. The ailing Zimbabwean
Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) has signed a deal to double its import of
electricity from the Inga Dam in Bas-Congo. The deal is dependent on
rehabilitating Inga’s power plant, as well as upgrading the capacity of the link to
Zimbabwe via Katanga and Zambia. The plan makes good economic sense but
depends on the still uncertain participation of Western or South African firms. In
addition, 500,000 hectares of Katanga farmland was given to one of Zimbabwe’s
largest state-owned farms.194 In the longer term the plan is also to upgrade rail
links between Zimbabwe and Kinshasa. The funds required for all these projects
will be difficult to raise without peace.
The Zimbabwean Government has admitted that its involvement in the Congo
war is costing the country more than it can afford - US$200 million in the two
years since August 1998, according to Finance Minister Simba Makoni. ‘Our
economy cannot support spending of this magnitude over the long term’, said Mr
Makoni in August, ‘which is why the government is committed to repatriating the
troops at the first opportunity.’ The ZNDF claims to spend US$3 million a month
for the upkeep of its 11,000 troops – a third of its entire force - deployed to the
Congo. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank assessed the
true monthly figure at US$27 million, and put on hold US$340 million of
desperately needed aid to the country.195 In February 2000, one Harare
newspaper (whose editors had received numerous death threats) reported that
the country had spent $US160 Million in public funds during the 18 months of
war – although these had not appeared in any budget. In addition, it reported
that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces had lost equipment valued in excess of
US$180 million over the same period.196 Even Makoni admitted, in late August,
that the war had cost over US$ 200 million. His calculations, however, accounted
only for food rations, salaries and basic equipment for the troops and did not
include the US$73 million in spending on new equipment from France, Russia,
and Libya.197
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The government had perhaps naively expected these costs to be recouped from
the proceeds of the deals in Congolese diamonds, gold and copper. Zimbabwe
Defence Minister Moven Mahachi once described joint ventures with the DRC as
a payment option: “Instead of our Army in the DRC burdening the treasury for
more resources, which are not available, it embarks on viable projects for the
sake of generating the necessary revenue.” 198 Unfortunately, the DRC did not
prove to be the El Dorado that Zimbabwe expected to find when it intervened,
and Mahachi has since admitted that: “The DRC is willing to contribute to the
upkeep of our forces, but it does not have the necessary cash to do so.”199
b. Domestic Political Crises
At home meanwhile, Mugabe is faced with escalating political and economic
crises. After twenty years of rule, the President’s ZANU-PF party has come under
serious pressure from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). A
violent campaign for the country’s fifth parliamentary election, marred by
widespread efforts to intimidate opposition voters, resulted in the nine-month-old
opposition party winning 57 out of 120 seats. This has sparked growing
opposition to Mugabe from within the ruling party itself, which threatens his hold
on the movement’s leadership post, although – despite much anticipatory
speculation - no challenge to him emerged at the December 2000 ZANU/PF
congress. The opposition MDC opposition submitted a motion to impeach
Mugabe that was accepted for consideration by the ZANU-PF controlled
Assembly, and the parliamentary and general political pressure upon him is not
expected to dissipate.
The public dissatisfaction with Mugabe is being driven in large part by his
stewardship over the worst economic crisis that the country has experienced
since its independence. The government is in the process of dismantling its
white-owned and economically successful commercial farming sector in order to
carry out politically motivated land redistributions.200 Riots have erupted in
Harare and Bulawayo, sparked by an annual inflation rate of over 62 per cent,
along with an unemployment rate of over 50 per cent.201 All foreign aid programs
are under review and both the World Bank and the IMF have suspended loans.
Foreign exchange reserves are dangerously low, according to the Deputy Finance
Minister, and fuel lines are at their worst after nearly a year of critical shortages.
As a consequence, Zimbabwe is listed among the world’s poorest countries in a
World Bank report that predicts 120 per cent inflation and a 10 per cent drop in
GDP during the upcoming year.202
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c. The Search for an Exit
Mugabe has been looking for a honourable exit from his Congolese adventure for
some time. His government is adamant that he came to Congo in order to help a
SADC ally invaded by enemies and that his motivation was to guarantee the
integrity of the Congolese territory, rather than to salvage the rule of Kabila.203
He seems to have been willing to sign a ceasefire deal as early as November
1998. Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC had all agreed on the ceasefire,
which was rejected by the Congolese rebellion. At about the same time, rebel
forces had cut off a large contingent of Zimbabwean troops at Ikela, in Southern
Equateur Province, and had forced Harare to enter into talks with Kigali for the
evacuation of the wounded and the delivery of food supplies. Embarrassed when
this was disclosed in the press, Harare denied that the story was true. Since then
Kabila’s intransigence has sabotaged the frustrated Zimbabwean efforts to find
an exit. After his late 1999 Equateur offensive, one Zimbabwean official in
Kinshasa commented: ‘He’s like a man who starts six fires when he’s only got
one fire extinguisher…The fire fighters are the Zimbabwean Army’.
Under pressure at home, and increasingly anxious about the Congolese
quagmire, Mugabe has steadily distanced himself from Kabila. In March 2000,
while attending the National Consultation in Kinshasa, he delivered a speech that
invoked the memory of Patrice Lumumba and called for Bantu solidarity, but did
not once mention Kabila. Relations between the two men worsened in April after
Kabila refused to accept the deployment of UN troops in Kinshasa, and rejected
the OAU-appointed Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, former Botswana
President and long-time Mugabe friend, Sir Ketumile Masire. Kabila later stayed
away from the 6 August SADC summit in Windhoek, on the excuse that he was
‘busy’. When he was late for the 14-15 August Lusaka summit, and then walked
out early claiming he had to attend a funeral, Mugabe said publicly that it would
be difficult to resolve the war if Kabila did not start listening to his allies. At the
time Mugabe and the other allies had refused to back Kabila’s call for a revision
of Lusaka agreement.
The subsequent 16 October summit in Maputo, chaired by South African
President Thabo Mbeki, was held in response to an appeal from Mugabe to find
relief for the threatened garrison of Mbandaka.204 The meeting’s participants
reiterated their support for the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan.
Immediately afterwards, Mbeki flew to Kigali, where he lectured Rwandan
leaders about the fruitlessness of the war while speaking at the opening of the
October reconciliation conference. The Rwandans were in no humour to listen,
as they were angered by the offensive in Katanga that had begun on the very
day of the Maputo Summit, and which involved Zimbabwean troops. When
Mugabe later addressed the COMESA summit in Lusaka on 31 October, he turned
to Kagame and remarked acidly, “There are some warmongers on the African
continent. It is something that Africa must discourage.”205
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Since he is cannot afford the war, Mugabe has strong incentives to find a
settlement. However, he has already made a substantial investment in the
Congo, which compels him to maintain ZNDF forces in the DRC (there is a direct
correlation between the between the number of troops and the respect for
contracts already signed). Mugabe’s own pride also stands in the way of a
withdrawal. A unilateral departure from the DRC is virtually impossible without
admitting defeat, and he cannot bring home a defeated army with the 2002
presidential elections looming on the horizon. Even opposition leader Morgan
Tsvangirai, despite his repeated commitments to withdraw troops from the DRC,
is calling for this to be done ‘with honour’. Unfortunately, this appearance of
Zimbabwean weakness only encourages Rwanda and Uganda to maintain their
military pressure rather than negotiate. For example, Kigali’s early December
2000 desire to continue to attack in the vicinity of Pweto may have been a
strategy to bring Mugabe down at the mid-month ZANU-PF party congress.
Finally, Zimbabwe is not strong enough to sign a deal without the permission of
its allies. In particular, it would be difficult to withdraw the several thousand
Zimbabwean troops from Mbuji Mayi without the agreement of the far more
numerous Congolese and Interahamwe.
The withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces could occur however, if Mugabe fell from
power. The reality of this threat is apparent in the recent price riots and the
growing political opposition, even though for the moment he remains in control
of his party and, perhaps more importantly, key elements of the security
services. Mugabe’s fall would certainly upset the current military stalemate, and
could have far-reaching effects upon the outcome of the war. Kabila would be
deprived of some of the best troops fighting on his side, and the defence of
Mbuji Mayi would be substantially weakened. Angola would be forced to decide
whether its interests in Congo justified taking Zimbabwe’s place in the frontlines.
If they are not willing to do this, they would have to sacrifice Kabila for the sake
of a deal with Rwanda or Uganda. If these two countries could not overcome
their distrust for one another, and agree on a candidate to rule their giant
neighbour however, the result of a Zimbabwean withdrawal could well lead to a
prolongation of the war.
Namibia, the last SADC ally, came into the DRC conflict in a far more moderate
fashion than Angola and Zimbabwe. It claims that it could not refuse the request
of the other two SADC countries, and President Sam Nujoma is a long time
friend of Kabila. Only 2000 troops were reported to have moved into Congo, and
only to train some FAC units at the Kamina base. It also gained its share of DRC
resources. The London-based Africa Confidential reported in November 1998 that
Namibia benefited by supplying the DRC with fish and that Windhoek President
Sam Nujoma's brother-in-law, Aaron Mushimba, had been awarded a stake in
the Miba diamond mining company. The magazine indicated that Mushimba also
ran the business arm of the ruling South West Africa People's Organisation
(SWAPO) Kalahari Holdings. Namibian troops are on their way out, and their
leaving would actually have little impact on the status of the war.
3. The Other Allies: Mercenaries and Mineral Buyers
Other states have reportedly assisted Kabila’s regime. These include China,
Libya, Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and North Korea – which has been the most active.
Pyongyang deployed several hundred military advisors to the DRC in mid 1999,
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where they have served to train FAC forces.206 North Koreans have also assisted
with munitions production. They assemble 250-500 kg bombs at Camp Mura in
Likasi under the umbrella of the Congolese parastatal Afridex. Poor manufacture
resulted in the explosion of one of these at Njili Airport in Kinshasa on 14 April
2000.207 North Korea has apparently shown interest in the DRC’s Shunkolobwe
uranium mines in return for their support to the FAC. The mines are reported to
be in a state of complete disrepair however, and it is doubtful whether any
production is currently feasible. Ultimately North Korea – along with China - is
probably happy to get access to DRC’s cobalt, a key mineral for their
aeronautical industries.
Cynical commentators in Kinshasa deplore the fact that Kabila is ‘not even’ a
dictator. He himself is not in firm control of his country. Despite his canny ability
to maintain the support of his allies, he has been unable to build a sustainable
regime in Kinshasa, and is therefore, the DRC’s president only by default. That
Kabila is well aware of this tenuous position is made clear in his paranoia and
obsession with his own security. His policies are so erratic, however, that even
those hoping to help him are getting frustrated as regional and international
initiatives to end the war collapse one after the other. The prospects for the
future look grim indeed.
V. AN INSUFFICIENT RESPONSE TO A LEADERLESS PROCESS
The response of both the belligerents and the international community to the
situation in the DRC has been insufficient. The region’s meager efforts to implement
the Lusaka agreement have permitted a humanitarian tragedy to unfold in the
Congo. The international community’s efforts to help the Congolese, by creating
MONUC and supporting the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, have been at best, only half-
hearted. These institutions were to have overseen the implementation of the cease-
fire, and the evolution of the Congo towards a new ‘political dispensation’. Both
have since proved to be disappointments.
There are a variety of reasons why MONUC and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue have
failed up until now. Most apparent of these is the belligerents’ own duplicity and
obstruction of the process. They seem to prefer holding out for a return on their
investment in the war rather than find a solution to end it. None, moreover, wanted
to take the lead in the diplomatic process outlined by the agreement.  And finally,
the continued lack of international will to confront the problem of disarming the ex-
FAR and Interahamwe – which lies at the heart of both Congo wars – has also
undermined policy responses to the Lusaka agreement.
A. Humanitarian Tragedy is Underway in the DRC
1. Massive Displacement and Food Crisis
The pulverisation of the Congo has created a humanitarian tragedy in the
country. The International Rescue Committee, an American NGO, estimated in a
May report that the conflict had caused 1.7 million deaths by either direct or
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indirect means. Of these, some 200,000 were killed in fighting; the rest died as a
result of malnutrition and disease. Even if there is a degree of inaccuracy in
these figures extrapolated from a statistical analysis of 1,000 randomly picked
households, they still indicate the devastating impact of Congo’s war.
Up to 2 million persons have been displaced by the conflict, including an
estimated half million in the first six months of 2000 alone.208 A quarter of a
million have fled to neighbouring countries as refugees. In addition, refugees
from other conflicts such as Angola (18,000 in October 2000 alone) have fled
into the DRC. A FAO mission to the remote central Maniema region estimated
that 68 per cent of the population had been forced to flee their homes at some
point since August 1998, and that 110,000 were still hiding in the forest.209
Displaced populations are utterly destitute. Regions that have suffered severely
from displacement include:
! Ituri: Four or five rounds of inter-ethnic fighting around Bunia, manipulated
by business interests, have caused tens of thousands of deaths and displaced
some 125,000 people
! Kisangani: Three clashes between the forces of Rwanda and Uganda have
caused well over a thousand deaths and, at one time, 60,000 displaced
! Equateur: During fighting in August-September 2000, some 120,000 fled,
either to other areas inside DRC or across the frontiers to the Republic of
Congo and the Central African Republic
! Kivus: In the last year the number of displaced has risen to 1,090,000
! Katanga: Here the recent October-December fighting between the
Government alliance and the Rwandans and their client RCD forces has
displaced some 150,000-200,000.210
Economic conditions have worsened due to the conflict, even for populations
that have not been displaced. Normal trade routes have been cut or disrupted by
battle lines. Two examples are barge traffic on the rivers, or roads to
Banyamulenge-inhabited areas of South Kivu. As a result, markets have
collapsed for food surplus areas, while food prices have skyrocketed in food
deficit areas. In regions such as the Kasais, the collapse of food markets and
insecurity have forced inhabitants to switch from farming to other activities, such
as the exploitation of mineral resources due to their high value and portability.
Finally, the entire population has suffered a reduced access to both health care
and education – creating the conditions for long-term impoverishment, spread of
disease and even the perpetuation of the conflict for a younger, unschooled
generation. The World Food Program estimates that approximately 16 million -
one third of the DRC population - are affected by food shortages, with two
million of these facing ‘critical’ shortages.211
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A novel characteristic of DRC’s humanitarian disaster is the prospect of urban
famine and suffering in the capital, Kinshasa – which is one of Sub-Saharan
Africa’s largest cities with a population of 4.5 to six million. The city has
benefited from the redirection of food exports from Bandundu Province due to
fighting in the traditional markets of Northern Angola. However, UNDP reported
in mid-2000 that the food supply to the capital was 100,000 tons below the pre-
war level. In 1999, the agency estimated that food supply was 400,000 tons, or
30 per cent, below pre-war levels – which were still regarded as significantly
below adequate. Other estimates of the situation are less dire. But even if food is
present in the market, the recent 53 per cent depreciation in the official value of
the FC, as well as the annualized inflation rate of 298.6 per cent, combine to put
its price out of reach of the average Congolese household.
2. Lack of Donor Commitment
The low level of assistance can also be blamed on the international donors, who
have displayed a marked lack of interest in funding humanitarian efforts in the
DRC. Of the US$37,039,207 requested by the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency
Appeal for 2000, donors have contributed US$9,380,611 – or just 25.3 per cent.
By comparison, the UN committed US$58.7 million to the MONUC peacekeeping
mission up to June 2000, out of a budgeted US$200 million aimed purely at
covering operations up to the stage of deploying the 5,537-strong force.212
Ultimately, MONUC was itself supposed to provide a vehicle for the delivery of
aid, but since it has not been able to deploy more than a fraction of its force, this
option has not been implemented.
Rampant insecurity also blocks humanitarian access to most at-risk populations.
These difficulties are compounded by the relief agencies’ own failure to bind the
various combatants to formal agreements to cooperate with aid operations. They
have also been reluctant to establish regular contacts with so-called ‘non-state
actors’, such as the Mai Mai and other guerrilla armies. To be fair communication
with such groups is difficult. They operate in secrecy for the most part, and
leaders are hard to identify. Aid groups also worry about giving undeserved
legitimacy to them, and are concerned not to endanger their relations with the
RCD authorities. Finally their hesitation stems from their political reluctance to
contradict the architects of Lusaka, who term these armies as ‘negative forces’,
despite the fact that they may control territory and enjoy a degree of local
support.
Donors are also aware that among the catalysts for the country’s last two wars
was the role played by UN agencies and NGOs in the delivery of aid to Hutu
refugees in Eastern Congo between 1994 and 1996. During this period,
Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias were able to rearm and train in the protection
of the camps. From that point, they were able to both threaten Rwanda’s
borders and ignite existing local ethnic tensions. The subsequent dispersal of
these extremist forces following the AFDL/RPA invasion helped to destabilise the
entire region.
Finally, humanitarian operations are hampered by the DRC’s vast size,
remoteness and the collapse of the infrastructure. Many areas are accessible
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only by air, the most expensive option open to agencies. As a result of this, not
more than 10,000 tonnes of food have been transported by this means.
3. An Urgent Necessity to Create Incentives for Peace
The Congo war is a complex emergency: political, military and humanitarian
aspects of the crisis are frequently interdependent. In such circumstances, the
prospects of resolving conflict will not diminish unless the humanitarian aspect is
addressed. Despite this, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement failed to make
provision for humanitarian action – nor have the parties signed a formal protocol
covering guarantees of access, security or freedom from rebel or government
fees and taxes. No single UN office co-ordinates humanitarian efforts in the DRC,
although the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is meant
to. In addition there is a department under the stalemated MONUC peacekeeping
mission. Some UN officials believe a separate humanitarian office should be
created under an influential ‘Czar’ to champion DRC aid efforts both
internationally and on the ground. However, officials within the world body itself
have so far stymied this plan.213
Addressing the humanitarian crisis coherently, apart from doing more to alleviate
suffering, could build bridges towards ethnic reconciliation alongside the
framework of Lusaka and slow down the militarisation of local communities.
Examples on the ground abound of how humanitarianism could assist with
building peace on a local level. The UN has organised ‘national immunisation
days’ against polio, measles and other diseases. It has reached 10.2 million
beneficiaries and only in conflict zones of Equateur did access prove impossible.
To access children in the Kivus, aid workers have built informal contacts with
guerrillas such as the Mai Mai – or local paramedics have emerged from the
forests to obtain vaccines. In Kisangani, workers have maintained the city’s
water and electricity services, despite fighting between rival foreign armies and
the fact that they have not been paid for months or even years. In rebel-held
areas, with UN assistance, children have been able to sit national exam papers
that are then transported to Kinshasa for marking – thus ensuring that at least
the vestiges of a Congolese education system survive.214
It is widely accepted that due to the increasing number of actors in the DRC’s
conflict, how the humanitarian assistance is given is as important as how much is
delivered. To be sure, logistics must be improved with greater funding –
particularly to establish a more efficient air transport capability. Before stepping
up aid in terms of financial commitments or commodities such as food, there is
wide acceptance that agencies should carefully target aid and take into account
the danger that it could fuel the conflict through providing resources to the
armed factions.215 As with the complex emergencies of the 1990s – such as
those of Somalia and Sudan – aid threatens to create a fresh logic for a
continuation of the conflict and the rise of warlord militias.
To avert such dangers, aid workers have advocated that humanitarian assistance
is aimed at promoting local peace initiatives and given to communities engaged
in ‘reconciliation and cohabitation’ efforts, including organisations such as the
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church and local NGOs. Secondly, more has to be done to access vulnerable
populations: currently just 18 per cent of the two million displaced receive
humanitarian relief.216 In areas such as the Kivus, one way to do this is to have
‘non-state actors’ drawn into negotiations for the delivery of aid and their good
conduct encouraged by ‘messages of peace’. Such approaches should also
include schemes such as ‘food for work’, that encourage disarmament, and help
rehabilitate the young men drawn into the conflict out of economic desperation.
B. The Failures of Lusaka
The Lusaka ceasefire agreement laid out a map for peace in the DRC that would
predictably, be difficult to follow. The document realistically identified the questions
of regional security and political reconstruction that must be confronted for peace to
be achieved, and it outlined useful institutions to lead the way. What the agreement
did not do was define who should take the leadership in overseeing its
implementation. The consequence has been that these institutions were burdened
with tasks, timeframes and expectations that they could never realistically fulfil.
In late 2000, the Joint Military Commission, once hailed as the manifestation of
regional leadership behind the Lusaka Agreement, is bankrupt and on the verge of
closing down. Meanwhile, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) remained unable to deploy due to the continuation
of fighting, the lack of security guarantees and restrictions on MONUC personnel
movements. And finally, the Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue
struggles forward without the support of the signatories, or even of the international
community – many of whom secretly hope he will disappear.
1. Belligerents Made into Peace Keepers: The Story of the JMC
At first the Lusaka agreement seemed to mark an ambitious attempt by the
region to seize the leadership role in its own search for peace. The Zambian-
brokered ceasefire called for an "appropriate" chapter VII UN force, defined its
mandate, and laid down a calendar for its deployment. To police the ceasefire in
the interim before the blue helmets could be deployed, the document created
the Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of the representatives of the
belligerents. It was intended that this body would carry out the necessary
peacekeeping operations.
The inspiration for this concept came from the December 1998 proposal by
Thabo Mbeki, which called for a peacekeeping force composed of the belligerent
forces under a neutral command. The rationale behind this idea was the fact that
the size of force needed in the DRC was far greater than either the UN or the
world’s major military powers were willing to provide. The proposal was criticised
at the time for reinforcing the idea of a de facto partition. Subsequently, the
Lusaka Ceasefire resurrected the idea by assigning the duties of overseeing the
agreement’s implementation to the parties, as co-ordinated through the JMC,
until the UN force arrived.
The JMC created by Lusaka was a decision-making body composed of two
representatives from each signatory under a neutral OAU-appointed chairman.
                                        
216 OCHA bulletin (August-September 2000).
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The body was to answer to the Political Committee, composed of the signatories’
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The mandate of the JMC was to
establish the location of units at the time of the ceasefire, and verify their
disengagement and subsequent withdrawal. Even more daunting was the Lusaka
Agreement’s assignment to the JMC that it was to work out mechanisms for
"tracking, disarming, cantoning and documenting all armed groups in the DRC”.
To assist the JMC with its task, neutral OAU observers – from Algeria, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Malawi – deployed to the DRC in Boende, Lisala, Kabalo and
Kabinda.
The JMC has faced persistent problems that have, in turn, complicated MONUC’s
work.217  Together, the two wrote the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan that
outlines the location of each nation’s forward line of forces, and the positions to
which they are to re-deploy. Since then, obstructions to its work have
proliferated. Belligerents from the anti-Kabila alliance blocked plans to move the
JMC’s headquarters to Kinshasa, to work alongside MONUC HQ, due to fears for
the security of their representatives in the city. The divisions in the Political
Committee also hampered the ability of the JMC to work. The Disengagement
Plan was suspended at a session of the Committee in late July, after the
government argued that UN Resolution 1304 called for a revision of Lusaka and
MONUC’s mandate.218 No doubt frustrated by the experience, the first OAU-
appointed Chairman, Algerian General Lallani Rachid, was chronically absent
from the JMC and finally resigned in September.
The JMC has also been plagued by a lack of money. It was forced to suspend
many of its activities because it never had the US$ 6 million a year it needed in
operating funds.219 The intended regional JMC’s were never established due to
budget difficulties. One Malawi officer heading operations in Lisala told
journalists that they were “handicapped. We have no boats to cross rivers, no
helicopters but a few motorcars. We cannot move over 200 km to see for
ourselves what is at the battlefronts.”220 Shortage of funds later forced the
committee to discontinue missions as the yearlong assignments of its officers
expired.221 The second JMC Chairman, Zambian Brigadier Timothy Kazembe,
nevertheless claimed that the observers had succeeded in reducing the level of
fighting in those areas where they were deployed.222
Lack of funds, and the proliferation of cease-fire violations, now cast doubt on
the institution’s future. “Hostilities have not only intensified, but ceasefire
violations are currently the order of the day on various fronts” said Zambian
Presidential Affairs Minister Eric Silwamba recently. “The JMC, which was
established as a stop-gap measure for verification of violations, has been
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218 Resolution 1304 (16 June 2000) calls for Rwanda and Uganda’s withdrawal from the DRC
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experiencing such grave financial constraints that its very survival is under
threat.”223
2. MONUC: Mission Impossible?
The Lusaka agreement assigned the UN mission two broad roles. First, it was to
work with the JMC to observe and monitor the cessation of hostilities, supervise
disengagement of forces, withdrawal of foreign troops, weapon’s collection, and
to oversee humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians. Second, it was to
engage in a chapter VII peace enforcement mission, in which it would track
down, disarm and rehabilitate members of ‘armed groups’, which were not
signatories to the Agreement. These so-called negative forces would be screened
for war criminals and ‘genocidaires’ and handed over to the International Crimes
Tribunal for Rwanda.
The belligerents never believed that the UN could accomplish the tasks they set
out for it in the cease-fire. Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame, whose
lieutenants authored the majority of the Lusaka agreement, made this clear on
the occasion of its signing. ‘I know how to fight insurgents…Does the UN also
know?’ he said, citing both the genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent arming
of Hutu refugees in Zaire ‘under the eyes of UN observers’. Asking for a chapter
VII force was the best way to expose Western powers’ reluctance to commit to
the DRC. It also served to demonstrate their double standards when it came to
the African continent, in contrast to the UN approval in June 1999 of a massive
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. How this was supposed to help the Congo is
a mystery. What is clear however is that the demonstration of Western good-will
towards the Congo, manifested by the creation of MONUC, was pre-destined to
disappoint the Congolese and embitter relations between the region and the
world body.
The Unrealistic MONUC Timeline
Establishment of Joint Military Commission and Observer
Groups
D-Day – D-Day+7 days
Disengagement of Forces D-Day + 14 Days
Redeployment of the Forces of the Parties in the Conflict
Zones
D-Day+15 Days – D-Day+30
Days
Provide Information to the JMC, OAU and UN Mechanism D-Day+21 Days
Mobilisation of OAU Observers D-Day+30 Days
Release/Exchange of Prisoners of War D-Day+7 Days – D+30 Days
Deployment of UN Peace Keeping Mission D-Day+120 Days
Disarmament of Armed Groups D-Day+30 Days – D-Day+120
Days
Orderly Withdrawal of all Foreign Forces D-Day + 180 Days
a. MONUC: The UN Responds to Lusaka
On 6 August 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1258 to authorize an
initial deployment of UN military liaison officers to the capitals of Lusaka’s
signatories. Their mission was to lay the groundwork for a much larger
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operation. Subsequently, on 1 November, the Secretary General requested a
further 500 Military Observers (MILOBS) to be deployed to the DRC as a ‘second
phase’ of the MONUC mission. A third phase, involving the deployment of a full-
scale peacekeeping force, was envisioned some time in the future.
Seven months after the Lusaka ceasefire, on 24 February 2000, the Security
Council finally passed Resolution 1291, which authorised the dispatch of 5,037
military personnel and 500 MILOBS. The mission laid out in the resolution
however, fell short of Lusaka’s call for a peacekeeping force. Instead, it was to
be an observer mission that included a four battalion-strong armed protection
force, in addition to other specialist logistical back-up personnel.224 Their
deployment moreover, depended on adequate security guarantees and
cooperation from the parties to the conflict.225
MONUC was given a limited Chapter VII mandate to defend itself along with
‘civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. Together with the JMC,
MONUC was broadly directed to ‘monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire
Agreement and investigate any violations’. It was also instructed to assist with
humanitarian operations, and cooperate with the Facilitator of the National
Dialogue. Finally, MONUC was ordered to draft an action plan for the overall
implementation of the Agreement by the warring parties themselves, including
some of the more dangerous tasks, such as disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration of armed group members and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
b. Modest Achievements
To date, the mission has only deployed 218 military observers, 24 troops and
207 other international staff to the DRC. MILOBS have also been deployed to a
total of 13 locations inside DRC. In addition, liaison offices have been established
in six regional capitals.226
MONUC officers can claim two major achievements:  together with the JMC of
representatives they drafted the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan. This set
out front line positions of all forces and committed them to a withdrawal that
would create a 30 kilometre-wide demilitarised zone across the provinces of
Equateur, the Kasais and Katanga. Despite the continuation of hostilities, all
combatants consistently refer to this plan as a key reference document to justify
their field positions. For example, the belligerents again pledged themselves to
follow this plan at the 16 October Maputo Summit convened by South African
President Thabo Mbeki. The Plan therefore, remains the best hope for future
ceasefire efforts.
                                        
224 Morocco, Pakistan and Senegal all agreed to send contingents. Other countries, including
Uruguay and Tunisia have also been identified as possible contributors.
225 Res. 1291 expanded on Res. 1258 (6 August, 1999), which authorised an initial MONUC
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Unarmed MILOBS also helped to end the clash between UPDF and RPA in
Kisangani. After they reinforced their presence, in May 2000, to oversee the
withdrawal of rival UPDF and RPA forces, the presence of MILOBS provided a
means for the Congolese – who felt isolated from the world - to voice their
discontent over the presence of the occupying forces. For example, on one
occasion, following the murder of a local pastor who had accused Rwanda-
backed RCD soldiers of looting his home, an angry crowd brought his body to
MONUC headquarters. On another peasant women organized a protest in front
of MONUC to publicize their alleged mistreatment, including rape, at the hands of
the UPDF.227 Subsequently, the presence of the observers probably helped to
end the third bout of fighting, which erupted on 5 June. UN liaison officers in
Kampala and Kigali, and the MILOBS, worked to broker a ceasefire to the
fighting with the help of Rwandan and Ugandan officers stranded at MONUC’s
Kisangani headquarters. This finally took hold on 11 June. Without the presence
of MONUC’s observers and communications equipment, the hostilities would
probably have worsened.
Furthermore, MONUC assisted with humanitarian aid for civilian victims, helped
with the exchange of POWs, reporting the dimensions of the crisis to the outside
world together with the ICRC – which allowed the international community to
mount pressure against the combatants to withdraw from Kisangani in Security
Council Resolution 1304.
c. Obstacles and Flaws
The limitations of the concept of operation
From the outset, the UN was determined to give its own interpretation to
Lusaka. A UN official told ICG at the time “There is no way the region will impose
the terms of reference of UN involvement in the DRC. We will have our own
chain of command, our own structure”.228 Nevertheless, the world body and the
major powers backed the idea of a peacekeeping mission in the Congo. At the
same time however, they denied this force the resources required for the
operation to work. In particular, the United States, whose diplomats and military
planners designed the MONUC mission, and whose logistical capabilities could
permit its success, has had persistent cold feet about the Congo.229
The Americans authored Resolution 1291, and conceived the concept of
operations it outlined. In fact, Washington offered its support for MONUC on the
condition that the UN accept the American plan. UN Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke testified before US Congressmen on 17 February that it was ‘what the
US Government, including the Department of Defence, has advocated as the
best approach. After months of resisting unrealistic peacekeeping proposals for
                                        
227 Group Justice et Libération, La guerre des alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au 10 juin 2000) et le
droit à la Paix, (Kisangani : July 2000).
228 ICG interview, UN official, Lusaka, September 1999.
229 The US has sought to avoid missions in Africa since the American-led UNOSOM II Chapter VII
operation to Somalia became embroiled in fighting with warlord Mohamed Farah Aydiid.
Washington withdrew its troops from the mission months after losing 18 US servicemen on 3
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the Congo, we have succeeded in getting the UN to adopt this three-phase
approach concept designed in part by US military planners.’230
The American concept contained several shortcomings. First, the MONUC
mandate was impossible to accomplish because it did not realistically address the
issue of armed groups. Resolution 1291 ignored the fact that three intertwined,
but very different, types of conflict were underway in the DRC: conventional war,
guerrilla insurgency and ethnic bloodletting. The blue-helmets could monitor the
first, but not the second or third, in which they would face intolerable risks. The
resolution however, made no distinction between them, and even tasked MONUC
to develop an ‘action plan’ to disarm the armed groups. This was an expansive
mission could not be accomplished by the force envisaged. American and UN
officials knew this very well. How could the UN succeed, where the
understandably more motivated RPA had failed?
Second, the concept of operations envisaged a bulky protection force in what
was to be strictly an observer mission. Alongside observers and support staff, the
UN was to deploy four mechanized infantry battalions, each of whom would
establish a regional strong point. In the event of trouble, the observers would
retreat into these bastions for evacuation by air. The difficulty with these
understandable American concerns about force protection was that it would take
the UN between four and six months to actually move the battalions to the DRC.
As it is designed, MONUC faces enormous logistical obstacles. Virtually all UN
troops and equipment would have to be brought in by air because of the limited
capacity of Matadi, the Congo’s only ocean port, and the virtual impassability of
most of its roads. The country’s airports are often in an equally poor condition.
They all lack the radars, air traffic control systems, night lighting, fire fighting
and unloading equipment required for 24-hour operations. These are all essential
logistical requirements that Washington was unwilling to provide, because to do
so would require putting American troops on the ground in the Congo. Moreover,
the majority of DRC’s airfields are too small for larger transport aircraft to land.
Even Bangboka airport in Kisangani, one of the country’s three largest, would
only be able to handle two flights a day because of these difficulties. To deploy
the battalion designated for the city however would require more than 150
flights.
Third, the American plan built-in additional political delays by linking the
deployment of MONUC to the belligerents’ own performance in implementing the
Lusaka ceasefire. Holbrooke explained that the “approach ties UN deployments
to concrete progress on the ground toward the Lusaka Agreement’s political and
military objectives”.231 This meant that even Resolution 1291 was held up as the
belligerents squabbled over who was to be named the Facilitator of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue. Just days prior to Masire’s 15 December 1999 appointment,
US envoy to the Holbrooke said, “the US will be unable to support a move to the
next phase of UN peacekeeping if the Lusaka parties do not themselves choose
the Facilitator called for under their own Accord.”
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The international response to the second Congo war was aimed above all at
stopping the fighting. In essence, this meant freezing the war before the victor
had become clear. Subsequently, the very unwieldiness of the US-designed
concept of operations prevented the international community from replacing the
dynamic of the war with that of a disengagement of forces. Incapable of
disengaging without international assistance and pressure, the belligerents would
remain facing one another in the DRC while they waited for the UN. This delay
also increased the likelihood of clashes between the two forces, which would in
turn delay the UN deployment. Whatever momentum Lusaka had given the
disengagement of forces was soon wasted as the belligerents returned to
fighting their war.
The obstruction of the Kabila government
All sides have, at one time or another, deliberately posed obstacles to MONUC
despite their call for a UN force. They have refused permission for observer
teams to deploy in some cases, or to land aircraft in others. In one case, the
rebel MLC threatened to shoot down a MONUC aircraft that allegedly did not
have flight authorisation. In Bunia, RCD-ML guerrillas have twice occupied a
MONUC base to escape their rivals during factional fighting.232
However, UN officials say that, in 95 per cent of the cases, the obstructions to
MONUC activities have come from Kabila’s Government. The UN Secretary
General’s fourth report on the UN mission in the DRC accuses Kabila of persistent
harassment and intransigence in its attitude to MONUC including: refusal to
authorize MONUC’s flights, media hate campaigns, state-organised street
protests, an extortive currency exchange rate, plus taxes and fuel charges that
add millions to operational costs. In addition, Kinshasa has rejected certain
MONUC contingents, such as a 165-strong South African logistical team that is
needed to assist with the deployment of the main battalions.
For its part, Kinshasa has variously claimed that MONUC forces violate DRC’s
sovereignty and that it should first and foremost force the ‘aggressors’ troops out
of the country. It claims that MONUC consistently violates the April 2000 Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between itself and the DRC by not consulting the
Government on flight authorizations. Kabila has therefore, systematically refused
to permit deployments in territory he controls. Government distrust of the UN
appears to reflect the fact that, for many Congolese, MONUC – and particularly
the idea of deploying armed troops - revives memories of the ONUC blue helmet
army that became involved in Congo’s civil war during the years 1960-1964.
The problems for MONUC in Kinshasa began immediately following the arrival of
the first personnel in September 1999 and have continued to date. UN Special
Envoys have made several high-profile visits to the DRC in an attempt to
persuade Kabila to co-operate. An apparent breakthrough finally came in late
August after UN Special Envoy and Nigeria’s former ruler, General Abdulsalami
Abubakar, met Kabila in Kinshasa. Following this, the Government promised to
grant MONUC observers free movement, to lift the requirement that flights to
rebel held territory pass through a ‘neutral third country’, and to permit MONUC
                                        
232 Fourth report of the Secretary-General, paragraph 41. RCD-ML leader Wamba dia Wamba
took refuge in MONUC’s office once again during factional fighting in early November 2000.
Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War
ICG Africa Report N° 26, 20 December 2000                                                                 Page 77
flights to take place without prior authorisation. Since that time, however,
Government co-operation has failed to improve.
More recently, at the second Maputo summit on 25 November, the government
again promised to lift the movement restrictions for MONUC. This new and
positive attitude is almost certainly as a result of pressure by his allies to salvage
MONUC before its mandate ran out on 15 December 2000.
d. Salvaging MONUC?
In his fourth report to the Security Council, the Secretary General warned that,
unless the parties display ‘unequivocal commitment’ to re-launching the peace
process, the future of the MONUC mission would be in doubt.233 The
international body has repeatedly extended the Force’s mandate, while seeing
little progress towards the accomplishment of its objectives, and has become
frustrated with the impasse.
To salvage MONUC, Thabo Mbeki attempted to reinvigorate the region by
organising the 16 October Maputo summit on the disengagement of troops in the
DRC. Only belligerent countries’ Heads of State or their representatives attended.
Angolan President Dos Santos did not come for ‘logistical reasons’. Neither the
rebels nor Masire were invited. South African sources report that Mbeki had to
pressure Mugabe to ensure that Kabila attended the meeting (which he did). As
a result, the belligerents re-pledged their commitment to the 8 April Kampala
Disengagement Plan.234 At the subsequent 28 November Maputo summit,
organized to review progress towards implementation, the Heads of State again
reiterated their commitment to the Plan, and scheduled a 5 December meeting
of their Chiefs of Staff in Harare. President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique,
who chaired the meeting, reported that Kabila had told the summit that he was
prepared to study ways to improve his relationship with MONUC.235
Since the end of October, there appears to have been an improvement in the
Government’s attitude towards the UN mission. It reaffirmed its commitment to
guarantee the UN observers free movement between Kananga, Mbandaka, Mbuji
Mayi, and Kisangani, and to provide free parking for MONUC planes at Njili
airport.236 MONUC officers, and the Secretary General’s representative in
Kinshasa, see this attitude as an encouragement to deploy troops.  But other UN
officials note that Mbeki’s effort has already run into some snags. The second
Maputo meeting was scheduled for 29 October, but had to be postponed three
times. This was due to a “lack of consensus among the parties about holding a
meeting”, reported Mozambican Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi.237
Furthermore, the mid-October FAC offensive in Katanga, that coincided with the
first Maputo summit, and the DRC’s absence at the 17 November JMC in Lusaka
suggest that Kabila does not take his commitments to Mbeki very seriously.
Finally sources at the DRC presidency suggest that Maputo is superseded by the
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subsequent 8 November Tripoli Agreement calling for a deployment of neutral
African peacekeepers on the DRC’s Eastern frontier.
UN officials believe therefore that Kabila’s new commitment is suspect. His
behaviour, they say, has been an example of the “worst case behaviour
described in the Brahimi report [on UN peacekeeping] as an obstacle to
deployment”.238 They also believe that a UN deployment without a proper
agreement between all the belligerents would be set-up for failure. Furthermore,
the recent government offensive in Katanga, which is a clear violation of the
ceasefire, makes any type of sizable UN deployment impossible.
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) officials therefore prepared
a plan for a phased operation, strengthening the presence of unarmed observers
before contemplating the deployment of the full MONUC force. This plan was
presented in the fifth Secretary General report to the Security Council on 7
December, which recommendations were endorsed by Resolution 1332 (2000)
on 14 December. Resolution 1332 extends MONUC’s mandate by six months
(until 15 June 2001) and recommends the deployment of additional military
observers and support units along the front line, where and when conditions
permit it.239 As a second step, it also envisages the deployment of infantry units
to back up observers in Kisangani, Mbandaka “and other areas the secretary-
General deems necessary”, including in Goma or Bukavu, along the border
between Rwanda and the DRC. 240
The second phase of deployment is still far-fetched. Kabila’s consistent
opposition to the presence of UN armed troops on his part of the Congolese
territory, and the likely rejection by Rwanda and Uganda of any deployment on
their side only, makes it impossible at this stage. But the deployment of
additional MILOBS along the frontline could be a very positive development.
To undertake this plan, MONUC needs adequate security assurances from the
armies on the ground. Once these can be secured, the deployment of unarmed
MILOBS - into both rebel and Government areas when and where possible -
could breathe life back into the Lusaka peace process. It may also give fresh
momentum to the UN efforts to entrench the ceasefire through the
disengagement of rival forces. Such a mission moreover, could continue to
operate under the same Resolution 1291 mandate, on the grounds that it
represented a staggered or limited interpretation of the envisioned deployments.
MONUC's record in Kisangani proves that even a small team of unarmed
observers can succeed in alleviating the conflict. Past UN operations in Africa
have achieved the same. During the UNAMIR I operation in Rwanda, following
the eruption of violence in April 1994 when most armed peacekeepers
evacuated, the few dozen MILOBS who stayed behind were able to save many
civilian lives. Furthermore, they gathered much of the evidence subsequently
used by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). MONUC’s Sector
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Commander in Kisangani outlined the paradox entailed by the deployment of
unarmed observers ahead of protection forces himself when he told ICG: ‘The
strength of the MILOB teams has been that we are unarmed’.241
By its very nature, MONUC’s mission must face a degree of danger. Its MILOBS
have found themselves in dangerous situations, such as the June fighting in
Kisangani – but they faced no greater peril than civilian staff from humanitarian
agencies. Nevertheless, the further deployment of unarmed observers does pose
serious risks. The Mission Commander would have to weigh carefully the benefits
of deploying officers to dangerous or remote locations. It is not necessary for the
mission to maintain a presence everywhere in the DRC. The ability to monitor
the activities of major combatant commands, and key logistical choke points,
would provide a wealth of information about the course of hostilities and the
intentions of the combatants. Individual countries could also discretely assist the
UN by providing information collected through other more technical means, such
as satellite imagery, communications intercepts, and analytical assistance. Armed
with such data, MONUC could work to restrain hostilities by providing the
Security Council with an accurate and timely understanding of events in the
Congo.
2. The Failure of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue
a. The Mandate
Lusaka also attempted to address the issue of power sharing and state-building
in DRC, by providing a framework for inter-Congolese negotiations, called the
National Dialogue.
The National Dialogue was supposed to produce a ‘new political dispensation’,
leading to the establishment of new institutions in a space of three months. The
new government would take on a range of tasks, including ‘the formation of a
National Congolese Army (composed of FAC, RCD and MLC forces), the
organization of free and fair elections and the drafting of a Constitution under
which DRC would be governed after the holding of elections.
The National Dialogue was to include the DRC Government, the rebel forces, the
political opposition, as well as representatives of the forces vives; and all
participants would  ‘enjoy equal status’ in the Dialogue. The OAU was tasked to
organize the dialogue “under the aegis of a Facilitator chosen by all parties”.  It
was supposed to start immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the
establishment of the JMC and the disengagement of Forces, and be completed
before the deployment of the UN Peace-Keeping mission, the disarmament of
armed groups and the withdrawal of foreign forces. Ultimately, it was to lead to
the re-establishment of state administration over the territory of the DRC and the
implementation of security measures to normalize the situation along
international borders.
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Inter-Congolese Dialogue Timetable
Selection of a facilitator D-Day +15
Beginning of a national dialogue D-Day +45
Deadline for the close of national dialogue D-Day +90
Establishment of new institutions D-Day +91
b. No Power-Sharing in Sight
Efforts to find a suitable candidate to fill the position of Facilitator caused the
Dialogue to fall behind schedule from the outset. Under the aegis of OAU
Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, several candidates were considered but
failed to win the required unanimous support of the signatories. Finally, on 12
December 1999 – five months after Lusaka – the former Botswana President, Sir
Ketumile Masire, was approved as the Facilitator, at the suggestion of President
of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe.
Masire has conducted three trips to the DRC and has met with parties both in the
Congo (two trips to Kinshasa and five in all to rebel territory) and outside (in
Cotonou). He has also briefed regional leaders (at Lome in July and at Windhoek,
Lusaka and Harare in August).
His team has prepared a broad outline of how a national dialogue might work to
fulfil the demands of the Lusaka Agreement. This involves preparation for the
Dialogue conference itself. A preparatory meeting will have to take place at an,
as yet, undecided location, but which the EU and US have already pledged to
fund. The structure of the National Dialogue will include four commissions: a
humanitarian commission, which should come up with a reconstruction plan for
the Kivus; an electoral commission, which should plan for a national census
before the elections, which the EU has already committed to fund (Masire’s team
estimates that it will take about a year to determine constituencies that have
changed since the conclusion of the 1992 National Sovereign Conference); a
constitutional commission, which should use the work done in 1992 to prepare a
new post-election constitution; and finally, a military commission to design a plan
for demobilization and disarmament.
Masire's efforts have been seriously impeded by a number of obstacles. From the
start, he has encountered systematic obstruction from the Kabila Government.
Masire visited Kinshasa in February and March and met Kabila at the Algiers OAU
summit at the end of April. A short time after these meetings, the Government
declared that it would no longer cooperate with him, and requested that the OAU
appoint a new Facilitator. On 20 June, it closed Masire’s Kinshasa office. Several
high-level attempts to change the government’s attitude have since failed –
including two OAU summits, two SADC summits and General Abubakar’s visit in
August.
Masire’s closest supporters are his regional neighbours, including Zimbabwe and
Angola, who have tried to convince Kabila to accept him. At SADC summits in
Windhoek and Lusaka in August, regional leaders, including Chiluba, Mbeki and
Chissano, gave Kabila a tongue-lashing for not supporting the work of the former
Botswana president. Nevertheless, they have been powerless to alter Kabila's
determined opposition to Masire. Instead, the Government claims that the Inter-
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Congolese Dialogue will henceforth be conducted through a 300-member
Constituent Assembly unilaterally appointed by Kabila and inaugurated on 21
August in Lubumbashi.
Kabila and his lieutenants have come up with several excuses for rejecting
Masire. First, they objected to Masire because he is a ”total Anglophone”.242 They
claimed that he was picked by Rwanda on the grounds that he was the Chair of
the OAU panel investigating the OAU role in Rwanda. However, the
Government’s own contradictory positions have undermined their arguments.
Despite the objections that Masire is not Francophone, by mid-November,
Kabila’s Ambassador to Dar es Salaam was calling for a panel of prominent
Tanzanian politicians (all Anglophone) to lead the dialogue and accusing Masire
of being pro-rebel.243 Civil society leaders in Kinshasa, who had earlier termed
the appointment of an Anglophone Facilitator an ‘insult to the Congolese people’,
have in fact accepted Masire as Kabila’s choice and declared themselves ready to
commit to the process.244
Second, in contradiction with the Lusaka agreement, Kabila has on numerous
occasions declared that the National Dialogue would never be held under
occupation.245 His representatives have argued for a separation of the military
and political aspects of Lusaka - requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops
before a national dialogue can take place. The bitterest pill of the Lusaka
agreement for Kabila has always been the principle, which stipulates that all
participants enjoy an equal status. The rebel groups and their Rwandan backers
designed the dialogue to confront Kabila, on an equal footing, with the
overwhelming opposition to his regime. Consequently, since the day of Lusaka’s
signature, Kabila’s representatives have consistently rejected making any
compromises on the sovereignty of the government.
The international support for Masire has been lukewarm. Despite ostensible
public support by western governments and the UN, Masire has suffered from a
lack of funding. Of the $5.85 million pledged by donors in March 2000, the office
had access to just $657,000 by October. Early on in the year, the UK
Ambassador to Gaberone initiated donor funding by personally signing a cheque
for UK £20,000. Delays are partly due to bureaucracy in the disbursement of aid,
but it says little to recommend the commitment of the donors to solving the
problem. The failure or delay in funding has undermined Masire’s credibility.
The unrealistic timetable for the National Dialogue, to which the parties agreed,
and that the OAU and UN witnessed, set-up the Facilitator for failure. Masire’s
team has studied other regional peace processes, notably those held in Burundi
and Somalia. Taking these into consideration, the team’s own lawyer says that
he believes the process will take at least three years rather than six weeks.
                                        
242 In French “un anglophone total”, ICG interwiew, Foreign Ministry official, Kinshasa, August
2000.
243 Individuals named were former Presidents of Tanzania and Zanzibar, Ali Hasan Mwinyi, and
Dr Salmin Amour, as well as former Prime Ministers, John Malecela, Joseph Warioba, and Cleopa
Msuya. Tanzania's 'Sunday Observer', (12 November 2000), as monitored by the BBC.
244 ICG interviews, civil society leaders, Kinshasa, August 2000.
245 “Le dialogue intercongolais ne se tiendra jamais sous le diktat des occupants”, President
Kabila’s speech to the UN Security Council,, 24 January 2000.
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Apart from being extremely vague, the objectives set out for the Dialogue are
very optimistic for a country that has never benefited from democratic rule. It is
equally hard to see how ‘the process of free, democratic and transparent
elections’ referred to in the Ceasefire Agreement can be organized given the
state of the DRC.
The international community must be prepared to continue support the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue process as it evolves over the space of years, rather than
weeks or months. It may be that a transitional executive and administrative
structure has to be established first – since the best legitimate ruler in the DRC is
likely to be one that has control over territory. A national dialogue may
therefore, have to run alongside the transitional authority for a long period.
C. Revising or Reviving Lusaka?
1. The Belligerent’s Views
Aware that the Congo has become a quagmire, the belligerents have begun to
search for a diplomatic exit from the conflict. Everyone has now admitted that
the Lusaka agreement has not worked, and that calling for its implementation
means in essence calling for the status quo. Numerous bilateral consultations
have taken place between the warring parties, including Angola and Uganda,
Angola and Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Their
determination to recoup their investment however makes these efforts
unimaginative and sterile. Different positions can be observed on this debate:
Rwanda and Uganda continue to call for the implementation of Lusaka. Both
countries say that the withdrawal of foreign forces needs to be decided by the
belligerents themselves. Their position is weakened however, by Security Council
Resolution 1304, adopted on 16 June 2000 in the aftermath of their third clash in
Kisangani, that demands: “that Rwanda and Uganda, which have violated the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
withdraw all their forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo without further delay, in conformity with the timetable of the Ceasefire
Agreement and the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan.”246
Kabila suspended Lusaka on 23 August following Resolution 1304. He presents a
number of arguments on why the agreement needs to be revised. First, he says
that Resolution 1304 recognizes that the war is an international conflict instead
of a civil war. The withdrawal of foreign troops therefore becomes a priority and
should be de-linked from any other aspect of Lusaka, such as the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue - which cannot happen as long as the country is occupied.247
Moreover, he doesn’t see why he, as the representative of a sovereign
government, should accept power sharing while his neighbours all continue to
resist this principal. Second, he claims the agreement is outdated. The rebel
groups party to the document have fragmented, with some of the leaders even
defecting to the Government’s side. Third, he argues that labelling the FDD as
‘negative forces’ contradicts their invitation to the Arusha peace talks on Burundi.
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247 President Kabila’s address, UN Security Council, 24 January 2000.
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Kabila wants a separation between the international and the national dimensions
of the Lusaka Agreement. He proposes direct negotiations between the warring
parties, intended to lead to Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi’s withdrawal from the
Congo. The deployment of an international force along the country’s eastern
border would provide the means to satisfy their security concerns. Finally, the
signature of a non-aggression and good neighbourliness pact would cement the
relations between the DRC Government and its eastern neighbours.248 After all
the foreign troops are withdrawn from the DRC, he promises to hold the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue.
By de-linking the external from the internal dimensions of the peace process,
Kabila hopes to win on both counts. In the first, he is the legitimate leader of a
sovereign nation. In the second, he becomes the incumbent President, faced
with a divided and easily dispatched opposition. These tactics are apparent in his
10 December offer to hold a National Forum on Democratisation in Libreville,
Gabon.249 Planned for 21 December, the talks will include only registered parties
and civil society groups. Consequently, they are not evidence of Kabila’s
willingness to follow the terms of the Lusaka Agreement, or for that matter,
share power.
2. The International Position
Most international players, including France, US, Britain and Belgium, among
others, agree that Kabila is the main obstacle to the implementation of the
Lusaka Agreement, and believe that he will not accept any compromise if he is
not weakened militarily. Similarly, for them the Kisangani fighting was the
catalyst for the rebel alliance’s loss of credibility. The clash exposed the end of
the Rwanda/Uganda alliance. It also exposed that the illegal exploitation of DRC
resources was an objective of the war. As a consequence, they all agree that
Lusaka is still the only road map for peace, but that it should be given a new
interpretation.
Belgium initially took the lead in trying to unlock the stalemate by proposing to
mediate between the parties, re-launch the negotiations and have the different
provisions of Lusaka implemented. France’s concerns focus on the consequences
of a partition of the country and its continued exploitation by its neighbours.
Paris fears the Congolese population will be the loser in any strictly regional
settlement and foresees a catastrophic worsening of the humanitarian situation
in such a scenario. This concern was apparent in Resolution 1304, strongly
supported by Paris. President Chirac moreover, is opposed to the “African
solutions for African problems” doctrine, and has long advocated for an
internationally led regional conference on the Great Lakes to end the war. France
is, of course, equally concerned with a spillover of the war to its oil-producing
allies (Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon). Paris also fears the humanitarian burden it
would shoulder were the world’s second-biggest Francophone country to
disintegrate.
                                        
248 ICG interview, Leonard She Okitundu, Minister for Human Rights, Kinshasa, 29/08/00. The
recent initiative by President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville who came to Kampala
late November to mediate between the warring parties for a regional settlement to the conflict is
in the same vein and does not have any better chance to succeed.
249 “Kabila préconise un dialogue intercongolais”, PANA, 11/12/00.
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The US is pushing for a revival of Lusaka, which they believe should be taken
over by the UN. They want to ‘call the shots’ from inside the international body
and guarantee the protection of their strategic interests in the region: safe
exploitation of the Angolan oilfields and easy access to the Colton of Eastern
DRC –used to manufacture fighter aircraft. However they do not want to be
directly involved. Washington is therefore, putting pressure on Angola and
Zimbabwe to force Kabila to respect his commitments, and permit the
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement.
3. The New Focus on Disengagement: Saving MONUC and Saving the
SADC?
South African President Thabo Mbeki also seems intent on adapting Lusaka.
Mbeki’s recent Maputo initiative came in response to a personal appeal from
Mugabe, who was concerned that Bemba’s MLC might attempt an assault on
Mbandaka. The South African President seized upon this opportunity to play the
regional leadership role that he believes is due to Pretoria. His motivations
appear to be a concern over the stability of Mugabe’s regime in  Zimbabwe and
the necessity of offering him an exit strategy from the DRC. Pretoria’s foremost
interest is to stem a further decline in the situation of Zimbabwe, which could
spread southwards and have a spill over into South Africa. Mbeki’s approach also
follows the long-held opinion of the South African Government that progress
could be made if the belligerents simply honoured the promises they made in
Lusaka and Kampala. This explains his focus on military affairs alone, and his
claim to support Lusaka and the leadership role of Zambian President Chiluba in
the process.
This emphasis on the withdrawal of foreign troops is an important departure
from the Lusaka agreement, and from the UN three phase plan for the
deployment of MONUC, both of which had emphasised the need for
simultaneous progress on all fronts. The Maputo meeting made no mention of
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. This suggested two things: first, that Kabila’s allies
don’t really have an interest in a change of power in Kinshasa and second, that
Kabila has succeeded in convincing them that he could agree to a MONUC
deployment - if the focus of Lusaka shifted to the withdrawal of foreign troops
and if plans for the Dialogue are dropped.
Following the first Maputo summit, another summit was organised under the
auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), but was
nevertheless dedicated to discussions on the DRC conflict. In attendance were
Dos Santos, Kabila, along with the Heads of State of Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon,
and the Prime Ministers of Equatorial Africa and the Central African Republic.
The 27 October Kinshasa summit which called for the ‘unconditional retreat of
the aggressors of the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to permit the
Congolese people to find a final solution in all sovereignty questions of internal
politics,” is another example of efforts to replace the Lusaka agreement, which
they said remained only “an important basis for peace.”
Since then, on 8 November, a summit in Tripoli, Libya, called for the deployment
of a neutral African force to secure the frontiers of Rwanda and Uganda before
the disarmament of militias had begun. This is another departure from the
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Lusaka framework to which no doubt Rwanda and Uganda only agreed to keep
the erratic Gadaffi happy. Sidelined by these efforts, South Africa has
understandably ridiculed the Tripoli meetings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two key questions are raised by this investigation into the war in the Congo. Should
the DRC remain a single state? And given its current occupied, exploited, and
fragmented condition – can it?
Kabila and his backers would be content with the western half of the country. Kabila
prefers sharing Congo to sharing power, people in Kinshasa say, and would be
unable to rule a restored country successfully. In any case, Kabila is no Mobutu and
would not survive if the country was at peace. Angola, moreover, is quite satisfied
to keep a weak leader in Kinshasa, who is unable to threaten its ambition to
become the power broker of West-Central Africa.
Zimbabwe meanwhile, has never concealed its intention to construct a zone of
economic influence stretching through Zambia to Katanga and Kasai, upon which it
can base its future prosperity. The restoration of territorial sovereignty under the
patronage of the international community, and the creation of a Government of
Transition, would severely limit Harare’s ability to profit from the Congo. In such an
outcome, the South African competition would be likely to shoulder them aside, just
as at the end of the Mozambican civil war. Thus, despite its claims to the contrary,
the partition of Congo would serve Zimbabwean interests.
The fight for Kisangani revealed that Rwanda and Uganda are in the Congo for
more than just the security of their borders. Both countries see the Eastern DRC as
their legitimate sphere of political influence, as well as the source of their future
economic prosperity. Uganda has the ambition to become the power broker of
Eastern Africa. It wants to make itself the centre of regional integration, and
intends to build its own prosperity on its dominance over the Great Lakes markets.
To overcome its Kenyan rival, and succeed in this objective, it must have access to
the resources of the Congo.
As for Rwanda, it believes permanent access to the greater Kivus to be the only
long-term solution to its security problem. Apart from foreign aid, this is also seen
as the only means to revive the country’s economy. Unable to solve its problem
alone, the RPA is ready to wait as long as necessary for regional and international
good will to emerge and help them disarm the Hutu rebels.
In the end, the Inter-Congolese negotiations and restoration of the DRC’s territorial
integrity is in no one’s interest other than the Congolese’s. The assessments of
most Western governments, and of the US in particular, appears based on this
realpolitik. Washington seems to have given up on – or to have lost interest in - the
prospects for positive change in the Congo. Policies based on the doctrines of
‘African solutions to African problems’ and ‘trade not aid’ provide cynical excuses for
leaving the continent to its fate. In the absence of a more dynamic and determined
policy from the international community, the Congo is certain to continue to
fragment. This also means the abandonment of the Congolese people to the chaos
now looming over them.
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The international community must  re-engage in the DRC if the Lusaka peace process is
to be revived.  This means in the first place a number of actions being taken by the
United Nations Security Council, beginning with the passage of a resolution to reconcile
Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000) with the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, that
de-links the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces, the disarmament of
armed groups, and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from one another, in order to
permit each to achieve the maximum forward progress.
Many other steps are required on which the Security Council can and should take
the lead. On the the question of dialogue, negotiations must be promoted on power
sharing and transition between the main players – government, rebels and key civil
society groups - with the Community of Sant Egidio and Belgian government as
ideal facilitators. Greater moral, financial, and logistical support needs to be given to
the facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, including the
appointment of a francophone ‘co-mediator’ based in Kinshasa, and efforts made to
force Kabila and the rebels to permit him to conduct consultations throughout the
DRC.
On the question of disengagement, it is necessary to support the Maputo Process
and the implementation of the Kampala disengagement plan as a first step to a
phased withdrawal. All countries involved in the war, and especially the Government
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, should be pressured to provide a secure
environment in which additional MONUC MILOBS can be immediately deployed
along the frontlines, as recommended by resolution 1332 (2000).
On the question of disarmament, an international structure headed by a high level
personality should be created to find solutions for the disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) of the armed groups: this would consult with the region,
and the armed groups, in order to formulate a robust and realistic plan for DDR.
Pressure must be applied to  Kabila to allow the Burundian FDD to join their
country’s on-going Peace Process, and to  the countries at war in the DRC to invest
more of their energies in domestic political reconciliation efforts, which in the end
offer the only means to convince the rebel fighters to return home.
On the question of peace-building, a ‘new humanitarian framework’ needs to be
designed to tackle the complex emergency unfolding in the DRC that follows the
recommendations of the JMC resolution adopted in Lusaka in early December. This
can be accomplished by establishing a separate humanitarian operations office
under a UN Director for Congo Humanitarian Operations responsible for the
formulation and co-ordination of a strategy for relief operations in both rebel and
government territories. Uganda and Rwanda should also be specifically pressured to
give compensation for the destruction of Kisangani as called for in Security Council
Resolution 1304 (2000).
The donor countries have a particular role in reviving and advancing the peace
process. They should link the foreign belligerents’ commitment to the DRC peace
process – together with their illegal exploitation of the nation’s wealth - to scrutiny
of their domestic economic performance and record of ‘good governance’ in order
to assess their qualification for financial aid, debt relief and trade agreements. They
should also pressure SADC countries to compel Kabila to comply with the
implementation of the Lusaka agreement. Means to accomplish this include
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restricting the quantity of fuel the DRC imports, and limiting the amount of SADC
military support his regime receives.
As to the foreign warring parties - Angola, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe - they are unlikely to break the stalemate in the war until they recognize
the limitations of their strategies. This may simply be a matter of time, but at the
moment none of the parties is able to conduct an honest ‘cost benefit analysis’ of its
part in the war and admit it is facing failure. However, for the foreign players, their
domestic problems are likely to mount as they exhaust themselves on the battlefield
of Africa’s ‘First World War’. Only when this reaches a critical mass will they
understand the benefits of reaching a compromise deal. They should recognize that
the Lusaka process offers the only way out of the DRC quagmire, with all parties
being involved in systematic negotiations as opposed to military endgames or ad
hoc, back-room contacts.
More specifically, they should provide MONUC MILOBS with the minimum
guarantees needed to deploy in the field, especially so that the unarmed UN
observers can work unhindered; restore support to the JMC, by calling regular
monthly Political Committee meetings, pushing for further deployment of teams in
the field and implementing the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan; assist Masire’s
office to prepare for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by providing access to all parties
and DRC territory; and step up sincere domestic reconciliation efforts to end political
or ethnic rivalries that have spilled over into the DRC and drawn them into an ever-
widening conflict.
Nairobi/Brussels, 20 December 2000
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APPENDIX A: Abbreviations, Names250 and Places
Abubakar, Abdulsalami (General) Former ruler of Nigeria who
served as a UN Special Envoy
to meet with Kabila in August
2000.
AFDL Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques pour la
Libération du Congo-Zaire:
Kabila’s rebel group in 1996-
1997.
ALiR Armée de Libération du




Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Ugandan insurgent movement
whose operations out of the
Eastern DRC served as a
justification for Uganda’s
intervention in the war.
Amouri (Colonel) MLC Chief of Staff.
Atenyi, Tibasiima Renegade Second Vice
President of the RCD-ML
Augustin Bizimungu, General Ex-FAR Commander. See
Appendix E.
Bangboka Airport The larger of two Kisangani
airfields fought over by the
RPA and UPDF. One of the
three longest runways in the
country.
Banyamulenge Ethnic Tutsis who have lived in
South Kivu since the 1900’s.
Their rights to Congolese
citizenship are questioned by
many, and their communities
are under assault from rival
ethnic groups.
Banyarwanda A collective name for the
inhabitants of DRC who are of
Rwandan ancestry.
Bemba, Jean-Pierre Leader of the Equateur-based
MLC.
Besigye, Kiiza (Colonel) An early member of the
Ugandan NRM who has
challenged President Museveni
in the upcoming Ugandan
elections.
Bo-Boliko, André A leader of the PDSC.
Bugera, Déogratias North Kivu Tutsi, and founding
member of the RCD.
                                        
250 For names, see also Appendix C: Who’s Who in the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC),
and Appendix D: Who’s Who Among Interahamwe Military Commanders.
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Bululu, Lunda Former Prime Minister of Zaire,
and founding member of the
RCD.
Buyoya, Pierre (Major) President of Burundi since his
July 1996 coup d’Etat.
Chiluba, Frederick The President of Zambia, and
broker of the Lusaka Cease-
fire Agreement.
Chissano, Joachim The President of Mozambique.
Comiex DRC company, chaired by
Pierre Victor Mpoyo, involved
in mineral exploitation with
Zimbabwe’s OSLEG.
CPP Committees of Popular Power.
Local bodies elected under the
direction of the Kinshasa
Government.
Dos Santos, Jose Eduardo President of Angola.
Dunia, Lwengamia Mai Mai leader in the Fizi
region of South Kivu.
Appointed a FAC Commander
in September 1999.
Ex-FAR Former Rwandan Armed
Forces which took part in the
1994 genocide.
FAC Forces Armées Congolaises or
Congolese Armed Forces. The
military force of the Kinshasa
Government.
FAZ Forces Armées Zaïroises. The
Mobutu regime’s military.




Forces d’Autodéfense Populaire (FAP) The official name of Dunia’s
Mai Mai militia.
Forces Innovatrices de l’Union et de
Solidarité (FONUS)
DRC opposition party led by
Joseph Olenghankoy.
Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) A largely defunct Uganda rebel
group.
Gécamines The DRC’s state mining
corporation.
Habyarimana, Juvénal Late Hutu President of
Rwanda, whose assassination
marked the start of the 1994
genocide.
Hedi Annabi Assistant UN Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping
Operations.
Hema Eastern DRC-based ethnic
group with powerful land and
business interests.
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Holbrooke, Richard US Ambassador to the United
Nations.
Ilunga, Emile (Doctor) Former President of RCD-
Goma.
Interahamwe Extremist Hutu militia group
that committed the bulk of
Rwanda’s 1994 genocide. Now
known as AliR.
Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye Leader of the Burundian rebel
Hutu FDD movement. At
present is an ally to Kabila
Government.
Jogo Baptista De Matos, General Chief of Staff of the Angolan
armed forces.
Joint Military Commission (JMC) A body composed of two
officers picked from each of
Lusaka’s signatory armies,
appointed to plan and
implement the Cease-fire and
forces’ disengagement with
the help of UN and OAU.
Kabarebe, James (Colonel) RPA Deputy Chief of Staff.
Commander of August 1998
attack on Kitona and Kinshasa
Kabila, Joseph DRC President Laurent-Desiré
Kabila’s son and a top
commander in the FAC. (See
Appendix D).
Kabila, Laurent-Désiré President of the DRC.
Kakudji, Gaetan Kabila’s cousin and DRC
Minister of the Interior.
Kamitatu Massamba, Cleophas A leader of the PDSC who is
currently imprisoned in
Kinshasa. Also the father of
leading MLC member - Olivier
Kamitatu.
Kamitatu, Olivier Jean-Pierre Bemba’s lieutenant
in the MLC.
Kapend, Eddy Aide-de-Camp to DRC
President Kabila.
Karaha, Bizima Chief of RCD-Goma Security.
An ethnic munyamulenge.
Kataliko, Emmanuel The late Catholic Archbishop of
Bukavu. Accused of
encouraging resistance to the
Rwandan presence, he was
barred from the city in early
2000.
Kazembe, Timothy (Brigadier) Zambian officer named as
second Chairman of the JMC.
Kazini, James (Brigadier) UPDF Chief of Staff.
Kibassa Maliba, Frederic Former DRC Minister of Mines.
Leader of the state authorised
wing of the UDPS.
Kibonge, Mulomba (Colonel) MLC Defence Secretary.
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Kifwa, Celestin DRC National Police Chief (See
Appendix D).
Kony, Joseph Leader of the rebel Ugandan
Lords Resistance Army (LRA).
Lendu Eastern Congo ethnic group
that has been embroiled in
bloodletting against the Hema.
Lumumba, Francois Leader of MNC/L party.
Currently resides in Belgium.
Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement Signed by the DRC war
combatants – five foreign
states, Congo’s government
and rebels - in July and August
1999.
Mahachi, Moven Zimbabwe Defence Minister.
Mai Mai Traditional militias found in the
Eastern DRC.
Makoni, Simba Finance Minister of Zimbabwe.
Mamba, Mashako (Doctor) DRC Health Minister.
Mandela, Nelson Former President of South
Africa and current Burundi
Peace Negotiations’ Facilitator.
Masire, Sir Ketumile Former President of Botswana
and OAU appointed Inter-
Congolese Dialogue Neutral
Facilitator.
Mazimpaka, Patrick Rwandan Presidential Envoy to
the Great Lakes.
Mbemba, Theophile Governor of Kinshasa. Once a
key intellectual and strategist
in the UDPS.
Mbia, Albert MLC Secretary of the
Economy.
Mbombo, Catherine Nzuzi Wa Current leader of Mobutu’s
MPR party.
Mchaka Mchaka The name of the ideological
program employed by the
Ugandan National Resistance




Miranda, Joao Bernardo Angolan Foreign Minister.
Mocumbi, Pascoal Prime Minister of Mozambique.
Mongole Combatants A Hutu militia formed in the
early 1990s to defend the
interests of the North Kivu
Banyarwanda.
Monsengwo Pasinya, Laurent (Cardinal) He presided over the
Sovereign National
Conference, would probably be
called upon to contribute to a
Dialogue.
MONUC United Nations Organisation.
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Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo created
in August 1999 and authorised
to deploy 5,537 observers and




DRC opposition party that
originated with Patrice
Lumumba’s MNC party.
Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution
(MPR)
Mobutu’s governing party. Its
current leader is Catherine
Nzuji Wa Mbombo.








MPLA Angolan ruling party.
Mpoyo, Pierre Victor DRC Petroleum Minister.
Muamba, Francois MLC Finance Secretary.
Mugabe, Robert President of Zimbabwe.
Mulumba, Kin Kiey RCD-Goma Official
Spokesman. Was Mobutu’s last
Minister of Information, and is
President of the Brussels
based Le Soft Newspaper.
Museveni, Yoweri President of Uganda.
National Army for the Liberation of
Uganda (NALU)
National Army for the
Liberation of Uganda. A
clandestine and largely
defeated guerrilla force.
National Resistance Movement (NRM) Yoweri Museveni’s political-
military group created in the
bush war in the early 1980s
that became the government
army after he took power.
Nawej, Yav (Brigadier General) Commander of the FAC
Kinshasa Brigade.
Ndombasi, Yerodia Abdoulaye Former DRC Foreign Affairs
Minister. Current Minister for
Education.
Ngoma, Arthur Zahidi Long-time opposition
politician, and leader of the
Force du Futur party. Was a
founding member of the RCD,
but subsequently quit the
movement.
Ntaganda, Bosco A Hema militia leader who is
alleged to have received
support from UPDF officers.
Nyamwisi, Mbusa Former First Vice President of
the RCD-ML and, from
November 2000, self-declared
President.
Nyarugabo, Moise Former RCD-Goma Second
Vice President, and still on of
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the Movement’s senior leaders.
Odongo, Jeje (Major General) UPDF Chief of Staff.
Olenghankoy, Joseph Leader of FONUS party.
Onusumba, Adolphe President of RCD-Goma since
October 2000. Previous to he
served as the movement’s
Foreign Minister.
Oryx Diamonds Zimbabwean-Omani-DRC
mining consortium that failed
to gain a London Stock
Exchange listing in mid-2000.
Osleg (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy) Zimbabwean Army company
engaged in buying diamonds
in the DRC.
Padiri Karendo Bulenda Bunyakiri-based Mai Mai
leader. Appointed a FAC
Commander in September
1999.
Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien
(PDSC)
DRC opposition party that
enjoys considerable support
among intellectuals but has
less nationwide appeal than
the UDPS. Like Tshisekedi, its
leaders and had served in
governments under Mobutu.
Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU) Party formed in 1964 by
Antoine Gizenga, minister in
Lumumba’s government.
Ramm, Colette Official spokeswomen for
Wamba’s faction of RCD-ML.
RCD Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Démocratie or the
Congolese Rally for
Democracy.
RCD Kisangani or ML faction Faction of RCD that followed
Wamba dia Wamba when he
split from the Goma based
RCD in March 1999.
Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) The army of Rwanda.
Originally created as a guerrilla
movement to fight the former
Hutu government between
1990-94.
Saleh, Salim (Major General) President Yoweri Museveni’s
brother and former Minister of
State for Defence.
Saolona, Bemba The father of Jean-Pierre
Bemba, and former Minister
under both Mobutu and Kabila.
Savimbi, Jonas Leader of the Angolan rebel
movement UNITA.
She Okitundu, Léonard DRC Human Rights Minister.
Sikatende, Shabani A Mai Mai leader. Appointed a
FAC Commander in September
1999.
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Silwamba, Eric Zambian Presidential Affairs
Minister.
SONANGOL Angolan state oil company.
Involved in DRC oil exploration
and distribution.
Sovereign National Conference of 1991 DRC’s 18-month constitutional
talks conducted under the
aegis of then President
Mobutu Sese Seko, who later
sabotaged the process.
Tambwe, Alexis A founding member of the
RCD.
Mbeki, Thabo President of the Republic of
South Africa.
Tous pour la Paix et le Développement
(TPD).
North Kivu NGO involved in
the repatriation of Hutu and
Tutsi refugees.
Tshisekedi, Etienne Leader of the UDPS. DRC’s
best-known opposition
politician.
Uganda People’s Defence Forces
(UPDF)
 The army of Uganda.
Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA)
Angolan rebel movement led
by Jonas Savimbi.
Wamala, Katumba (Brigadier) Overall Commander of the
UPDF operations in Congo
after July 2000.
Wamba dia Wamba, Ernest Embattled leader of Bunia
based RCD-ML that broke
away from the main RCD
faction in March 1999.
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) A largely defunct Ugandan
rebel group.
ZANU-PF Zimbabwean ruling party.
Zimbabwean Electricity Supply Authority
(ZESA)
Zimbabwean state power




•  Appendix B: Chronology of the War in the DRC
2 August 1998 Second rebellion in the DRC breaks out.
6 August-1
September 1998
Rebels and Rwandans seize Kitona, and move on Kinshasa.
Zimbabwe and Angola intervene to save Kabila from being
overthrown, and beat back the rebels and their allies from the
capital city. In Kinshasa anti-Tutsi massacres break out.
23 August 1998 Rebels and Rwandans seize Kisangani.
October 1998 Growing international pressure on Rwanda to “admit its role” in
DRC.
27 October 1998 Zambian President Frederick Chiluba mandated to press on with
peace initiative to end the war after consultations between regional
foreign and defense ministers.
November 1998 New rebel group, the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
(MLC), reported in Equateur province. Its leader is Jean-Pierre
Bemba, son of leading businessman Bemba Saolona who was close
to ex-president Mobutu.
6 November 1998 Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame admits Rwandan troops
helping DRC rebels, citing security concerns. Reports say he acceded
to a request by South African President Nelson Mandela to admit
involvement in a bid to advance peace talks.
1 January 1999 RCD claims they killed 400 Hutu rebel militiamen in three days of
fighting at Makobola near Uvira. Missionary news service report that
hundreds of civilians shot and hacked to death.
18 January 1999 Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola agree on cease-
fire at Windhoek meeting. RCD not invited, but promises to examine
text.
22 January 1999 RCD restructures movement. General assembly enlarged from 28 to
147 members, including 22 military personnel. Executive committee
comprises 23 departments, up from eight. Ten-man political council
created to head the movement. General assembly urges better
cohesion between political and military wings.
30 January 1999 Cracks appear in RCD. Non-Tutsi Congolese members query why
Banyamulenge "hold so many posts" in new set-up. Belgian daily Le
Soir describes the new "political mixture" in the RCD as "explosive".
RCD leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba reportedly at odds with his
deputy chairman of the RCD, describing its Members as "petty
puppets".
25 February 1999 UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in DRC, Roberto Garreton,
urges international community to take action against Tutsis detained
in Kinshasa, expressing concern for their safety.
5 March 1999 Missionaries claim 100 people killed in RCD reprisal attack at
Kamituga in South Kivu. RCD denies the allegations.
9 March 1999 Rebels confirm strategic town of Kindu is under their control.
22 March 1999 Southern African Development Community (SADC) reaffirms support
for Kabila, at meeting in Botswana, but expresses concern over
continuing destabilization of the region.
3 April 1999 Kagame vows to keep his troops in DRC as long as Rwanda’s
national security is threatened.
5 April 1999 Tension increases within RCD, as Wamba moves his base from
Goma to Kisangani.  Disagreement between RCD and MLC in
Kisangani also intensifies.
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18 April 1999 Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, and Kabila sign cease-fire
accord in Sirte, Libya, through the mediation of Libyan leader
Colonel Muammaar Gaddafi. Both the RCD and Rwanda refuse to be
bound by the agreement.
20 April 1999 Kabila announces dissolution of ADFL, which swept him to power in
1997, accusing some members of “opportunism” and “self-
enrichment”.
4 May1999 Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, spearheading peace efforts for
the DRC, “agrees to work” with Gaddafi to implement Sirte accord.
Rwanda says it only recognizes the Chiluba peace initiative.
Presidents of Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania meet in Dodoma to
discuss growing rift between Ugandan and Rwandan military
campaigns in DRC.
7 May 1999 Outbreak of a hemorrhagic fever in rebel-held Watsa, possibly due
to Marburg virus. WHO confirms Ebola virus not present. First ever
flight between Kinshasa and rebel-held territory since the conflict
began, lands in Goma bringing medical experts.
11 May 1999 Over 40 killed and 50 wounded in bombing of Goma by Government
and its allies. The aircraft then went on to bomb Uvira, killing two.
15 May 1999 Details of Sirte accord released, in which Kabila reportedly agrees to
“direct talks” with the rebels. He previously resisted all attempts to
meet the RCD.
16 May 1999 Disaffection within the RCD reaches its peak as Wamba ousted, and
Emile Ilunga announced as the new leader. Wamba refuses to step
down, saying he is the victim of a “coup” within the rebel
movement.
17 May1999 Kabila celebrates two years in power with a lackluster ceremony and
“forced parade”.
23 May 1999 Rival RCD factions clash in Kisangani. Rwanda and Uganda deny
reports of a split.
26 May 1999 Chad, which supported Kabila, withdraws troops from Equateur
province “in line with the Sirte agreement”.
29 May 1999 Rwanda declares unilateral cease-fire in DRC.
2 June 1999 Uvira and Bukavu airport bombed by Government forces.
3 June 1999 RCD issues statement explaining that Wamba’s leadership style had
resulted in a "series of crises " within the movement. It announces
new structures, including a Congress, Council and an Executive with
the latter two headed by the same person, DR. Emile Ilunga. The
now-defunct General Assembly decamps to Kisangani in a show of
support for Wamba.
7 June 1999 Journalists confirm that Kabila’s hometown of Manono, in Katanga
province, is under rebel control.
8 June 1999 Rebel factions meet in Uganda, along with Rwanda, Uganda and
Tanzania, to try and iron out differences and form a united front
against Kabila.
10 July 1999 Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe, and the Minister of Defence of Angola sign an
Agreement for a cessation of hostilities between all belligerent
forces in the DRC. Representatives of the RCD and MLC refuse to
sign.
15 July 1999 RPA forces cross the Sankuru River, capture the East Kasai town of
Lusambo, and advance to with 50 km of Mbuji Mayi. The UN
Secretary General issues report on the United Nations Preliminary
Deployment to the DRC.
1 August 1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba signs the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement.
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7 August 1999 Fighting between the RPA and UPDF first breaks out in the
Northeastern city of Kisangani over an attempt by then Ugandan-
supported RCD dissident, Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, to
hold a political rally.
14 August 1999 Renewed violence breaks out in Kisangani, followed by three days of
clashes in which the two armies battled for the airport, the central
bank and the major road junctions.
17 August 1999 Rwanda and Uganda agreed on a temporary cease-fire. The fighting
had caused approximately 600 casualties.
31 August 1999 50 Representatives of the RCD sign the Lusaka Cease-fire
agreement.
September 1999 Intensification of militia activities in South Kivu.
1 October 1999 RCD Kisangani moves its headquarters to Bunia.
October 1999 DRC Government launches offensive against the MLC in the vicinity
of Mbandaka that lasts till mid December.
11-12 October
1999
First meeting of the JMC occurs in Kampala.
15 October 1999 First meeting of the Political Committee in Lusaka. Expresses
concern about the “slow pace at which the United Nations was
handling the request for the deployment of peacekeepers in the
Democratic Republic of Congo” and calls on it to address the
situation “with the urgency and seriousness it deserves.”
23 - 24 October
1999
The third and final round of polio immunizations carried out in the
DRC.
1 November 1999 Secretary General issues a second report on the United Nations
Preliminary Deployment in the DRC.
November 1999 At mid month 15 Congolese women accused of aiding the Mai-Mai
are allegedly buried alive at Mwenga in South Kivu.
November 1999 FAC and ZNDF forces attempt to advance from Basankusu to relieve
the siege of Ikela. The attempt fails.
3-10 November
1999
Special Envoy of the Secretary General for the peace process in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Moustapha Niasse, visits Kinshasa to
discuss the difficulties experienced by MONUC in positioning liaison
officers at rear military headquarters, as well as the freedom of
movement for the operations of the technical survey team.
30 November 1999 Security Council decides that the personnel authorized under
Resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999) should constitute MONUC
until 1 March 2000.
9 December 1999 ADF guerrillas attack Fort Portal Prison in Southwest Uganda.
10 December 1999 Government of the DRC declares a moratorium on Capital
Punishment on the occasion of the 51st Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the Military Court of
Justice continues to sentence prisoners to death and conduct
executions.
11 December 1999 Kamel Morjane of Tunisia assumes his duties as the UN Secretary
General’s Special Representative in Kinshasa. On the same day he
meets with US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, who was
on a tour of the sub-region.
14 December 1999 A rebel massacre of 23 women and children alleged to have
occurred near the town of Kalima, North East of Kindu. Victims were
accused of complicity with the Mai Mai.
15 December 1999 OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim, announces the
appointment of former Botswana President, Sir Ketumile Masire, as
‘Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations’.
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16 December 1999 UN Security Council briefed by Undersecretary General for
Peacekeeping Bernard Miyet. Informed that the detailed Concept of
Operations plan for MONUC is impossible to carry out until the
mission’s observers are guaranteed full security and freedom of
movement. US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, says the
US supports the operation, but wants to “get it right.”
17 December 1999 Government of the DRC frees 156 political prisoners. The majority
are activists of PALU or the UDPS.
22 December 1999 UN Secretary General writes to Chairman and Secretary general of
the OAU to urge the establishment of the JMC as a standing body.
29 December 1999 Government of the DRC accuses rebels of burying 15 women alive in
Kivu province under the suspicion that had ties with the Mai Mai.
January 2000 With his authority as Temporary Chairman to the Security Council,
US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke declares that the
month will be dedicated to Africa. A coordinated attack by
Interahamwe, Mai-Mai and some FAC commanders succeeded in
temporarily seizing Shabunda.
24 January 2000 Security Council Meeting on the Congo Peace Process. Kofi Annan
declares, “The entire sub region has been engulfed in a crisis of
such complexity that it continues to defy our best efforts to resolve
it… The Lusaka Agreement remains the most viable blueprint for
resolving grievances and achieving a comprehensive negotiated
solution.”
25 January 2000 UN Mini-summit in New York on the Congo Peace process.
27 January 2000 Masire presents his preliminary requirements for achieving his
mission as Neutral Facilitator to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue at a
donors meeting in New York. President Kabila declares his
willingness to participate in the dialogue, and meet with Masire.
28 January 2000 An investigation into the Mwenga massacre conducted by the DRC
branch of UNHCR. Investigation lasts till 15 February, and ascertains
that the event did in fact take place.
31 January 2000 Unrest breaks out in Goma and Bukavu, in which the local
population conducts strikes aimed at the RCD authorities until 6
February. These events prompt the RCD-Goma to refuse Archbishop
Kataliko permission to return to his parish in Bukavu.
February 2000 Fighting between the MLC and FAC continues around Mbandaka. At
Ikela, Zimbabwean, Namibian, and Congolese troops relieved the
siege of the city. Also clashes reported in the East between the
Rwandans and rebel forces.
15 February 2000 Holbrooke testifies to the House Committee on International
Relations Subcommittee on Africa: “The time has come for the
parties to realize the full potential of the Lusaka Agreement. And the
time has come for the US to lend its support.”
16 February 2000 US Secretary of Defence meets with current South African President
Thabo Mbeki in Pretoria, and promises to provide logistics support to




Masire visits Kinshasa, where he meets with Kabila, representatives
of civil society, the opposition, and the Secretary General’s Special
Representative.
17 February 2000 US President Bill Clinton addresses the opening of US National
Summit on Africa. About the Lusaka agreement, he says “it is more
than a cease-fire; it is a blueprint for building peace. Best of all, it is
a genuinely African solution to an African problem…. I have told our
congress that America intends to do its part by supporting the next
phase of the UN’s peacekeeping operation in the Congo, which will
APPENDIX B
send observers to oversee the implementation of the agreement.”
19 February 2000 Presidential Decree by Kabila on amnesty for political prisoners.
23 February 2000 Signatories of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement meet in Lusaka.
The group reaffirms its support for the agreement, welcomes the
imminent adoption of resolution 1291 (2000) by the Security
Council, and establishes a new implementation calendar for the
Lusaka process starting 1 March 2000.
24 February 2000 Security Council passes Resolution 1291 authorizing the expansion
of MONUC to 5537 military personnel and appropriate civilian staff.
Resolution also authorized a phased deployment of MONUC by the
Secretary General in accordance with specified prerequisite
conditions of security assurances.
March 2000 Banyamulenge inhabitants of the Haut-Plateau area, in the vicinity
of Fizi-Uvira, come under effective siege by the interahamwe and
Mai Mai forces.
12 March 2000 A 13 member ad-hoc commission (Commission ad hoc chargé de
veiller à la stricte application du décret) headed by the Minister of
Justice established to ensure the strict application of the DRC
Presidential decree on amnesty.
12 March 2000 Rwandans and RCD-Goma seize Idumbe as part of an offensive
launched Southwards and Westwards in Kasai province. Offensive
included attacks towards Longa, Lodi, and Bena Leka astride the
Ilebo-Kananga railroad. The Rwandans and RCD Goma also continue
efforts to cut off Kabinda and Mbuji-Mayi.
17 March 2000 Kamel Morjane met with J-P Bemba in Gbadolite, and with President
Ange-Félix Patassé of the Central African Republic.
20-22 march 2000 Masire visits Kinshasa, where he is prevented from traveling in the
interior of the country. He subsequently cuts short his visit.
29 March 2000 Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation in the DRC,
Roberto Garreton, submits his sixth report to the Commission on
Human Rights.
4 April 2000 JMC meets in Kampala to discuss a draft plan for the disengagement
of forces from the confrontation line.
7 April 2000 Security Council passes Resolution 54/260 grants commitment
authority for USD 200 million for MONUC in order to permit its
logistical preparations for phase II. Secretary General’s third report
on MONUC predicts that some US$58.7 million will be spent by 30
June 2000.
8 April 2000 Kampala disengagement plan signed by the Political Committee.
10 April 2000 Kabila held a special cabinet meeting and issued statement
reaffirming the government’s support for the inter-Congolese
dialogue.
14 April 2000 A series of explosions devastate Ndjili Airport in Kinshasa.
18 April 2000 Issue of second report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
21 April 2000 As per the Kampala agreement the parties required to provide
MONUC and the JMC with detailed military information, area by
area, for the planning on disengagement.
21 April 2000 Masire briefs the Security Council on the approach he intends to
follow in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
30 April 2000 OAU summit on the DRC convened in Algiers.
5 May 2000 Heavy fighting breaks out between the RPA and UPDF in Kisangani.
4 - 8 May 2000 Security Council mission, led by Holbrooke, visits Kinshasa, Lusaka,
Harare, Kigali, and Kampala.
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9 May 2000 The second outbreak of fighting between the RPA and UPDF in
Kisangani resumes.
12 May 2000 MONUC reinforcements arrive in Kisangani from Kinshasa.
14 May 2000 Presidents Museveni and Kagame meet in Mwanza, Tanzania. The
two reaffirm their willingness to demilitarise Kisangani.
11-21 May Masire travels to Kinshasa where he meets with Kabila. Then he
continues to meet RCD leaders in Goma, RCD-ML leaders in Bunia,
and MLC leaders at Gbadolite.
22 May 2000 RPA and UPDF Chiefs of Staff sign an agreement and calendar for
the demilitarisation of Kisangani.
23 May 2000 Jean-Pierre Bemba assures the Secretary General’s Special
Representative that his forces will halt their forward movement.
Nevertheless, their advance continues.
23- 24 May 2000 Masire returns to Kinshasa, where he meets with the Foreign
Minister instead of Kabila.
25 May 2000 DRC Government announces that they had launched a counter-
attack to stem the MLC’s advance.
28 May 2000 Museveni addresses Parliament on Uganda’s role in the DRC.
29 May 2000 Start of Kisangani demilitarisation.
31 May 2000 Bangboka airport in Kisangani re-opened to civilian flights.
3 June 2000 Kabila and Kagame meet at Eldoret, Kenya. End of demilitarisation
around Bangboka Airport and La Forestière (Zone 1) camp.
5 June 2000 Heavy fighting between RPA and UPDF breaks out in Kisangani.
UPDF crosses Tshopo River, and occupies Northern portion of the
city. Incident is the third outbreak of fighting between the two
countries.
MONUC observer team in Mbandaka requested to convey message
from government of the DRC to Bemba threatening to push back the
MLC forces if they did not withdraw to the positions they occupied at
the time of the Lusaka Agreement.
DRC government officials prevent representatives from civil society
and the unarmed opposition from leaving Kinshasa for Inter-
Congolese Dialogue meeting Cotonou.
7 June 2000 RPA asks MONUC to leave Kisangani because they are not able to
assure their security. MONUC Commander declines.
8 June 2000 A cease-fire is signed by the Ambassadors of Rwanda and Uganda
to the UN, scheduled to go into force at 1600 Kisangani time. Cease-
fire is not observed.
Holbrooke and Annan contact President’s Kagame and Museveni to
urge them to order an immediate cessation of hostilities and a
withdrawal of their respective forces from Kisangani.
The Political Committee meets in Lusaka to discuss preparations for
the meeting with the Security Council in New York on 15 and 16
June.
11 June 2000 Kisangani fighting comes to an end in early morning. MONUC
deploys to Tshopo Bridge between the two armies.
12 June 2000 Third Report of the Secretary General on MONUC.
12 June 2000 Ugandan forces reported to have withdrawn northwards from
Kisangani.
9-14 June 2000 A series of violent demonstrations, involving several hundred people,
takes place outside of MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa. Protests
are intended to criticize the UN’s supposed inaction during the
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fighting in Kisangani. Demonstrations occurred on the 9th, 10th, and
14th.
15 June 2000 Open meeting on the situation in the Congo. Holbrooke states “the
Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement is one of the few things standing
between order in the DRC and its degeneration to war-lord
dominated, resource driven satrapies.”
16 June 2000 UN Security Council passes Resolution 1304 Condemning Rwanda
and Uganda for their actions in Kisangani.
16 June 2000 The UN Security Council approves Resolution 1304 calling upon
Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw from the DRC.
30 June 2000 DRC celebrates its fortieth anniversary since independence.
Promises to inaugurate Constituent Assembly on 1 July.
4 July 2000 OAU mini-summit in Algiers.
19 July 2000 Uganda appoints Brigadier Edward Katumba Walumba as overall
Commander of Operation Safe Haven – the UPDF operation in the
DRC. He replaces UPDF Chief of Staff, Brigadier James Kazini.
24 July 2000 RCD Government of Kisangani replaced because of popular
dissatisfaction in the city.
27 July 2000 Fighting reportedly intensifies at Ikela.
1 August 2000 Interahamwe attack on Ruhengeri Commune in Rwanda.
7 August 2000 SADC summit meeting in Windhoek Namibia. DRC president Kabila
does not attend because he is ‘busy’.
9 August 2000 MLC forces decisively repulse FAC advance northwards along the
Ubangui River near Libenge. The ‘high-tide mark’ of Kabila’s
Equateur Offensive.
9 August 2000 The Rwandan Government announces that it is willing to withdraw
200 km from the current DRC frontlines, rather than the 15 km
called for in the Kampala Disengagement Plan of 8 April 2000.
10 August 2000 RCD-Goma rebel movement announces that it is willing to withdraw
200 km alongside its Rwandan supporters.
14-15 August 2000 All night summit in Lusaka between the warring parties, minus the
rebels, breaks down in acrimony as Kabila maintains his rejection of
Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile
Masire.
16 August 2000 UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, recommends a one-month
extension of the MONUC mandate.
21 August 2000 Kabila swears in constituent and legislative assembly in
Lumumbashi. He says the body is not a ‘sham’.
22 August 2000 Former Nigerian President, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, arrives in
Kinshasa as the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for the DRC,
and meets with Kabila.
23 August 2000 DRC Government officially ‘suspends’ the Lusaka Agreement, and
then authorizes the deployment of MONUC observers to monitor the
cease-fire. The Security Council extends the MONUC mandate until
October 15.
28 August 2000 A grenade attack at a social gathering in Bukavu leaves seven dead
and 43 injured. The authorities blame forces loyal to the Kabila
government of using terrorist tactics. Bukavu civil society blames
Rwanda and the RCD of the same thing.
11 October 2000 Museveni hosts reconciliation conference between rival RCD-ML
leaders Wamba and Nyamwisi in State House.
28 October 2000 RCD-Goma President Dr. Emile Ilunga resigns from the Movement’s
top post. Is reported to have recognized the ‘mistakes of his
leadership’. His two Vice Presidents, Jean-Pierre Ondekane and
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Moise Nyarugabo, also resign. The new President, Adolph
Onusumba, reshuffles the rebel cabinet.
5 November 2000 Forces loyal to renegade RCD-ML First Vice President Nyamwisi
launch a coup attempt against movement president Wamba dia
Wamba. The attempt fails.
8 November 2000 Talks in Tripoli, Libya, conclude with decision to send an African
peacekeeping force to the DRC. The summit was attended by the
Heads of State of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Mali, as well as
representatives from Angola, the DRC, Namibia and South Africa.
14 November 2000 South African President Thabo Mbeki cancels his trip to Maputo
Mozambique, where he had been scheduled to lead a second round
of discussions on the DRC conflict.
15 November 2000 DRC Government defers the introduction of new rules requiring
import taxes and a number of other government fees to be paid in
foreign currency. The measure had threatened to paralyse the
Congolese economy, cause a shortage of basic goods, and
contribute to inflation.
16 November 2000 Tension in Bunia is reported to be ‘very high’. Nyamwisi orders
Wamba to leave the town within the week. Wamba says that it is
out of the question for him to leave the people of Bunia to this fate.
16 November 2000 Fighting reported in the vicinity of Pepa. RPA and RCD reported to
be advancing on the town.
27 November 2000 South African President Thabo Mbeki convenes a second summit in
Maputo Mozambique, to review progress on the implementation of
the Kampala Disengagement Plan. Summit breaks down in
arguments between the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, and the
DRC.
29 November 2000 DRC President Kabila says UN demands for freedom of movement in
the DRC for MONUC amount to a denial of national sovereignty.
29 November 2000 Political Committee overseeing the Lusaka Peace Process meets in
Lusaka and calls on the UN to increase its military presence in the
DRC, to take advantage of the renewed commitment by the parties
to pull back their forces.
30 November 2000 Acting UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Carolyn McAskie, briefs the
Security Council on the situation in the DRC, which she describes as
“one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.”
4 December 2000 An Antonov Transport Aircraft owned by the Great Lakes Company
is hijacked while enroute from Goma to Kindu. Hijackers demand
that the plane be flown to Government controlled territory. The
attempt fails when an RCD Commander on the plane fatally shoots
one of the hijackers in the neck.
4 December 2000 RPA and RCD forces seize Pweto. Tens of thousands civilians
resident in the region flee towards Zambia. Several thousand
Government and allied troops accompany them. DRC Government
calls the retreat a ‘tactical withdrawal’. Zimbabwe Government
explains that their forces had pulled back in order not to violate the
Lusaka Cease-fire.
8 December 2000 The International Court of Justice refuses to order the suspension of
an international arrest warrant issued by Belgium against the former
Foreign Minister of the DRC, Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi, for his
role in the August 1998 massacres of Tutsis in Kinshasa. The DRC
Government had complained that the warrant prevented Yerodia
from traveling, and therefore, from doing his job as Foreign Minister.
The World Court however, ruled that the recent Cabinet reshuffle
that transferred him to the Ministry of Education invalidated the
appeal.
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14 December 2000 The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1332 extending by six months
the mandate of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC), and agreing to a proposal by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to
increase the number of military observers monitoring the disengagement
of forces from confrontation lines. It gave qualified support to the idea of
sending infantry units to the DRC’s eastern border with Rwanda, agreeing
to support Annan on the matter "as soon as he considers that conditions
allow it".
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Appendix C: The Balance of Conventional Military Forces251
Angola: Forcas Armadas Angolanas (FAA)
Numbers Total Armed Forces 107,500
Army 100,000
Navy 1,500-2,000
Air Force/Air Defence 6,000
Paramilitary 15,000
Rapid Reaction Police 15,000
Only 2,000 -2,500 second echelon
troops deployed to DRC. Most are
thought to be in Mbuji Mayi,
Mbandaka, and in the western DRC
near Matadi.
Organization 35 Regiments including both infantry
and armoured. Strength and quality
vary.
Equipment








100 X BTR-60/-80/-152 APC
400 BMP 1/2





100mm SU-100 assault guns
(quantity unknown)
50 X BM-21 122mm multiple rocket
launchers
40 X 122mm RM-70
240 mm BM-24 (some)
250 X 82mm mortars
40 + 120mm M-43 mortars









40 X ZSU-57-2 SP (wheeled)
20 ZSU-23-4 SP (tracked)
Surface to Air Missile
Systems







10 X SA-13 (mostly unservicible)
Missiles Include
Air to Surface: HOT, AT-2 Swatter
Air to Air: AA-2 Atoll










9 X PC 7/9
3 X Cessna 172
6 X Yak-11
Emb-312
                                        
251 Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS), London, The Military Balance
(1997-98, 1998-1999, 2000-2001). Specific numbers are the most recent given.
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Maritime Reconnaissance 2 X EMB-111
1 X F-27 MPA
! X King Air B-200B







8 X AN-12 (leased from the Ukraine)
2 X Il –76 (leased from the Ukraine)
Combat Helicopters 15 X Mi-25/35
5 X SA-365M gunships
6 X SA-342 with HOT anti
vehicle/personnel rockets
14 Mi-24B
Transport Helicopters 8 X AS-565
30 X IAR-316
25 X Mi-8/17
Naval Ships 4 X Mandume Type 31.6m PCI
3 X Patrulheiro PCI
1 X SS-C-1 Sepal
1 X Sov Yevgenya (counter mine)
1 XSov Polnochny LSM,( Amphibious
TroopsTransport with capacity 100
tps, 6 tanks)
Many ships are non-
operational.
Congo-Kinshasa: Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)
Numbers 55,000 Army
Organization 10 + Infantry Brigades
1 X Presidential Guard Brigade
1 X Mechanized Infantry Brigade
1 X Commando Brigade (reported)
Specialized Units Some specialised units reportedly trained
by ZNDF and North Koreans
Equipment
Main battle Tanks 20 X Chinese type 59 (being
refurbished)
40 X Chinese type 62
Armoured Fighting
Vehicles
30 X Panhard AML 60
30 X Panhard AML 90
12 X M113
12 X YW-531
60 X Panhard M-3
Some Casspir, Wolf Turbo 2, and Fahd
APC
Artillery 30 X M116 75mm Pack howitzers
20 X Chinese Type 56 85mm field guns
20 X  M-1938 D-30 122mm
15 X Chinese Type 60 122mm field guns
8 X Chinese Type 59 130mm gun-
howitzers
20 X Chinese Type 63 107mm multiple
rocket launchers
10 X BM-21 122mm multiple rocket
launchers
81 mm mortars (quantity unknown)
107mm M-30 mortars (quantity unknown)
50 X 120mm Brandt
Anti Tank 57mm M-18 recoiless rifles (quantity
unknown)
75mm M-20 recoiless rifles (quantity
unknown)
106mm M-40A1 recoiless rifles (quantity
unknown)
Air Defence 14.5 mm ZPU-4




Aircraft Few aircraft remain servicible.
10 SU-25 reported as on order
Naval Ships 4 X Chinese Shanghai II PCC (most non
operational)
2 X Swiftships PCI
6 X Armed Boats (most non operational)
Zimbabwe: Zimbabwean National Defence Force (ZNDF)
Numbers Total Active 40,000
Army 35,000
4,000 Air Force
Police 19,500 (incl Air Wg)
Police Support Unit 2,300
Organization 5 X Brigades HQ1 Mechanized Brigade
1 Artillery Brigade
1 Presidential Guard Group
1 Armoured Squadron
18 X Infantry Battalions including
2 X Presidential Guard
Battalions
1 X Mechanized Battalion
1 X Commando Battalions
1 X Parachute Battalions
2 X Field Artillery Regiment
1 X Engineer Regiment
1 X Air Defence Regiment










Main Battle Tanks 22 X Chinese type 59
10 X Chinese type 69
Armoured Fighting
Vehicles
20 X Eland 60/90 armoured
cars
90 X EE-9 Cascavel with 90mm
guns





Artillery 4 X Chinese Type 54 122mm field
guns
12 X Chinese Type 60 122mm field
guns
18 X Chinese Type 63 107mm multiple
rocket launchers
52 X RM-70 122 mm multiple rocket
launchers
502 X 81/82mm mortars
14 X M-43 120mm mortars





Aircraft 2 X Ground Attack Squadrons with




1 with 8 X Hawk (MK-60/MK-60A) (2
servicible)
1 X Fighter Squadron with
12 X Chinese F-7
(MiG 21) (9
servicible)
1 X Recce Squadron with
14 X Reims-Cessna 337
Lynx
1 X Transport Squadron
Servicibility rates are




8 X C 212-200(1 VIP)
1 X Trainning/Reconaissance/Liason
Squadron with
22 X SF-260 Genet(9-C, 6-F,
5-W, 2 TP)
1 X Helicopter Squadrons
2 X As 532 UL(VIP)
10 X AB-412





Namibia: The Namibian Defence Force (NDF)
Numbers Army 9,000, Coast Guard 100
Organization 6 X Infantry Battalions1 X Combat Support brigade with
1 X Artillery Regiment
1 X Air Defence Regiment
1 X Anti-Tank Regiment
1,600 - 2,000 troops deployed
to the DRC with
1 X Artillery battery
2 X Infantry battalions





20 X Casspir APC
30 X Wolf APC
10 X BTR 60
Artillery 8 X 88mm field guns24 X 140mm G-2 gun-howitzers




Anti Tank B10 82mm recoilless guns (some)57mm anti-tank guns (some)
M1942 76mm ZIS-3 anti-tank guns
(some)
Air Defence 50 X 14.5mm ZPU-415 X 23 mm Zumlac (ZU-23-2)
50 X SA-7
Aircraft 1 X Falcon 9001 X Learjet 36
5 X Cessna 337/02-A
2 X Y-12
1 X F406 Caravan (maritime patrol)
2 X SA-319 Alouette helicopters
Servicibility rates are likely to be low
Naval Ships 1 X Oryx PCO1 X Osprey PCC
Rwanda: Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)




17,000 – 20,000are in the DRC
Organization 6 X Brigades1 Mechanized Infantry regiment









16 X RG-31 Nyala
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Aircraft 1 BN-2A Islander2 + Mi-24 helicopters
4 X MI-17 MD helicopters
Uganda: Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF)
Numbers Army 50,000 – 60,000Presidential Protection Unit 2,000
Air Force 800
Local Defence Forces 15,000
Border Defence Unit 600
Marines 400
Organization 4 X Army Divisions (2 with 3, 2 with 4brigades)
12 X Brigades with
12 X Infantry Battalions
2 X Armour Companies
2 X Artillery Batteries
2 X Air Defence Regiments
1 X Marine Battalion
Presidential Protection Unit
10,000 deployed to Congo
with most of its best personnel
and equipment
Main Battle Tanks 140 X T-54/5520 X PT-76 Light Tanks
Armoured Fighting
Vehicles
40 X Eland armoured cars
60 X Ferret armoured cars
12 X BTR 60
4 X OT-64 SKOT
20 Mamba APC
20 X Buffel APC
Artillery 60 X 76mm M-194220 X 122mm M-1938
12 X 130mm M46
4 X G5 155mm
122mm BM-21 multiple rocket
launchers (quantity unknown)
L-16 81mm mortars (quantity
unknown)
M-43 82mm mortars (quantity
unknown)
60 X Soltam 120mm mortars
Anti Tank 40 X AT3 Sagger
Air Defence 48 X 14.5mm ZPU-1/2/420 X 23mm ZU-23 (towed)
 20 X 37mm M-1939
SA-7 (quantity unknown)
Aircraft 7 X MiG-21 bis Fishbed-N (5-MF, 2UTI)
3 X Mi-24 attack helicopters
3 X Mi-17 assault helicopters
3 X Bell 206 transport helicopter
2 X Bell 412 transport helicopter
1 X Jet Ranger police helicopter
However the UPDF has not yet
trained pilots the fly the five
upgraded MiG-21.
Boats 8 riverine patrol craft, plus boats
Burundi: Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB)
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Numbers Army 45,500; Air Force 100
Specialized Units Parachute BattalionCommando Battalion
Organization 7 X Infantry Battalions
2 X Light Armoured battalions
1 X Engineer Battalion
1 X Artillery Battalion
1 X Air Defence Battery
10 X battalions of Reserves (reported)
Armoured Fighting
Vehicles
6 X AML 60 (Recce)
12 X AML 90 (Recce)
9 X Panhard M-3 APC
7 X Shorland SB-301 Armoured car
30 X BRDM-2 (quantity unknown)
20 X BTR-40 APC
Artillery 18 X M116 75mm field gun18 X D-30 122 mm (quantity
unknown)
100 + mortars incl
 M-43 type 82mm mortar
120 mortar (type unknown)
12 X 122mm BM-21multiple rocket
launchers (quantity unknown)
Anti Tank 15 X 75mm Chinese Type
52recoilless rifles
83mm: Blindicide
Air Defence 15 X 14.5mm ZPU-4
23mm ZU-23 (quantity unknown)
18 X 37mm Type 54
SA-7
Fixed Wing Aircraft 4 X SF 260W T/P
2 DC-3 Transports
Helicopter 2 X SA 342 L Gazelle
3 X SA-316B
2 X Mi-8
Boats 4 X Huchuan PRC Type 026




APPENDIX D: Who’s Who in the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC)
 (Except where noted, all the military commanders have occupied their current posts at least since September 1999.)
Minister of Defence President Kabila
Minister Delegate of Defence Tchamlesso A comrade of Kabila’s for
many years, he took part in
Kabila’s Parti de Revolution
Populaire (PRP) guerrillas in
South Kivu. A native of the
region, he has a reputation
for implacable hostility
against Tutsis. He was
appointed in November 2000
Vice-Minister of Defence Major General Dieudonné
Kayembe
A Luba from Kasai, and ex-
FAZ officer. He served a long
prison term under Mobutu
for suspected disloyalty.
Minister for Reconstruction
and Commander of National
Service Corps
Major General Denis Kalume
Numbi
A Luba from Maniema, and
ex-FAZ officer. Served a long
prison term under Mobutu
for suspected disloyalty.





A Bembe from South Kivu. A
long time Mai-Mai leader,
involved in guerrilla
resistance to Mobutu since
1969. According to one
accounts he was also a FAZ
officer. He is an old man and
was probably appointed
because of his political status
among the Mai-Mai. Not
clear how much he was
involved in Kabila’s PRP.
Commander of Land Forces Major General Joseph Kabila. The President’s (eldest?)
son. His mother is reputedly
a Rwandan Tutsi. Too young
to have seen much service
before the mid-1990s. Has
spent most of his life outside
Congo.
Commander of the Naval
Force
Major General Liwanga Mata. From Equateur. Ex-FAZ
officer.
Commander of the Air Force Major General Faustin
Munene
From Bandundu. Said to be
the son of Pierre Mulele, a
revolutionary leader in the
1960s. If so, his father and
his mother were executed
and mutilated by Mobutu’s
forces. Brought up in Angola,
where he rose to a high rank
in the Angolan army. Related
by marriage to President
Eduardo Dos Santos.
Munene was one of the
commanders of the so-called
‘Katangan Gendarmes’, some
of whom are descendants of
Congolese who fled to
Angola after the Katanga
Secession.
(Some of the Katangan
Gendarmes have military
experience, but for others
the label is more political).
He was commander in chief
of the armed forces until
September 1999. Has been
arrested and severely
humiliated by Kabila on
several occasions. Also
rumoured to have survived
several assassination
attempts in the past two
years. Seen as a threat to
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Kabila. Has nevertheless
remained the Head of the Air
Command because of his
close links with the
Angolans. Said to have a
bitter distrust of westerners
due to his parents’ fate.
COMMANDERS OF MILITARY REGIONS




A Mai-Mai leader from Kivu
or Maniema, probably
operating in the east.
Commands the allegiance of
one ‘wing’ of the Mai-Mai






Said to be an ex-‘Katangan
Gendarme’. Probably from
east DRC.




Possibly an ex-FAZ. Probably
from east DRC.
4th Region (Katanga) Brigadier General John
Numbi
Said to be ex Katangan
Gendarme. He was a
Politician and organiser of
the JUFERI a youth
movement that followed the
populist Katangan politician
Kyungu wa Kumanza, who
incited the expulsion of
Kasaiens from Katanga in
1990s. Numbu is a
mulubakat, (same tribe as
the President).
5th Region (Equateur) Brigadier General Kisempia
Songilanga
From either Bas-Congo or
Katanga. He replaced
Brigadier General Jean-Leon
Mabila, also a Katangan,
who was blamed for
incompetence and military
reverses in Equateur.
Kisempia is an ex-FAZ




6th Region (Kasai Occidental
and Bandundu)
Brigadier General Felix Mbusa
Mabe
From Equateur. A colonel in
the ex-FAZ. Imprisoned
under Mobutu.
7th Region (Kinshasa) Brigadier General Jean Yav
Nawej
From South Katanga. A
Lunda. Elderly. Ex-Katangan
Gendarme. Said to be
related to the President.
8th Region (Bas-Congo) Brigadier General Marcelin
Lukama
Ex-FAZ officer. From Kasai
Oriental.
Commander of the National
Police including the Police
d’Intervention Rapide (PIR)
Celestin Kifwa Kifwa was Commander in
Chief of the armed forces at
the outbreak of the rebellion,
but was replaced by the
more experienced Munene. A
so-called Katangan
Gendarme, Kifwa is
apparently a Mulubakat, and
married to the President’s
elder sister.
Second in command of the
Force d’Intervention pour la
Capitale (FIC)
Jean-Claude Kifwa Celestin Kifwa’s son and
Kabila’s nephew. Also called
Cmdt ‘Tango-Tango’. Second
in Command of the FIC, but
is said to be the more active
commander.
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APPENDIX E: Who’s Who Among Interahamwe Military Commanders
Function Name Location




















? Major Makilo ?
Interahamwe Command Structure in the Kivus






Cmdr 1st Division Colonel Bemera
(formerly Maj Haguma)
North Kivu
2 I/C 1st Division Colonel Mutabazi North Kivu
Brigade Limpopo












Bn Toro Cmdr Captain Sindi Lukweti-Mutongo
2 I/C Captain Linani Lukweti-Mutongo
Bn Mbarara Cmdr Captain Fils Lukweti-Mutongo
Bn Abidjan Cmdr Captain Darious Lukweti-Mutongo
BRIGADE NIAMEY
Brigade Niamey Cmdr Colonel Kakeri Rutshuru
BRIGADE LILONGWE
Brigade Lilognwe Cmdr Colonel ‘Omega’ Katoye
2nd Division
Cmdr 2nd Division Colonel Mutabazi South Kivu
2 I/C 2nd Division Colonel Rwagakinga South Kivu
Cmdr Mobilization in
South Kivu
Major Mahoro South Kivu
Brigade Okapi Cmdr Major Mugabo South Kivu
Brigade ? South Kivu




Captain Saddam/Sadick Near Bukavu
Logistical Coordinator Commander Georges Near Bukavu
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A. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (Source: Reliefweb)
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B. The Kivus (Source: Reliefweb)
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